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07/05/2024

France and China: Making the Best of an Unequal Relationship

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France and China: Making the Best of an Unequal Relationship
 François Godement
Author
Special Advisor and Resident Senior Fellow - U.S. and Asia

In Xi’s state visit to France, face matters. It is significant that Emmanuel Macron was able, this time around, to keep level with Mr. Xi Jinping, literally and politically. This is no small feat, even if achieved on home ground as against a trip to China. No downbeat photo opportunity where the emperor looks down at a foreign visitor paying homage, no extravagant verbal praise for the great helmsman. The visit to a scene of one of Macron’s childhood memories is a "mirror" image of the Guangzhou surroundings where he had been taken by Xi. It involved a climb to the Col du Tourmalet (6900 ft), hardly a priority or a photo op for Xi.

Chinese leaders often repeat a line that one must scale mountains to achieve great things. Indeed, the road to Europe is less of a leisurely stroll than before.

Perhaps this is a metaphor for the rebalancing – as opposed to balancing – that Macron is trying to achieve. Chinese leaders often repeat a line that one must scale mountains to achieve great things. Indeed, the road to Europe is less of a leisurely stroll than before.

The French President has often insisted on his country’s independence of judgment from the United States. He has overused French terms – puissance d’équilibre and troisième voie – leading to mistranslations: the first term is closer to voicing balanced judgments, the second about seeking to be a bridge rather than being neutral. Ambiguity or hedging is an instrument of influence for middle or lesser powers. Indeed, whatever counter-protests say at home, France is now a middle power, with perhaps more geostrategic leverage than economic strength remaining.

At times, the prolific speaker that is Macron had overshot the target, delivering unscripted views on the Taiwan issue in a plane interview, just as he had presumed of his influence over Putin in the year after the invasion of Ukraine. Not so this time, and the messages that Macron gets across to Xi are soberly realist. None of the main irritants or disagreements went officially unmentioned, even if the President still hangs on to "quiet diplomacy" on human rights. This was a situation where the Chinese visitor wanted to make it seem as if he was visiting China’s Europe: Serbia, Hungary – and France seen through the lens of "strategic autonomy". Building on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations established by De Gaulle, China’s official media have lavished praise on France for independence and "autonomous strategy", and termed it a “great power” (大国) in the People’s Daily. Macron not only has been aware enough of the attempt at flattery and has minimized these aspects, but he has brought back Europe into the visit, with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen participating, and Chancellor Olaf Scholz consulted and invited. In fact, von der Leyen even publicly delivered her account of a stern warning to Xi on China’s overproduction and export outlet.

Let’s not treat this as a minor feature. Consistently under Xi, China has pushed bilateral relations, with heavy praise and minimal concessions, or alternatively coercion and reprisals, against genuine engagement at the level of the European Union. Unfortunately, Chancellor Scholz has not resisted recently the short term impulse to go it alone – and he can now witness that when a European partner meets alone with China, the lack of genuine leverage ensures China will soon turn its gaze elsewhere. 37 "agreements" were signed during Xi’s visit, although without any genuine business deal: in fact, top Chinese businessmen, public or private, were absent from the Chinese official delegation, and an “investors meeting” was mostly held with representatives present in Europe.

Keeping level with the assertive power that is China, with an omnipotent dictator at home, and with the world’s first trading economy is not an easy exercise. American visitors to Beijing have experienced it. The so-called "charm offensive" notwithstanding, Xi Jinping’s foreign and economic policy almost invariably stonewalls demands, instead granting one-shot deals to partners that become close to tributary nations, or where it is China’s own supreme interest: it is fascinating to watch how Beijing, over the years, has managed to turn foreign high tech FDI into a concession by China, when it was always a concession to China – and a bet on the future.

Saving face and diplomatic parity will not turn around the basic facts of a lopsided EU-China relationship. Macron recounted a century of cultural contacts with China, and mentioned the sack of the Summer Palace in 1860.

Saving face and diplomatic parity will not turn around the basic facts of a lopsided EU-China relationship.

In fact, cultural and educational exchanges have dried up since 2019, but their mention also helps to avoid the charge of being "anti-Chinese". In an age where social media venom and instant promises dominate politics in our democracies, Macron will be faulted again, including by some of his French competitors for the coming French elections. In an op-ed, Raphaël Glucksmann, now the European list leader for the French Socialists, has listed Macron’s faults – not enough of this, not enough of that – and above all attacked the President for keeping the appearance of a "personal relationship" with Xi during the visit. The MEP’s record at the European Parliament of taking on the PRC is strong indeed. But grandstanding doesn’t do the job. Would Glucksmann, who called for ties with Israeli universities to be cut, also criticize an unexpected Xi-Macron declaration where China, for the first time, admits that the October 7 attack was the starting point of the current tragedy?

The reality is that there is no regime change for the near future in China, that we are entangled in economic relationships that do need sorting out, but not overnight, and that one must also deal with the limits of European unity on China policy. Still, Macron will need to persuade many member states that he sticks to his words on de-risking, on economic security, on addressing imbalanced trade, and, in a near future, on exacting a price at the European level for China’s probable support to Russia. And this will have to be achieved in a context of American uncertainties, with a China that is responsive to relations of force above all. Blustering with insults seldom worked with an underweight China. It works even less with a strong and overconfident China.

Dominating is not leading, and China has no intention of leading anyone – only to play out its own interests, with ever fewer limits.

Xi Jinping himself has built a track record of deception – words of peace and stability, often without any intent other than to lull partners into complacency and inaction. Dominating is not leading, and China has no intention of leading anyone – only to play out its own interests, with ever fewer limits.

"Soft power" and international law are just a sidekick. Not so for Europe and for France, which need rules and to try to preserve the postwar international order: those who see this as a futile exercise are just digging their and our own graves.
And so, Macron the irrepressible talker also practices the art of ambiguity. That is indeed a plus, in a situation where you must answer challenges that cannot presently be met on all fronts. "Hide your strength and bide your time", once said Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader who is most directly responsible for China’s rise of the past thirty years.

Copyright image : Mohammed BADRA / POOL / AFP

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