Armenia’s Multi-Aligned Strategic Partnerships

18/05/2026

Author

International Relations and Security Analyst

This second part of a two-part series on Armenia’s foreign policy examines the looming shadow of Russia and Yerevan’s attempts at multi-alignment. Armenia, a historic ally of Russia against Turkey-backed Azerbaijan, has suspended its participation in the Moscow-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organization since 2022. As the June parliamentary election campaign has begun and Russia seeks to maintain its influence in the Caucasus, Yerevan aims to demonstrate pragmatism, particularly regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia’s evolving foreign and security policy reflects a broader strategy of diversification through strategic partnerships. While some analysts describe this as "pivoting westward" and others-"hedging," Pashinyan has framed it as "balanced and balancing" relations, and other analysts-as multi-alignment. Armenia is navigating a fragmented geopolitical environment characterized by competing power centers and declining reliability of traditional alliances and security guarantees.

This strategy has intensified since the collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Pashinyan interpreted as an opportunity to reduce structural dependence on Russia. For three decades, Russia had instrumentalized the conflict as a geopolitical bargaining tool to maintain its influence in the South Caucasus.

Within Europe, this strategy extends beyond engagement with EU institutions and France to a growing network of bilateral partnerships. Alongside the EU and France, Armenia has established strategic partnerships with the Netherlands, Germany, and Luxembourg, and is advancing them with Poland, Greece, and Cyprus. On the margins of the EPC, Armenia formalized strategic partnerships with the United Kingdom and Bulgaria, and launched a strategic dialogue with Croatia.

Beyond Europe, Armenia has established a key strategic partnership with the United States. The latter has played a significant role in brokering initialization of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement with Azerbaijan, even if it remains unsigned, and in initiating the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as a framework to reconcileAzerbaijan’s demand for a corridor to its exclave Nakhichevan through Armenia with Armenia’s need to preserve sovereignty over the road and advance regional connectivity. The U.S. has also expanded bilateral cooperation with Armenia, with a focus on nuclear energy, artificial intelligence and semiconductors, defence and police reform. Regionally, Georgia is a strategic partner in spite of its recline in democracy, while relations with Iran-though intended to be formalized at the strategic level-are complicated by its ongoing conflict. Further east, Armenia has strengthened ties with India, its primary defence partner alongside France, while its strategic partnership with China is largely economic in nature. Armenia has also recently formalized a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan, a member of both the CSTO and the Organization of Turkic States.

For three decades, Russia had instrumentalized the conflict as a geopolitical bargaining tool to maintain its influence in the South Caucasus.

Nevertheless, Armenia continues to operate within a constrained geopolitical environment in which a complete disengagement from Russia is not feasible in the short term. Relations with Russia fluctuate between attempts at stabilizing ties and periods of tension. The emerging approach is one of recalibration-reducing dependence while expanding alternative partnerships and increasing strategic flexibility. Deployment of EUMA, Cooperation with France and India has contributed to reducing Armenia’s security dependence on Russia: CSTO participation has been de facto suspended since 2022, and the last Russian border guards have been removed from Armenian border checkpoints in 2025. However, Russia maintains a military base in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city, whose role in Armenia’s security is increasingly questioned and often viewed as a liability. Armenia remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), with continued structural economic dependence on Russia.

Taken together, these developments point to the emergence of a layered partnership architecture. Rather than aligning exclusively with a single bloc, Armenia is developing differentiated relationships serving various functions. This approach enhances flexibility and reduces vulnerability, but it also requires careful management of competing expectations and strategic trade-offs, including the risk of overstretch and potential deviations from normative commitments. Tensions between key partners and broader geopolitical frictions-Russia and Euro-Atlantic actors, the U.S. and Iran, the EU and Georgia, strategic competition between the U.S. and China, and recent divergences between the U.S. and European partners-further complicate Armenia’s external environment. These dynamics require continuous calibration of its positioning within an increasingly complex and contested geopolitical landscape. Within this diversified framework, the EU, France, and the U.S. stand out as Armenia’s most significant and strategically consequential partners.

Russian Reaction to European Summits in Yerevan

Russian rhetoric intensified following the EPC summit in Yerevan, including in response to the presence of President Zelensky. Pashinyan met Zelensky, discussed bilateral economic cooperation, and reiterated in his post-summit briefing that Armenia is not Russia’s ally in the context of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, remarks by President Macron that Armenia had previously been perceived in Europe as a "de facto satellite of Russia" reinforced Moscow’s perception that the summit reflected Armenia’s geopolitical reorientation. Pashinyan’s decision not to attend the May 9 parade in Moscow further underscored Armenia’s evolving positioning.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova framed Armenia’s engagement with the EU as alignment with an "anti-Russian" and Euro-Atlantic course, violating Armenia’s previous commitments. A few days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned of economic consequences should Armenia move closer to the EU, pointing to its economic ties within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and invoking Ukraine as a cautionary example. He urged Armenia to clarify its strategic orientation and suggested holding a referendum on EU membership, indicating that, should Armenia choose the European path, relations could move toward a "soft, civilized, mutually beneficial divorce."

He urged Armenia to clarify its strategic orientation and suggested holding a referendum on EU membership, indicating that, should Armenia choose the European path, relations could move toward a "soft, civilized, mutually beneficial divorce."

This rhetoric reflects elements of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and cognitive warfare by Russia. The call for a referendum at this stage is premature, as such votes are typically held only at the final phase of accession, once negotiations are completed and an accession treaty is ready for ratification. Armenia has expressed EU integration aspirations in a parliamentary bill but has not formally applied for membership. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated that, when the time comes, Armenia itself will decide on holding a referendum. Unlike Russia, the EU does not impose timelines or seek to predetermine Armenia’s strategic choices.

Contested Narratives and Electoral Dynamics

This rhetoric has been accompanied by statements from Moscow questioning the legitimacy of Armenia’s upcoming 7 June parliamentary elections. Pro-Russian opposition accuses Brussels, Paris, and Washington DC of political interference and support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, citing the EPC summit in Yerevan, the deployment of the EU Partnership Mission in Armenia (EUPM), and Macron’s and U.S. Vice-President J. D. Vance’s visits its manifestations.

Armenia’s deepening engagement with the EU a has become an issue in domestic political contestation. External narratives intersect with domestic political dynamics within Armenia, where the Nagorno-Karabakh issue continues to polarize the society, making it particularly susceptible to manipulation. As voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in 2025, narratives advanced by Moscow and Armenian pro-Russian circles have framed the EPC Prague as the moment when PM Pashinyan recognized-allegedly encouraged by France and the EU-the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, interpreting it as a "handover" of Nagorno-Karabakh.

This framing overlooks the failure of Russia and the CSTO to fulfill their collective security commitments to Armenia during Azerbaijan’s 2021-2022 military intrusions into Armenia’s internationally recognized territory, which resulted in significant casualties and the occupation of around 240 sq km-s of Armenia’s border areas. They also disregards difficult strategic dilemmas for both Armenia and its Western partners to prioritise Armenia’s territorial integrity over the protection of Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, it ignores Russia’s acquiescence to Azerbaijan’s use of force in the fall of 2020, Vladimir Putin’s statement in November 2020 that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, and the subsequent complicity of Russian peacekeeping forces in the blockade and the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The narratives, rooted in interpretations of past conflict and responsibility, are now actively mobilized in the election campaign that officially began on 8 May with 19 registered parties competing. The ruling Civic Contract party led by Pashinyan is the main incumbent force, and two major pro-Russian contenders-Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian oligarch, and Robert Kocharyan, Armenia’s second president and former leader of Nagorno-Karabakh-are the main contenders, alongside with smaller pro-Russian and pro-Western parties and others with unclear orientation. Investigative reporting (Swedish Blankspot) indicates Russian efforts to influence the electoral environment and political discourse ahead of the vote. While Pashinyan remains the leading candidate, the outcome of crucial elections be guaranteed.

Armenia’s Transition Toward Pragmatic Peace

Sovereignty, security and identity, war and peace narratives dominate political discourse. The cause of the return of Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh,, detached from current geopolitical constraints, is mobilized by the opposition versus the Government’s decision of the final closure of the Karabakh issue.

Azerbaijani revisionist and expansionist claims toward Armenia, coupled with the lack of progress in border delimitation and the anticipated-but uncertain-deoccupation of Armenia’s border areas, in turn sustain threat perceptions. They are not only instrumentalized by pro-Russian forces but also generate broader societal anxiety, raising doubts about the genuineness and sustainability of the peace process, constraining the space for pragmatic policy choices, and challenging their legitimacy. Constitutional reform, including the proposed removal of references to the Declaration of Independence linked to Nagorno-Karabakh, is perceived as a precondition imposed by Azerbaijan to justify delaying the signing of the peace agreement, rather than as an internal democratic process.

The opposition also articulates a false choice between alignment with a Russian-Belarus Union and exposure to Turkish-Azerbaijani hegemony, narrowing the perceived range of policy options and discouraging pragmatic approaches to normalization and diversification. At the same time, opposition rhetoric warns of the "Ukrainization" of Armenia, echoing Moscow, and the ruling party caution against "Belarusization," reinforcing a polarized framing of Armenia’s strategic trajectory.

Within this environment, PM Pashinyan’s "Real Armenia" ideology represents a shift toward pragmatism, sovereignty, and adaptation to a changing geopolitical context. It reflects a move away from narratives rooted in the memories of historical homeland toward a more constrained assessment of Armenia’s capabilities and strategic options, prioritizing sovereignty and peace over historical justice and human rights. As a result, Armenia’s foreign and security policy realignment is inseparable from internal contestation over narratives of identity, sovereignty, and security.

Armenia at a Crossroads in a Fragmented Geopolitical Order

The Yerevan meetings illustrate both Armenia’s transformation and the evolving nature of Europe’s engagement in the South Caucasus within a fragmented international system and contested geopolitical space.

Armenia is repositioning itself as a platform for political, economic, and strategic interaction, leveraging connectivity, diversification, and technological modernization to enhance its agency. France plays a catalytic role, while the EU operates through layered and sometimes divergent approaches reflecting its institutional complexity. Armenia stands at a crossroads whose significance extends beyond its national context, with the potential to shape the South Caucasus and its place in Europe.

Copyright image : Frederick FLORIN / AFP