India’s Multi-Alignment and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Breakthroughs

India is at a moment of reckoning. The United States’ (US)  imposition of 50% percent on India in August – 25 percent of which were  punitive and directly linked to its imports of Russian oil - had marked a turning point in India-US relations. This threat was  compounded by U.S. President Trump’s recent clearance of the 500 percent Tariff Bill to be imposed on countries importing Russian oil, including India. More importantly, it had raised a debate around India’s multi-alignment policy, which looks more like strategic hedging now. 

Washington and New Delhi have predictably acquiesced to each other’s needs with a new interim framework that has seen a reduction of tariffs to 10  percent for India, just behind Pakistan and Bangladesh. Yet this new agreement has raised eyebrows in India over excessive concessions to the US; the trust deficit will be hard to overcome. This is especially the case for the sensitive agricultural sector, as well as linked to energy and data security. Certain revisions have now been made by the US to accommodate Indian interests, including the change from India’s “commitment” to its “intent” to purchase USD 500 billion (EUR 425 billion) in US goods and services over the next five years. In addition, there is now overall uncertainty in what concerns US trade policy following the Supreme Court’s recent International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEA) Ruling that revokes President Trump’s power to impose sweeping global tariffs without congressional authorization. The Trump administration has responded to the Supreme Court’s ruling with a 10 percent across-the-board tariff imposition, which will affect India too.

US-India bonhomie has not resulted in the US distancing itself from Pakistan, thus far. Instead, the Trump administration maintains close ties with both India and Pakistan, keeping US national interest in mind. The US realizes that India cannot be a reliable "net security provider" in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)  if it is tied up in the Himalayas along both the Line of Control (LoC/Indo-Pakistani de-facto border) and the Line of Actual Control (LaC/Sino-Indian de-facto border). In the eyes of the Trump administration, Pakistan has now gained geo-political weight not only vis-à-vis Afghanistan but, more importantly, in what concerns Iran and the broader Middle East.

This past year Islamabad has successfully relaunched its strategic partnerships. This renewed influence goes beyond the US. Pakistan has further managed to establish tighter security ties with Saudi Arabia - a leading power in the Gulf security-complex - while continuing to receive crucial military support from Beijing and Turkey. Pakistan’s unexpectedly robust resistance to India’s Operation Sindoor - named Operation Bunyan-Ul-Marsoos - in May 2025 is illustrative of how Islamabad has become more capable of standing on its own footing military-wise.

This article aims to explore how Pakistan’s renewed regional and global leverage has turned against New Delhi’s diversification strategy. It has further brought to the fore the hard consequences of neglecting its backyard, despite its "Neighbourhood First" policy. How should New Delhi react to Pakistan’s "foreign policy revival" in a moment of recalibration of its own foreign policy?

Unpacking Pakistan’s "year of miracles"

After a period of relative diplomatic isolation and financial abyss, Islamabad is now on an outward and upward trajectory both regionally and globally. The landmark signing of the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman during a state visit to Riyadh in September 2025 illustrates this turnaround. This further speaks to Pakistan’s key role in shaping a new Middle East security architecture orchestrated by Washington with Riyadh’s acquiescence. While neither player is likely to sign the Abraham Accords, the US sees them as reliable and desired partners amidst a renewed co-existence in the Middle East.

This landmark agreement follows Pakistan’s strategic overture to the US, which saw Islamabad offering its critical mineral resources to Washington in the form of a USD 500 million deal with the firm US Strategic Metals to deliver copper and antimony to the US from Pakistani deposits estimated to span 370,000 square kilometers. In what is termed as Pakistan’s largest foreign investment in history, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has further committed to contributing up to USD 300 million in loans to the Reko Diq Mining Company Private Limited (RDMC). This entails 50 percent Canadian corporate ownership and a USD 110 million partial credit guarantee to cover the equity component of the Government of Balochistan [25 percent ownership]. In addition, the Export Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) has committed USD 1.3 billion to ensure copper and gold production at the Reko Diq Mine. Both Pakistan and India have participated in the inaugural 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial, as well as in the launch of the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE).

When fully complete, Reko Diq is expected to be the world’s fifth largest copper mine should the exploitation come to fruition. This is questionable considering the volatile security situation in Balochistan, as experienced by the Chinese in their quest to develop the Gwadar port, part  of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). During March of 2025, the Chinese deployed three Chinese private security companies to oversee the Pakistani Army’s supervision of CPEC Phase II projects for fear of terror attacks against approximately 30,000 Chinese nationals stationed there. In addition, Pakistan has also offered access to the Pasni port to the US to ship Pakistan’s critical minerals. This port lies near Iran and could substantially increase the US' strategic footprint in the region.

Islamabad also gave President Trump full credit for his alleged role in achieving a cease-fire between Pakistan and India in May 2025, further recommending him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Acknowledging third-party involvement in the cessation of hostilities with Pakistan is a domestic red line for New Delhi; not so for Islamabad, which has historically sought to internationalize the decade-long conflict over Kashmir. India has consistently maintained that all existing issues between Indian and Pakistan are bilateral in nature and have to be resolved between the concerned parties without any third-party intervention.

As part of this new beginning, the Trump administration has further authorized the sale of advanced military technology and the upgrades for Pakistan’s F-16 fighter planes, part of a deal struck in 2022 which the Biden Administration had been reluctant to pull through. In recent months, Pakistan has also offered the deployment of roughly 3,500 troops as part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. The mission has been authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, which entails the use of “all necessary measures” to maintain peace. This goes beyond peacekeeping, including peace enforcement. Pakistan has also joined the "Board of Peace" in support of President Trump’s plans for Gaza. Such a bold move by Islamabad, despite domestic opposition, demonstrates the extent to which it is keen to show its alignment with the US. It further reinforces Pakistan’s image as a Muslim-majority state with an established credibility in the Islamic world.

The recent US-Israel attacks on Iran and the latter’s retaliation actions in Gulf countries, however, have triggered an official condemnation by Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari on both counts. Taking into account the existing strategic security pact between Islamabad and Riyadh, additional Iranian attacks on Saudi soil against US interests could put Pakistan in dire straits. In addition, protests have unleashed on Pakistan’s streets following the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini. The implications of these developments for the US-Pakistan relationship are yet to be seen in the coming months.

Pakistan has also been pitching itself as a leading weapons exporter in recent months. It has now reached a deal to sell the JF-17 Thunder a multi-role combat aircraft to Bangladesh, among 17 other countries. These developments are relevant because the sale of military supplies creates long term dependencies and enduring influence. Competition is increasingly fierce among arms suppliers to littoral states across the IOR. SIPRI data on arms transfers show strong competition between China, India and the US to remain among the top five suppliers. During the 2018-2023 period, China was the number one supplier to Pakistan and Thailand; India was the top supplier to the Maldives while the US headed arms supplies to Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the UAE. Not in vain, India remains a producer and exporter of arms supplies and military technology. Indian exports of its BrahMos missile, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and other military equipment are a case in point.

New Delhi’s response to Pakistan’s revamped foreign policy

In this section, we dwell into the means available to New Delhi to respond to renewed and growing Pakistani influence, both from a security and geo-economic standpoint. We do so by looking at two strategic triangles, namely: (i) the US-India-Pakistan triangle; (ii) the China-India-Pakistan triangle.

When it comes to US-India-Pakistan security-related developments, the Trump administration seems prone to a stronger engagement with both players as a means to guarantee stability in South Asia. The renewed efforts to supply military technology and updated equipment to Pakistan has come with additional pressure on New Delhi to increase its purchase of US arms. India has attempted to comply with US demands and has diversified its weapons exports in recent years despite being traditionally reliant on Russian weapons and technology such as the S-400 defence system. This is no small thing, considering that India ranks number 2 in SIPRI’s list of arms importers, just below Ukraine for 2020-2024. Its top arms suppliers were Russia  (36%), France (33%) and Israel (13%) during this period.

Notwithstanding, the US and India did renew their "Framework for the US-India Major Defense Partnership" for another ten years in October 2025. This has strong strategic implications for the US-India relationship since it signals solid levels of coordination, intelligence sharing and technological collaboration between both partners. This deepening of the partnership is visible across different sectors such as defense industrial production, energy as well as maritime and naval cooperation.

India has recently committed to purchasing Excalibur Projectiles and Javelin Missile Systems from the US through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Route. In addition, on the naval front, India has also shown its intent to purchase US SeaVision software and other related training equipment for an additional $131 million to advance its Maritime Domain Awareness Capabilities in the IOR, having already expressed its keenness to purchase the MQ-9B drones along with the Poseidon 8 (India) aircraft to improve Indian Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the IOR.

Finally, both sides have also agreed to co-develop critical underwater infrastructure under the ongoing TRUST initiative. India and the United States are also collaborating on protecting undersea cables, thereby, truly advancing the scope of the relationship from the "sea to the stars". Both partners have launched the Indian Ocean Strategic Venture to further advance coordinated investments in economic connectivity and commerce. This includes Meta’s announcement of a multi-billion, multi-year investment in an undersea cable project to connect five continents and strengthen global digital highways in the IOR and beyond.

Similarly, India and the United States have also operationalized their strategic energy partnership, which had initially enabled the two sides to cooperate on a Strategic Petroleum Reserves operation and maintenance, including the exchange of information and best practices. In this regard, Indian Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) have recently concluded a one-year structured contract to import around 2.2 MTPA of Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) from the US Gulf Coast. The US has also agreed to support India’s membership of the International Energy Agency (IEA), giving a push to the energy partnership.

Therefore, ongoing defense, security and energy cooperation between Washington and New Delhi makes Washington’s recent rapprochement with Pakistan all the more surprising. A decades-long improvement of the US-India strategic partnership has delivered crucial outcomes for New Delhi. Aside from the renewed defense pact, crucial foundational defense agreements have been signed and India was designated as a "Major Defense Partner" by Washington in 2016. In addition, India became the third Asian country, after Japan and South Korea to receive Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-I) status from the US, which has enabled India to receive high technology products. The US-India Reciprocal Defence Procurement Agreement has still not been finalized due to the regulatory challenges linked to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Notwithstanding, following the recent US intervention in Venezuela, India has chosen strategic restraint and only "expressed concern" at the turn of events. This shows that when it is about security, a strategic bond remains between India and the US.

Substantial progress has also been achieved in joint strategic initiatives linked to critical and emerging technologies (CETs) as epitomized in the launching of the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (ICET) from 2022, which has been replaced by the US-India Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology (TRUST) initiative announced during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the US in February 2025. This happened soon after the second Trump administration had taken office. The desire to advance interoperability in crucial dual-use domains seems to endure. In space, for instance, India and the US have deepened cooperation in recent years through the formulation of the US-India Advance Defense Domains Dialogue, a niche initiative that promotes the safe, stable and responsible use of these technologies.

India had already become a member of the Artemis Accords, a US led grouping promoting civilian space cooperation, as far back as in 2023. Prior to that, India had signed a Space Situational Awareness Agreement in 2022 that allows it to share information regarding space debris and other space threats with the US. As part of this, the Indian Space Research Organization’s (ISRO) has recently launched a next-generation US satellite Blue-bird Black-2 onboard its heaviest vehicle LVM3-M6 from Andhra Pradesh. This has happened in the wake of the launch of the Indo-US- led NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) to study the earth’s geographic relief features.

From an Indian perspective, New Delhi still counts on the structural premise that it remains the most reliable partner for extra-regional actors in countering growing Chinese economic influence across the Indo-Pacific. India has branded itself as a crucial rising power in the Indo-Pacific which aspires to become both a developed economy by 2047 and a leading power. Its population dividend, central geographical location in the IOR and strong reliance on seaborne trade - over 90% by volume - has certainly helped India’s curation of a wide range of interests-based strategic partnerships.

These have enabled New Delhi’s engagement in numerous security and connectivity initiatives such as the QUAD, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic (IMEC) Corridor or the India-Israel-US-UAE (I2U2) initiative. These partnerships further illustrate India’s significant gains in the Middle East in recent years, particularly vis-à-vis the Gulf countries. US expectations to get all I2U2 players to support the Abraham Accords has been counterproductive for the grouping’s future, nonetheless. In addition, India is yet to join the "Board of Peace". IMEC, for its part, remains latent following the outbreak of war in Gaza after October 2023 though its Eastern branch - from the UAE to India - can likely lead in revitalizing it.

New Delhi remains intent on increasing its investments across IOR littoral states in critical maritime infrastructure, as well as on engaging in exercises aimed at expanding holistic maritime security in the region. This is aligned with its declared maritime policy of Mutual and Holistic Advancement of Security and Growth for All in the Region (MAHASAGAR), an upgrade of the earlier maritime policy of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). India routinely conducts Exercise Malabar in conjunction with the US, Japan and Australia as well as the multinational flagship Exercise Milan to demonstrate its growing naval prowess. In this respect, India is way ahead of the game as compared to Pakistan, despite Islamabad’s breakthroughs as a key player vis-à-vis a US-led re-orchestration of the security architecture in the Middle East. Pakistan also carries out its own multilateral naval exercises, such as Exercise Aman, which enjoys the participation of key IOR littoral states (such as Saudi Arabia), as well as China and Turkey and is a permanent member of the CMF much like India. It has further conducted combined naval exercises and counterterrorism exercises with Russia, hereby deepening military cooperation.

While friction over trade has been a relative constant in US-India commercial relations, the US has remained India’s largest overall trading partner since 2021-22, with India-US bilateral trade now standing at US$132.2 billion in the fiscal year 2024-25. The US has also become a leading source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Indian markets in recent years. In addition, India has recently been invited to become part of the US-led Pax Silica, which seeks to reduce coercive dependencies and secure global technological and AI supply chains among a group of trusted partners. Interestingly, India has been invited to become a member of this initiative after the previous Biden administration had considered India to be a Tier 2 country under the "Framework for AI Diffusion", an initiative aimed at establishing export controls on AI. India fervently seeks a seat at the high-table of digital and technology leadership, aware of the importance of securing access to critical minerals and rare earths for its technological development and clean energy industrial complex. Not in vain, it is a member of the originally US-led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), converted into FORGE.

In what concerns the China-India-Pakistan strategic security triangle, Pakistan’s robust military response to India’s Operation Sindoor has introduced an additional layer of complexity for New Delhi with regards to defense industrial production. It demonstrates the deepening military cooperation between China and Pakistan. In addition, it points to the interoperability between both combined with growing domestic Pakistani military capabilities, inimical to Indian interests in the long-term. India’s fears concerning the "Two Front Threat" have become more palpable after the armed conflict in May 2025. While Beijing wants India to acquiesce to the idea of a China-led South Asia, this is not palatable to India since it has traditionally viewed the region as its own. The US also supports a prevalent Indian presence in the IOR.

The question as to whether Gwadar will become a dual-use port endures. This would fulfill New Delhi’s worst prophecy, namely, an additional "strategic strongpoint" to advance Beijing’s "Strings of Pearls" strategy to encircle India. As concerning is the fact that New Delhi is now reportedly planning to exit the Chabahar port based on Trump’s repeated threats concerning increased tariffs and the revocation of an earlier exemption that allowed India to contribute to building it. This would result in yet another setback for India’s access to Central Asia via Afghanistan and to Eurasia via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that ends in Moscow. Alternatively, India may choose to rely on the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor to regularly transport containerized cargo to Russia.

Way forward for New Delhi: options for recalibration

Pakistan seeks to position itself as a reliable partner in the eyes of both the US and China, as well as vis-à-vis key players across the Middle East. Islamabad has come to realize that abiding by the tenets of a US-led order, even if increasingly transactional, will ensure it a needed geo-political and geo-economic umbrella.

India, for its part, considers US presence in the region more benign than that of China, despite its aversion to external meddling in its backyard. New Delhi views China as intending to become a benevolent hegemon across its sphere of influence. This is understandable considering that all of India’s neighbors have signed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) MoU with China, except for Bhutan. Beijing’s growing geo-political and geo-economic influence in the IOR has further pushed littoral and smaller island states towards ‘swing behavior’ as they navigate between both powers. This constitutes a serious source of regional instability for New Delhi, which can hamper its path towards economic development.

New Delhi does not expect the US to take its side during any potential future contingency with Pakistan either. India understands that the Sino-Pakistani nexus is there for the long-haul. However, a sustained US engagement with Pakistan could benefit India if it indirectly contains Beijing’s expanding sphere of influence in the IOR, as well as Islamabad’s nuclear program. Let us not forget that Pakistan is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) as designated by President George W. Bush in 2004. This inevitably enhances US ‘checks-and-balances’ in the Indian Ocean.

In addition, Washington is adamant about limiting Jihadist terrorist activity emanating from the region that could become a threat back home. So is New Delhi. In this regard, Indian and US interests align, even if the price to pay is a stronger US-Pakistan rapprochement. The main risk, however, is that Washington uses this as a lever to coerce New Delhi into accepting trade - or geo-economic conditions that work to its detriment, such as those pertaining energy -. technological - or military-related imports

Under such circumstances, India is unlikely to shift away from its multi-alignment approach in its foreign policy. New Delhi is also likely to leverage its partnerships with key partners in the IOR, such as with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and even Iran, with a view to avoiding them from intervening in any impending conflict with Pakistan; Islamabad is aware that it enjoys guaranteed military support from China and Turkey. Israel remains a faithful military supplier for New Delhi, particularly in what concerns hybrid warfare. India has further built a strong partnership with Saudi Arabia and could potentially sign a logistics support agreement with the Kingdom, similar to what India shares with the QUAD, France and the UK, respectively. This diversification strategy continues to ensure New Delhi a wider spectrum of opportunities against heightened global uncertainty, the unravelling of the liberal international order and its aspiration to become a leading power.

The recent finalization of a European Union (EU)-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in combination with the launch of a Security and Defence Partnership is telling in and of itself. Much can be advanced in the security relationship following the signing of a Security of Information Agreement (SoIA) between the EU and India. This can eventually open the door of Europe’s military-industrial complex to joint procurement and to dual-use technological cooperation. New Delhi is also aware of the added value of engaging with different EU Member States on a bilateral level in specific domains, such as in security-related matters with the French, commercial ones with the Germans, maritime-related ones with the Southern Europeans or on clean energy with the Scandinavians.

While New Delhi has done phenomenally well in diversifying and deepening its partnerships across the IOR and beyond, India must do more to avoid unwanted outside interference in its backyard.The newly created Bangladesh-China-Pakistan Trilateral Mechanism is a case in point. Triangulation between India, its Western/Asian partners and its backyard neighbours provides for an optimal way forward.

Copyright Jim WATSON / AFP
Donald Trump and Narendra Modi in the East Room of the White House in Washington, DC, on February 13, 2025.