This is not impossible indeed, but it is not guaranteed: it will very much depend on the actual behavior of the Iranian authorities themselves with regard to their nuclear programme.
In this regard, the Iranians have argued that the non-compliance measures they have adopted are reversible - and in fact relatively harmless. This has been a questionable assertion since September 2019, when they broke free from the limits imposed by the agreement in the field of research and development. There is indeed a risk that they will acquire a new type of centrifuge that is much more efficient in the production of enriched uranium. These could come into operation at the Fordow site, which the Iranians decided in November to reopen (again, in contradiction to the JCPoA provisions). These additional violations therefore lead one to fear that Iran has set out to reduce the so-called "break out" time that separates it from the possession of a bomb. Some estimate that around April, the "breakout time" could be between 7 and 9 months compared to 1 to 2 years today. If that were to be the case, Europeans would not be satisfied solely by discussions within the JCPoA Commission, however in-depth they may be. Resorting to the Security Council would become inevitable, despite Tehran's threats to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or other multilateral instruments.
A procedural chess game
It is certainly significant that the Iranians have not questioned the role of IAEA inspections; these can provide a certain visibility on their nuclear programme. The Agency's next report in February will be examined with particular attention. At the same time, and if it operates in accordance with the wishes of the Europeans, the Dispute Resolution Mechanism can provide a forum for the various parties to express their concerns. The objective of the Europeans is obviously to get Iran to return to full compliance with its commitments; Iran, if it wants to play its cards right, could try to give guarantees on the supposedly "limited" nature of its violations, indicating for example "verifiable thresholds" regarding the renewal of its prohibited activities - if only to continue to benefit from the indulgence of the Russians and the Chinese and avoid the Europeans going to the Security Council.