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04/11/2025
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[Decoding France] - A Season of Political Crises in France as Macron's Presidency Enters Its Endgame

[Decoding France] - A Season of Political Crises in France as Macron's Presidency Enters Its Endgame
 Blanche Leridon
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Directrice Exécutive, éditoriale et Experte Résidente - Démocratie et Institutions

It seems like every Sunday brings a new national drama in France this autumn. First, there are the political dramas, beginning with the appointment of Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s first government on Sunday, October 5-which fell the very next day, after becoming collateral damage from a power struggle on the right. The second Lecornu government was appointed on Sunday, October 12, but in a much more low-key manner this time-given how brief the first one was, caution prevailed. Following these two Sundays of political psychodrama, a different spectacle followed: the theft of the jewels from the Louvre’s Galerie d’Apollon, casting a harsh spotlight on security failures at one of the world’s most prestigious museums. Now, amid these political theatrics and a spectacular heist, a high-stakes budget debate is playing out in Parliament on a tight timetable-one that will tolerate no further government collapses. At this point, no one can guarantee that the budget will be approved-or that the jewels will be recovered! We look at how this may all unfold in this new installment of Decoding France.

Will Lecornu Manage to Get the Budget Through?

First, let’s look at the conditions under which the budget debate is taking place. What sets this budget debate apart is Lecornu’s declaration, when he was first appointed in early October, that he would refrain from using Article 49-3-a constitutional provision allowing the government to adopt a budget without a parliamentary vote. This mechanism has been used consistently since 2022. The decision to forego the use of this article is highly symbolic, as well as a bid to gain time. It is also highly transactional-and possibly now much regretted.

By renouncing Article 49-3, Lecornu not only dared to violate a political and partisan taboo but also-and perhaps most importantly-made a highly symbolic gesture. The renouncement of Article 49-3 wasn’t just something that his opponents-primarily the Parti Socialiste-had demanded but was called for by a broad swath of French citizens. During the debates about the controversial pension reforms in 2023, over two-thirds of French people saw the use of Article 49-3 as anti-democratic. The question, however, is whether it was wise for the new prime minister to handicap himself by discarding a constitutional tool from the outset when facing an ungovernable assembly and a lost majority. Midway through the debate, it appears that the prime minister may have made an error of judgment.

By renouncing Article 49-3, Lecornu not only dared to violate a political and partisan taboo but also-and perhaps most importantly-made a highly symbolic gesture.

Beyond the symbolic significance of the renunciation of Article 49-3, it is also a way to play for time. The pledge not to use 49-3 signals to the public that a genuine parliamentary process is at work-an Assembly in full force, where committee work and floor debates are not merely theatrical, and the final act is not known in advance.

However, Lecornu did not abandon all of the "rationalized parliamentarism" methods that can be used to bypass parliamentary debate:

  • Article 47-3 allows government measures to take effect by ordinance if Parliament fails to act within seventy days-an expiration date that is now looming.
  • Article 44-3 allows for a "blocked vote" procedure-that is, the government asks for a vote on the entire bill, limiting amendments to those it proposes or accepts.
  • Article 40 prohibits the creation or aggravation of public expenditures unless offset by increased resources.

Renouncing 49-3 is also a strategic concession-a transactional gesture. The move is clearly aimed at the Socialist Party, which-just as it had done with pension reform suspension-made the renunciation of 49-3 a condition for not censoring the government. However, at this stage, the gesture is purely formal-it does not guarantee any substantive shift. As the debate shows, progress on substance is painful and partial; this is the theme of the next section.

Pension Reform and New Taxes: Where Do We Stand?

Having looked at the form of the budgetary debate, we turn to its substance. Examination of the revenue side of the state budget has begun in the National Assembly, while the social security budget is under review in committee. On the floor, tax burdens have increased markedly-with an estimated over €35 billion in new taxes-during review thanks to several amendments:

  • A new tax on "unproductive wealth": Targeting assets such as gold, collector cars, yachts, art, digital assets, and life insurance investments. Productive real estate and a primary residence up to €1 million are excluded. The original version of the bill provided for a single tax rate of 1 percent would replace the progressive rate ranging from 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent. This rate was to apply to unproductive capital starting from a new threshold of €2 million (as opposed to €1.3 million previously). After amendment, the single 1 percent rate is maintained, but the €2 million threshold is replaced by the already prevailing €1.3 million threshold. This expands the "IFI" (real estate wealth tax) that replaced the ISF in 2018, widening the base but reducing the rate by a third for the ultra-rich. It is not yet clear how much addition tax revenue these measures will raise. 
  • A higher tax on share buybacks: An amendment from the Rassemblement National raised the tax rate on share buybacks from 8 percent to 33 percent. This is expected to yield €8 billion. La France insoumise (LFI, France Unbowed, JL Mélenchon’s party) also succeeded in passing a narrow vote to impose an exceptional tax on "super-dividends."
  • A tax on multinational profits: An LFI amendment, overwhelmingly approved, would tax multinationals based on activity in France to combat tax avoidance. Called a "universal" tax inspired by the economist Gabriel Zucman and group Attac, it could raise €26 billion according to its supporters. For the Economy Minister, it represents "€20 billion of trouble," given France’s more than 125 tax treaties.
  • A modification of the corporate profits tax: Deputies adopted an amendment to focus the burden on France’s largest companies while easing the load on mid-tier firms. The target yield rose to €6 billion from the €4 billion initially in the 2026 finance bill.
  • Doubling the tech (GAFAM) tax: Deputies voted to raise the GAFAM tax from 3 percent to 6 percent (from an earlier 15 percent proposal). Economy Minister Roland Lescure had warned of potential US reprisals: "If we introduce a disproportionate tax, we’ll face disproportionate retaliation."

Meanwhile, the famed "Zucman tax" (economist Gabriel Zucman’s proposal for a 2 percent annual levy on fortunes over €100 million) and its lighter variant were rejected by Parliament (228 votes against to 172 for). Centrists and the Rassemblement National (RN) united against it.

Regarding the suspension of the 2023 pension reform, the article was approved in committee (22 votes to 12), but the social security budget itself was rejected-despite the reform suspension article. That was a warm-up before the plenary session. Next up: the full vote situation.

The entire right opposes the budget in its current form-it contains too many taxes. But it isn’t a "good" budget for the left, either. It is neither a compromise nor a lowest-common-denominator-it is a budget nobody really wants.

In sum, the tax pressure is increasing without satisfying the PS, which wanted the Zucman tax, or at least its lighter version. The entire right opposes the budget in its current form-it contains too many taxes. But it isn’t a "good" budget for the left, either. It is neither a compromise nor a lowest-common-denominator-it is a budget nobody really wants, and it may not be passed.

What if it fails? Adoption by ordinance is possible but would provoke massive outrage and be perceived as anti-democratic. Ironically, if the budget is not passed, then it will turn out that Article 49-3 would have been a handy tool after all… Another alternative is a motion of no confidence. Displeased with the way the debates have unfolded, the Socialist Party is once again brandishing the threat of a motion of no confidence. There is little doubt that if the SP were to call for a vote of no confidence, it would be supported by the RN, LFI, and very likely by the Greens and the Communists.

Modest French growth in low-growth Europe

And yet… Despite a difficult internal situation, there are some encouraging signs. Insee, the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, has published its growth estimates for the third quarter and reports that France-although worrying Brussels politically-contributes half of the growth in the eurozone. France’s gross domestic product (GDP) in volume rose by 0.5 percent compared to previous months (where growth stood at +0.3 percent), notably thanks to exports in the aeronautical sector (+2.2 percent). Production, particularly in the manufacturing industry, is also a growth driver, while household consumption remains stable but at a low level (0.1 percent). On the Paris stock exchange, the CAC 40 also recorded its best month of the year (+2.85 percent in October). Will France reach its objective of +0.8 percent average annual growth despite the economic uncertainties that economists recognize as being damaging for investments? Perhaps. The fact remains that this growth is unequal across sectors, and other indicators invite more pessimism.

Macron’s Popularity in Free Fall and the RN on the Rise

Meanwhile, President Emmanuel Macron’s approval rating has plummeted. He once benefited from the unpopularity of his prime ministers, but this is no longer the case. Only 11 percent of French say they trust Macron to solve the country’s problems, the lowest rate he has ever reached. He lost five points in one month and now matches the previous record low, held by his predecessor, François Hollande, in November 2016. Lecornu, by contrast, gained five points, reaching 26 percent.

The share of French people who would like to see the president resign, according to the 2025 Ipsos/Institut Montaigne "Fractures Françaises" survey, is now clearly in the majority: 58 percent, up 6 points in a year. Among the electorate, 86 percent of RN supporters are in favor of his resignation, as are 78 percent of LFI voters and 6 percent of Renaissance voters.

What is most concerning, however, is not so much the twilight of a presidency entering the final stage of its second term-it is that the president is dragging down the presidency itself with him. Asking the French whether they trust President Macron is not the same as asking if they trust the institutions he leads. Today, only 22 percent say they trust the presidency of the Republic, a historic low (44 percent in 2017). Replacing the president won’t automatically restore trust.

What is most concerning, however, is not so much the twilight of a presidency entering the final stage of its second term-it is that the president is dragging down the presidency itself with him.

Far from resigning or fading, Macron has now pivoted to a new issue: the impact of social media on democracy and youth. He gathered academics, civil society actors, elected officials, and ministers at the end of October to address this topic, and then defended it at the Paris Peace Forum. A laudable initiative. The question is, however: Will it lead to concrete, effective results?

And Finally… Will the RN Win?

The National Assembly is stuck in budgetary gridlock, the president and his camp are drastically weakened, and in the meantime, only one actor is emerging: the Rassemblement National. The party wisely kept its distance from October’s endless political negotiations. It revived the much-ballyhooed "UMPS" narrative-the idea of a conniving left-right party cartel (from the former party name of Les Républicains, UMP, and the Socialist Party, PS). While endless deals took place at Matignon in early October around Lecornu, Marine Le Pen was standing alongside farmers in Cournon-d’Auvergne in Puy-de-Dôme.

The political climate favors Le Pen’s successor, Jordan Bardella: According to recent polls, 45 percent of French people want him to play an important role in the coming months-the highest level for any French politician since Édouard Philippe in June 2022. With 500 days until the presidential election, Bardella remains far ahead, while Édouard Philippe has fallen back. Of course, caution is warranted: This is only a snapshot, not a prediction. Still, it is one worth taking seriously.

Bardella’s comeback is supported by his new book, Ce que veulent les Français (What the French Want), a gallery of testimonials through which he presents his vision for France. He wants to show that behind the TikTok star image, there is substance. Will he succeed? Broadening the appeal of the party could help.


According to the "Fractures Françaises" survey, all positive indicators for the RN are rising this year:

  • 42 percent of French people believe the RN is "close to their concerns," up from 29 percent in 2020.
  • 47 percent believe that RN is a party that can govern the country, up from 32 percent in 2020.


Conversely, negative perceptions are declining:

  • 49 percent of French people now consider RN a "dangerous party for democracy," down from 61 percent in 2020.
  • 47 percent consider it a xenophobic party, down from 58 percent in 2020.


Another "historic" victory for the RN: On Thursday, October 30, for the first time in the party’s history, one of its texts was adopted in the National Assembly, by just one vote (185 to 184). This marks a major step in the party’s long-term de-demonization. The resolution targeted France’s 1968 accord with Algeria, which grants Algerians special rights for circulation, immigration, and residence. Backed by the right and the Horizons group (Édouard Philippe’s group), the resolution is not legally binding, but its symbolic and political impact is high at a time when tensions between Paris and Algiers remain sharp. As the new Interior Minister attempts to restore dialogue rather than engage in strong-arm tactics, this vote, though nonbinding, will surely complicate matters.

Copyright image : Alain Jocard / AFP

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