EU-China: The New Semantics of the Summit

As per previous joint statements, this 2019 text sometimes falls back on the obvious. Imagine for a second if the two parties had declared that they did not "support the peaceful settlement of regional disputes and conflicts through dialogue and consultation"… 

Cynics will argue that the text tries to achieve too much, and that this is probably a measure of the frustration expressed by the European side from previous exercises and the lack of delivery by China. The words "commit", "committed" or "commitment" appeared 34 times in the 2018 joint statement. They still figure 23 times in the new statement. Who is fooling whom? Either a revolution is under way from the Chinese perspective on Europe, or many of these "commitments" are neither spelled out, nor timed, and certainly not sanctioned. 

The Europeans are no fools, however, and the side declarations of Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Tusk show awareness of the risks.

Juncker: "we are ready to work together and at the same time be more ambitious in standing up for our interests and values".
At the same time…
Donald Tusk : "We managed to agree a joint statement" (sic).

Both emphasized the statement was based on "reciprocity". The word never appears in the actual text, where it is the Chinese formulations of "mutual respect" and "mutual benefit" that prevail. Juncker also mentions the "rules-based global order", and adds cryptically: "you can express it in a different way". This is precisely because China refused to repeat a commitment to the "rules-based international order", which it had conceded in 2018.

In short, the EU is holding China to quick delivery on several key items, and in two cases with a precise deadline. But it is not holding China’s feet to the fire, as the Trump administration has done with increased tariffs on Chinese imports. In July 2018, China’s primary aim was to enlist Europe’s neutrality or even its cooperation in countering the Trump administration’s offensive. In April 2019, it still needs a joint statement badly enough to concede these timed pledges. There is no immediate deliverable, however. In the coming months, the EU will find itself absorbed by several problems – such as the continuing Brexit saga ; European elections and the designation of a new Commission ; possibly, other trade tensions with the United States which could hinder coordination on common goals regarding China. Whatever its proclamations of support for "European integration", China is continuing its direct appeal to member states : it has collected Portugal, Italy and even Luxembourg as participants to the Belt & Road Initiative ; the 16 + 1 are now 17 + 1, with the inclusion of Greece. The implementation of the new investment screening rules by the EU will also be a test of the cohesion of the member states, with 5G deployment and Huawei’s role as a case of both substance and symbol. 

All of this must figure also in Chinese calculations about the European Union’s capacity to follow through. Once more, China has made promises, and the EU has quite explicitly said it did not agree with the methods employed by the United States, if it often agreed with the analysis that justified with these methods. The temptation will be to declare victory on the slightest concessions by Beijing. If not, and as is the case with the terms for Brexit, this will turn into a test of the EU’s cohesion.

Copyright : JOHN THYS / AFP