5G and sovereignty issues
In the era of cloud computing, and tomorrow of edge computing, virtualised infrastructures are becoming increasingly important for operators. This implies significant storage and processing of data which are not subject to any regulatory framework - except the GDPR. In a market dominated by American players and Chinese infrastructure, Europe and France are at risk of dependence and vulnerability.
5G and security
With 5G, entire business sectors and new uses will be highly dependent on the network’s availability, providing hackers with a new playing field.
- Will it be possible for an equipment manufacturer to shut down a whole network ?
Today, the risk concerns the possibility or not for an equipment manufacturer to insert a backdoor into the computer code. In the most extreme scenario this would allow the manufacturer to shut down the network remotely. It is not possible to check whether or not a back door exists: as with any telecom product or information system, the code is updated regularly. As a result, even regular access to the code is ineffective in ensuring that security is mastered. Moreover, systematically validating it before each use is unrealistic. Trust in the selected equipment manufacturer is therefore essential.
- Will it be possible for an equipment manufacturer to spy on the data?
Theoretically, equipment manufacturers can spy on the data transiting through their products. However, operators retain at all time visibility over the data entering or leaving their core network (even if the core network is decentralised, as is the case with 5G). They can therefore see any data leaks in their equipment. Given this background, we can only encourage the development of tools to monitor data flows through their network equipment.