Rethinking our Defense
in the Face of 21^st Century Crises

The pandemic, financial crises, cyber attacks, Islamist terrorism, information manipulation, foreign investment in strategic sectors, the return of military powers: since the 2000s, the threats facing France and Europe have increased and diversified. 

On top of this, there are also powers that will seek to take advantage of an unstable context in order to impose their will by various means, military or non-military, direct or indirect. Such was the case of Turkey: in the context of a weakened US and Europe, on 10 August 2020, a seismic research vessel and a military flotilla were sent into the seas claimed by Athens in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

The multilateral framework, debilitated by the Sino-American rivalry, is struggling to stabilize and coordinate a global response to crises. Covid-19 has proven just that. The same is true for NATO, which is a powerless witness to growing conflicts between several of its members. And though Joe Biden’s election as President of the US is indeed a source of hope that Europeans may regain a peaceful transatlantic relationship, it is clear that relations with China will remain a priority. The diagnosis of all this is that France and the European Union will not be able to rely exclusively on their American ally, or the multilateral order, for their security.

In order to contribute to the debate a Montaigne task force co-chaired by Nicolas Baverez, lawyer in the Court of Appeal of Paris, and Bernard Cazeneuve, former French Prime Minister, publishes a report on France’s defense policy. They conducted nearly 50 interviews with public and private actors, including civilians and the military, French and international. This research and analysis has led to 12 recommendations for France’s approach to the current security context, presented in this report. 

In addition to securing the ongoing Military programming law (MPL), France must prepare its Armed Forces and its entire defense-industrial ecosystem for harsher conflicts, and forge a comprehensive and agile response to more systemic threats to its security. The report argues it must pursue its efforts towards European cooperation: there simply is no alternative. 

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The recent terrorist attacks in France, as well as the health crisis, have highlighted the role that the military is capable of playing in non-military situations. 

That being said, the possibility of a major conflict in the coming years should not be neglected. In fact, that is the kind of scenario for which the means of the Army, which are costly and potentially lethal, are rather designed. In other words, the military may provide reassurance in non-military contexts, but should not be the go-to solution.

This is why we believe that the Armed Forces should be strengthened, in order to allow them to deal with what they have best been adapted to do. To this end, we see three levers: 

• funding 
• human resources
• innovation

Funding

The Military programming law (MPL) 2019-2025 was then created, as part of an effort to ensure France’s decision-making autonomy in the 21^st century. Despite this, two points are important to consider: 

• The MPL stretches over a 5 year plan, but the higher tiers of the budget increase is only planned to take place in 2023 (+3 billion vs. +1.7 billion between 2019 and 2022).
   
• The financial commitment of 295 billion euros of the MPL is significant: it is the second largest item in the State budget after national education. However, the health and economic crisis will likely cause French public finances to significantly deteriorate, thereby potentially questioning this commitment.

Human resources 

Another key element for the Armed Forces, the number of military staff, has also been on the rise since 2015. The MPL plans to create 1,500 new jobs between 2019-2022. Nonetheless, recruiting and retaining staff has proven difficult due to the very strong competition coming from the civil sector and the very demanding nature of the arms industry. Given cyber threats and digitization, the recruitment of computer engineers and data scientists has become essential. To this end, the military does need to become a more attractive career option. 

Innovation

In a context of the technology race taking place between military powers, strengthening an army requires innovation. There are numerous technological breakthroughs to take into account: UAVs and autonomous systems, connectivity and the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, hyper-velocity, etc. Appropriating these technologies is not only a matter of funding, but also of the industrial apparatus being able to meet these military needs. The French Ministry of the Armed Forces has placed this challenge at the heart of its priorities, through the creation of the Defense Innovation Agency (AID) in 2018. Difficulties remain, however, and more work is needed in order to scale up, to fund startups and SMEs, and to develop a common culture around military innovation.

As crises accumulate, France needs to become more resilient, better at absorbing shocks and then at bouncing back. Threats are becoming increasingly hybrid, and our security no longer depends on just the robustness of our defense. Instead, it solicits a more global approach that needs to include diplomatic, military, economic, political, information or even health and social dimensions, as has been made clear by the Covid-19 crisis.

Strategic autonomy: the first step towards resilience

We live in an era where a nation's power is conditioned by its resilience. Crisis management can lead to a downgrading or, on the contrary, to the affirmation of its rank and values on an international scale. The development of resilience in an operational way is based on the condition of strategic autonomy. Though constantly evolving, strategic autonomy historically relates to the field of defense and implies freedom of decision and freedom of action. Today, that also reaches into areas such as food and energy security, and is also needed in the health, tech, space and financial sectors.

A more agile response

There are three ways through which France can become more agile in its response:

• Improved anticipation - Public and private players (including think tanks and NGOs), who are naturally focused on the long term, need to work better together on that front. 
   
• Improved preparation - Building anticipation is a prerequisite, but what is essential is that the State, local authorities and civil society develop their capacity to react. This involves building up robust crisis management strategies and training. 
   
• Improved coordination - So far, the crises we have experienced have been viewed as one-dimensional, leading to the designation of one specific department to take the lead in the response: the Ministry of Interior for attacks, or the Ministry of Finance for financial crises. If Covid-19 taught us anything, it’s that the crises we are going through are increasingly multidimensional and therefore require coordination between ministries, as well as between the central state and the different local authorities.

Given the new era of big power plays and the Sino-American rivalry, France cannot ensure resilience and strategic autonomy all by itself. The only answer lies within European cooperation. The European recovery plan for the Covid-19 crisis is a good example of this, and should serve as a source of optimism for the perspective of a European response to the crises that affect all the Member States. 

• Persevering: working to strengthen cooperation between European states on defense.
   
• Diversifying: strengthening bilateral partnerships and ad hoc coalitions where appropriate. 
   
• Explaining: better conveying the French position on European strategic autonomy, in particular regarding Europe's place in NATO, which is today a major sticking point. This also means taking better account of the perspectives of France’s partners on these subjects. That first and foremost concerns Germany, because only a common Franco-German vision will lead the rest of the EU.