[Africa: Strategic Rivalries] - Reinvesting in Africa: The American Challenge

On May 23, 2024, a state dinner between US President Joe Biden and Kenyan President William Ruto was the subject of an official photo that stirred up controversy, as other presidents of allied countries did not have the same opportunity for a photo with the president. The taking of this photo was part of a sequence of reaffirmations of the American partnership with Kenya, which in the process became a "non-NATO priority ally." It is interesting to ponder what the State Department or the Pentagon might have proposed to President Biden in the briefing notes to try to improve the image of the United States on the African continent as tarnished or distant, even if institutions like the CIA have of course always maintained a close interest in understanding the objectives of African leaders in global geopolitics.
 

In fact, 2021 marked a new phase for US policy in Africa. The arrival in office of Joe Biden, the French strategic adjustment in the Sahel, Russia’s aggressive expansion on the continent, and the rise of confrontation with China are all factors that prompted the American administration to reassert its presence on the African continent. The United States has breathed new life into its Africa policy, but it is still in search of a new direction. The objectives and resources have not changed that much, and "great power competition" remains the main focus, much to the chagrin of African political authorities.

All the more so, as the United States has a specificity that European nations do not have: The US is the intellectual cradle of Pan-Africanism, which offers it intellectual, cultural, and political levers to support the current aspirations of African populations and not leave this current of thought to uninhibited authoritarianism.

Africa for the United States: a Comeback

The African continent was intimately linked to the construction of the United States through the first agricultural colonies in the center and south (from Maryland to Georgia), which were based on the slave trade, and merchant centers such as New York. The triangular trade was largely responsible for the economic boom of the first settlers and had a profound impact on American society. Westward expansion was, in part, sustained by this economic "success," and the American Civil War was triggered by the controversy surrounding the abolition of slavery, resulting in a long-lasting racist system of segregation, white supremacism rooted to this day in many parts of the country, and the birth of a Pan-African abolitionist movement at the end of the nineteenth century.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the various currents of the Pan-African movement, the decolonial sympathies of part of the American establishment, the Second World War, and the American civil rights movement were all distinct and parallel factors that favored the settlement of African American intellectuals and religious leaders on the African continent (Liberia, Sierra Leone), as well as decolonization (Ghana, Belgian Congo). This movement of rapprochement between the United States and the newly liberated peoples was quickly slowed down, if not completely reversed, by the emerging context of competition with the USSR, making the African continent an arena of strong strategic rivalry, usually to the detriment of its people. The fear that national liberation movements would come under Soviet control and that several states would fall into the Russian sphere alarmed the State Department and the CIA, leading to a strong policy of influence and coercion. In particular, the US wanted to guarantee certain strategic accesses (to resources and military positions) while denying them to Russian influence, as in the case of the Congolese uranium mine at Shinkolobwe. In this context, other European democracies, notably France and the United Kingdom, were invaluable allies (and sometimes adversaries).

This massive support has replaced an ambitious bilateral approach, in contrast to the Chinese approach that emerged in the early 2000s. However, despite popular belief, Africa has never been the "preserve" of France or the United Kingdom-the United States has always maintained a strong political role and has remained particularly well informed about African leaders (from the 1950s to the present day).

Moving Away from Counterterrorism, Only to Fall Back Into the Turmoil of the Cold War

The Global War on Terrorism led the United States to gradually reinvest in the African continent, but strictly from a security angle, favoring the involvement of allies without necessarily taking into account the socioeconomic changes affecting the various countries on the continent. American armed forces and intelligence services invested political and strategic resources in Somalia (against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State), Djibouti (against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen), and Nigeria (against Boko Haram). They provided strong support for allies involved in military operations on the ground, such as France in the Sahel, the Congolese ANC against the ADF-MTM (EI) in the Democratic Republic of Congo, AMISOM in Somalia, and militias in Libya (Marshal Haftar, but also his opponents in Misrata), and developed military cooperations, such as the Sahelian partnerships and the Flintlock exercise, led by the Special Forces (SOCAF). Against the backdrop of counterterrorism, "stabilization," and settling old scores (the hunt for Joseph Kony in the Great Lakes region), the Africa Command (AFRICOM) has become the central player in US Africa policy at the start of the twenty-first century.

The Biden administration recognized the need to move away from a strictly military approach in Africa and in August 2022 proposed a specific strategy for the continent-a rather innovative approach. This was quickly embodied in a number of official visits, notably by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Vice President Kamala Harris, as well as in more visible strategic communications: the December 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, the recent state visit by the Kenyan president to the White House, etc. This policy also draws on the influence and attractiveness policies supported since the Obama administration (the Young Leaders program, research grants at American universities, support for entrepreneurship, etc.). On the cultural front, this policy is quite visible, from the cinema (Black Panther, The Woman King) to the museum (the National Museum of African American History and Culture) and television (Iwaju) and seeks to highlight and enhance the links between the United States and the African continent.

In this context, for example, the United States launched a diplomatic offensive in the CAR to convince President Touadéra to expel Russian mercenaries in exchange for security support, particularly through American companies. That the US would offer to replace paramilitary support from the Russian state with security provided through an American company illustrates the US’s lack of understanding of the strategic reality in the region, or perhaps its unwillingness to get heavily involved in these issues, which Washington considers to be of secondary importance while Ukraine and Taiwan consume all its strategic resources.

Nevertheless, the approach remains uninspired: it is still difficult to identify its contours, and the security lens persists. The political framework has, however, changed fundamentally, requiring a renewed approach.

Visibly Reinvesting in Africa

In West Africa, the United States is trying to distance itself from the French approach and make itself more visible, particularly to challenge Russian expansion. In Niger, this approach was marked by failure: wishing to maintain maximum cooperation with the country despite the arrival in power of an anti-Western military junta, the United States remained in denial and refused to face reality. The US was asked to leave the country, even though it had built one of its largest military bases in Africa there. In this context, the US is working closely with Côte d’Ivoire to put forces in place to help the Ivorians counter the jihadist threat. An American military base is even under construction in Odienné, in the northeast of the country. AFRICOM is in the driver’s seat and does not seem to see the political risk for Côte d’Ivoire, with tense presidential elections due to take place in the country in October 2025. The security logic persists. In Chad, the United States supported Succès Masra, president of the Transformateurs, an opponent turned prime minister who was defeated in the elections. The Chadian authorities have also asked American forces to leave the country, even though the Russians could be on their way. The fragile position of the US in the Sahel has been swept aside by local authorities amid a reconfiguration of alliances.

Conversely, in Senegal, the clear and strong stance taken by the United States during former President Macky Sall’s attempt to seize the elections was much appreciated by the population and reaffirmed the role of the United States as a guarantor of democratic processes, even if the new authorities are not particularly pro-American.

Conversely, in the case of Sudan, Russia is directly involved on the ground while maintaining dialogue with both sides. As for the DRC, despite commendable efforts, these have been weakened by the arms embargo denounced by the Congolese army and, more recently, by a risky coup attempt by an American-Congolese politician.

The high level of investment in Kenya that has recently come to light confirms this dynamic, as well as revealing its ad hoc and low-risk nature. Kenya is a traditional ally of the United States, and while the recent strengthening of ties is significant, it does not confirm a new dynamic but rather a reinforcement of traditional alliances. There is a structural change, but it still reflects a primarily security-oriented approach: Kenya has become the fourth African state-after Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt-to secure "major non-NATO ally" status, meaning that it now has facilities to receive military equipment, training, and loans for military investments.

What strategy?

A new and innovative approach, integrating competition against authoritarian powers as much as the well-being of African partners, would involve strongly supporting, officially and unofficially, the democratic forces in African countries. In order to avoid the current trap of the security lens, which was similarly framed during the Cold War and the war on terrorism-and which results in supporting the worst political leaders to ensure that their countries don’t tip over into the Russian or Chinese fold, or ensuring that they are involved in a fight to the death against jihadists-the United States should regain strategic depth by limiting bad short-term actions in favor of a strong and attractive medium-term positioning.

This strategy is likely to apply equally to the Europeans and will be developed in the final installment in this series.

US President Joe Biden and Kenyan President William Ruto during Ruto’s state visit to Washington on May 23, 2024.

Copyright image : Roberto SCHMIDT / AFP