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29/05/2026

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What Is the Status of Middle Powers?

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Michel Duclos

Special Advisor and Resident Senior Fellow - Geopolitics and Diplomacy

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In Search of the Middle Powers

On January 20 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the Canadian Prime Minister urged middle powers to ally and reject the domination of great powers, first and foremost the United States. As early as February 28, the outbreak of the American war against Iran seemed to contradict what had been presented as a historic speech, as did the difficulties faced by Europeans in dealing with the partial defection of the Americans in Ukraine. Has the historic "moment" come to an end? Rather, Michel Duclos demonstrates that if middle powers are lagging, it is less due to great powers than to their own inability to organize and promote a common agenda.

The Canadian Prime Minister, Mark Carney, gave legitimacy to the theme of "middle powers" in Davos on January 20, 2026 - a theme we ourselves addressed two years ago, with Soli Özel, in a series for Institut Montaigne.

Behind the applause generated by Mark Carney’s speech, snickering was already audible in Davos itself: was the Prime Minister not just returning from Beijing, and was his entire speech not mainly aimed at distancing himself from Trump’s America? Did he not show through example that the only possible leverage for "middle powers" was to choose one protector over another among the "Greats"? A few weeks later, Israel and the United States launched their offensive against Iran - which dismayed a majority of middle powers.

However, Prime Minister Carney - like Chancellor Merz and Prime Minister Modi at the beginning - were careful not to distance themselves from Washington on this matter, which for now structures the international scene.

Middle powers have indeed multiplied initiatives in the face of the war in Iran but in a dispersed order and without much impact

In a well-argued paper ("Trump’s war Exposes The Weakness of Middle Powers"), the great Indian analyst Raja Mohan uses this example to suggest that the war in Iran tends to contradict the thesis of the emergence of middle powers. Mohan quotes an article by Anne Marie Slaughter in the FT ("armadillo order") going in the same direction. According to the American think tank analyst, middle powers have indeed multiplied initiatives in the face of the war in Iran but in a dispersed order and without much impact - whether these were diplomatic initiatives like the one by Pakistan, supported by Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, or a military coalition attempt, around France and Great Britain, to contribute to the stabilization of the Strait of Hormuz once the conflict is over.

We should also mention a long and scathing critique by Michael Beckley in Foreign Affairs, whose title and subtitle say it all: "The Middle Power Delusion -Not Choosing Is Not An Option". Beckley's argument is as solid as it is brilliant; it only has one flaw: by trying to prove too much, it ultimately fails to be convincing.

On not Mistaking Perspectives

As for the more nuanced Slaughter and Mohan, events are moving so fast that part of their argument is already questionable. When we see President Trump, before deciding whether or not to conclude a first agreement with Iran, call a number of Gulf leaders, besides Islamabad, we can conclude that, to his eyes, this grouping of middle powers still exists.

Admittedly, the President of the United States can decide whatever he wants; he is in no way bound by these consultations. The role played in this matter by the group of four - Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan - nevertheless appears to be one of those "weak signals" that herald a shift in the configuration of the balance of power in the world. This is true in several respects: it is in itself significant that regional powers rather than European allies are on the American President's radar; as he experiences difficulty finding a way out of this war, DonaldTrump is testing the limits of unilateralism. We recall that the same regional powers, particularly the Gulf countries - with the tacit agreement of the Russians, Chinese, and Europeans - had been decisive in giving a semblance of credibility to the "Peace Council" instituted by Mr. Trump to manage the reconstruction of Gaza.

Hasn't Trump, however, just reverted to a threatening tone to demand that all his regional partners join the Abraham Accords (recognition of the State of Israel by the states in question)? There is little chance that Saudi Arabia or Qatar will comply in the current circumstances.

It is in itself significant that regional powers rather than European allies are on the American President's radar

Far from this burning issue, let us take a step aside and examine another "weak signal": the "environmental" summit held at the end of April in Astana, Kazakhstan, which brought together 9 heads of state, from Georgia to Mongolia (and the "Central Asians") around President Tokayev. These are countries that find themselves, a priori, in a rather uncomfortable geopolitical situation, caught between the Chinese giant and their former Russian guardian-a power undoubtedly in decline but currently in a phase of acute tension. . Kazakhstan, which certainly accommodates Washington (cf.: support for the "Peace Council" on Gaza), plays a leadership role in this regard. Astana has seen a surge of visitors in recent weeks (from Kenya, Turkey, Azerbaijan, etc.). The President of Kazakhstan, leveraging his experience as a former high-ranking UN official, tends to elevate his country to an intermediate power on multilateral issues.

To achieve this plan, he can rely on a simple fact: Kazakhstan is the world's leading uranium producer and ranks among the top ten oil suppliers. Its leaders have understood the advantage of appearing as reliable partners in energy and other areas (critical minerals, digital services, logistics). Furthermore, the uncertainties around Hormuz enhance the value of Central Asian land routes. The war in Iran contributes to re-evaluating the profile of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in particular.

Can Europe be overlooked in this context? It appears singularly marginalized in Middle Eastern affairs, non-existent on Indo-Pacific issues, and kept away from any potential settlement prospects on Ukraine. And furthermore, the predictable deterioration of the global economic situation risks worsening its economic position. However, Europeans possess two assets: Europe is waging, if not a "good war," at least an "honorable war" in Ukraine, of which it has become the main supporter due to the American defection; even if Russia benefited from a favorable prejudice in the Global South in this Ukrainian affair, its star is beginning to fade as its performance on the battlefield proves unconvincing; secondly, it is toward Europe - more precisely toward the EU - that middle powers of the South are in fact turning as the potential unifying "middle power" on a global scale, the pole of moderation and stability par excellence in the face of the hubris of the great powers.

Not Prejudging the Future

Overall, we could say that it is too early to put an end to the "middle power moment" opened by Prime Minister Carney. If only for the following reason: two of the "great powers" - Russia and the United States - are in fact being challenged by powers weaker than themselves, Ukraine on the one hand, and Iran on the other. Only China seems to emerge strengthened by the current global crisis, but it has its own weaknesses. The future fortune of middle powers will in fact depend on the ability of the supposed "Greats" to recover. Beckley, whom we dismissed at the start of this contribution, would be right if the Greats effectively crushed the middle powers with their superiority; in this scenario - and considering the competition between the United States and China, or even Russia - middle powers would have no choice but to side with one camp or the other. Iran after Ukraine shows that military superiority alone does not ensure political domination.

Perhaps, moreover, the weakness of the theme of the emergence of "middle powers" does not primarily come from geopolitics. It is not obvious that Iran, or peace or war in the Middle East, constitute the real test from this point of view. If we stick to Mark Carney's speech in Davos, the real test would rather be the following: getting organized to reintroduce a minimum of order - particularly in trade and environmental matters, concerning global issues - where the great powers - especially the United States - no longer play their role or behave as agents of destabilization. It is on this level that we do not see anything decisive emerging for the moment.

Copyright image : Ludovic MARIN / POOL / AFP
Volodymyr Zelensky, Emmanuel Macron, and Keir Starmer during a meeting of the volunteer coalition at the Élysée Palace, January 6, 2026.

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