It is also contradictory to incriminate the authorities for their delay in initiating segregation measures and at the same time to challenge the usefulness of such measures. Of course, the limits of the Chinese crisis management are visible. But what other health and civil defense system would have done better, given the scale of the crisis? The official fight against the epidemic has an important ally: the population, which in cities seems to literally anticipate the containment measures as a precaution, and in the countryside is regaining ancestral reflexes of local blockade. To interpret these reactions only as a sign of totalitarian power is a mistake. In that respect, it is revealing that since February 2, Xi Jinping himself has changed his tone and warned against "excessive" reactions with great risks for the Chinese economy. Does he have reliable information about a possible peak in the epidemic – and a declining risk rate – or is he now fighting on two fronts? The international integration of the Chinese economy, much greater than in 2003, makes a temporary interruption of human and trade flows more serious. This is why Chinese diplomacy is working, for example, to get international flights resumed. Chinese digital giants persisted in wanting to attend the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, resulting in the exodus of their foreign counterparts from that meeting – and its cancellation.
China’s authoritarianism: resilient but not triumphant
In the absence of certainties about the direction and duration of the epidemic, let us attempt to draw a temporary conclusion. The harmful effects of an authoritarian system are concentrated in its first phase. Even so, it is not certain that between early December and January 5 – the date of the genome sequencing – other authorities would have been able to take the radical preventive measures that are retrospectively deemed necessary. The crucial phase was between January 5 and 20, when more precise information came to light. These two weeks were marked by the great New Year's migration, and the delay therefore had immense consequences. From January 23 onwards, however, the system's mobilization capabilities came to the fore, including the limitation of movements and the conversion of factories to the manufacture of masks and other equipment. If the epidemic is contained, this will appear to have been a successful mobilization.
In a second stage, the crisis will be retrospectively assessed. There is no doubt that local officials will be designated culprits. Social movements may also demand a real account of the victims of the epidemic, as is already the case for doctors. On a national scale, rather than a full-scale offensive against Xi Jinping, it may be the massive and open demonstrations by Chinese Internet users of their skepticism or anger that will leave their mark. But virtual protests do not make a physical movement or a structured organization. The triumphalism of the Xi Jinping era is shaken; the monopoly of power remains intact.
Copyright: Philip FONG / AFP
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