[Trump’s World as Indonesia sees it] Dino Patti: "The World Does Not Need to Submit to a 'Leader'"

Institut Montaigne — You previously urged your country to resist pressure from Donald Trump. How would you characterize Indonesia’s relationship with the United States? More broadly, how would you assess ASEAN’s relationship with the Trump administration?

Dino Patti Djallal - The recent visit of Minister of Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto to Washington captures the current dynamics well. Donald Trump has threatened to impose 32% tariffs and an additional 10% surcharge on us if no agreement is reached by August 1. The talks were relatively productive and culminated in an agreement signed on July 7, under which Jakarta committed, among other things, to import $1.25 billion worth of American wheat.

Indonesia—like many others—faces the challenge of an American administration that is markedly unresponsive. Securing access to key decision-makers is a formidable task. Yet such technical negotiations are only possible if Indonesian envoys, however accommodating, find willing interlocutors on the American side.

President Trump accuses us of imposing excessive import barriers on U.S. goods—he cites a figure of 64%. It is true that the United States is our second-largest trading partner, after China, and that the U.S. trade deficit with Indonesia reached USD 17.9 billion in 2024 (a 5.4% increase over 2023).

Trump's chief complaint, however, is Indonesia’s membership in the BRICS and our initiatives to move away from the dollar. In retaliation, all BRICS members face a 10% tariff increase starting August 1. The conditions set by the White House are vague and imprecise, making them difficult to meet. Furthermore, they are delivered in a tone that lacks the most basic diplomatic courtesy—as illustrated by the letter Mr. Trump sent to President Subianto.

Of course, the United States is a sovereign state, and its strategic choices are largely beyond reproach, especially considering that Indonesia maintains a comprehensive strategic partnership with Washington. We have strategic and global partnerships with many countries, but only the United States combines both. On November 12, 2024, Joe Biden welcomed his Indonesian counterpart to reaffirm this alliance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio appeared to echo this message in his January 22 remarks—though this remains to be confirmed.

It is urgent that we diversify our commercial partnerships. The European Union appears to be a promising ally: a cooperation agreement between Indonesia and Brussels, stalled since 2016, is expected to be signed later this month.

IM — Should we then expect a deepening of relations with China? 

DP - Yes, but not exclusively. I mentioned Europe—we are currently enjoying a diplomatic honeymoon. President Emmanuel Macron paid a state visit to Indonesia on May 28–29, and President Prabowo Subianto is the guest of honour at the July 14 parade. He will also visit Germany and Brussels. Although President Subianto had expressed reservations about ties with Europe prior to his election, his current signals are markedly different.

This does not translate into minimizing our relations with China, which presents itself as the antithesis of the United States. While Donald Trump has restricted student visas for foreigners, Beijing has offered five-year student visas to all Asian nationals pursuing studies in China.

In Indonesia—and more broadly across Southeast Asia—both public opinion and policymakers have undergone a shift in their mindset. The United States held centre stage for decades, but that era has passed. Today, China is viewed as thetrue superpower. All countries in the region understand that China cannot be contained. With its rapidly expanding economy—despite facing challenges—China continues to grow, increases its defence budget, expands its power-projection capabilities, strengthens its diplomatic network, enhances its influence strategy, and asserts leadership in technology—far beyond what Russia, Japan, or the European Union can claim. We are realistic: we observe this expansion and know it cannot be halted—nor is that our objective. Our task is to adapt and respond accordingly.

IM - Does this worry you?

DP - It could be cause for concern, but only if three conditions were to converge:

• If China were to establish military alliances equivalent to NATO. 
• If Chinese nationalism were to reach levels that pose security threats—especially amid rising global populism 
• If Beijing were to adopt a hegemonic agenda based on spheres of influence

Becoming a strategic superpower often brings with it a strategic "super-ego." Much will depend on how China recalibrates its worldview, particularly in the South China Sea. The post-1945 order has little relevance in today’s world; it is being reshaped by new actors with new capabilities. India and Indonesia are keenly aware of this. But acknowledging the need to reform the old international order does not mean it must be wholly replaced.

IM - Precisely. From the U.S. perspective, is it rational to alienate allies instead of reinforcing them?

DP - The United States has surprised us with the aggression and swiftness of its decision-making. But who is truly in a position to lead on global issues such as climate, health, migration, or trade? The U.S. contributed 70% of the WTO’s budget. The balance of power still heavily favours the United States.

However, Washington appears to overlook one crucial element—it would be naïve to underestimate it: respect cannot be coerced. Indonesia may acquiesce to White House demands out of intimidation or humiliation—as seen in the Oval Office’s confrontational treatment of President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 28 or President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa on May 21—but we no longer regard the United States as a friendly or trustworthy partner. Losing the respect of one’s partners is to forfeit a key strategic asset.

IM - What alternatives does Jakarta have?

DP - We are committed to keeping the region free from hegemony-a view shared by all ASEAN countries. No single nation should dominate or be hegemonic, including Indonesia, despite our demographic weight and economic leadership in the region. We practice what I call "hegemonic temperance," which is deliberate and consensual-not so that others may dominate us. Our "Asia First" policy aims to develop a strategic partnership with China, but not at our expense. ASEAN countries-and Indonesia in particular-are hedging powers, balancing forces rather than choosing sides.

IM - But the region also includes India, South Korea, Australia, and Japan-all long-standing U.S. allies.

DP -Indonesia cultivates ties with middle powers of all types: pivotal or strategic (such as India, which positions itself as the leader of the Global South), conventional middle powers, and emerging ones-those still catching up (like Mexico under López Obrador, or Brazil, which, despite its economic clout, could exert more global influence).

In the coming decades, as the world becomes increasingly asymmetrical, a multitude of middle powers-from Mongolia, to name just one-will rise alongside the two superpowers, the United States and China.

For the first time, Indonesia finds itself operating in a multi-option multilateral environment that suits us well. The current transatlantic tensions offer an opportunity for middle powers in the Global South to engage with their northern counterparts-an idea echoed in Emmanuel Macron’s proposal for a "Third Way."

IM - Is Trump accelerating this realignment? After all, his preference for spheres of influence risks undermining these alliances.

IM - What should we take away from the recent BRICS summit?

DP - Indonesia has much to gain from BRICS membership, so long as the group remains focused on economics and does not morph into a geopolitical bloc. Indonesia embraces multiple affiliations: we began OECD accession talks in 2024; we are part of the CPTPP (with Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam); the RCEP (which includes ASEAN countries, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand); and we officially joined BRICS in January 2025.

We did not join BRICS to ingratiate ourselves with China or boost trade with Beijing-we can achieve those goals bilaterally.

We would be strongly opposed to BRICS positioning itself as an anti-Western bloc. On the contrary, we aspire to act as a bridge between BRICS members, the West, and other emerging superpowers such as China and Russia-without aligning ourselves, and certainly without submitting.

Interview collected by Hortense Miginiac
Copyright image : Alan Ducarre