During the Greek parliamentary debate on ratification, Syriza, the main opposition party, insisted that its vote was conditional on the understanding that the agreement would cover the Greek EEZ and the continental shelf. Prime Minister Mitsotakis seemed to fudge the issue when he retorted: "You know that retrospective commitments cannot be added. You know that the term territory that the report protects explicitly protects not only the land but also the sea and the air. And the treaty operates within the framework of international law and the law of the sea. I add that the Agreement provides for a general commitment of defensive assistance in the event of an attack regardless of location or occasion. This is why there is a reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. I guess you know that the International Court of Justice has accepted that an armed attack is not only an invasion, but also any incident of use of force against military forces even outside the territory. That is why no defense agreement in the world refers to an EEZ or a continental shelf".
This was, at best, a misunderstanding. In a background briefing that took place on September 28, 2021, a senior French official noted that there was no agreement on the delimitation of EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean (and that the Libyan parliament had not ratified its 2019 bilateral agreement with Turkey). Further clarifying that France would only protect the internationally-recognized Greek territory, the French Ministry for the Armed Forces made it clear that "an EEZ is not part of a State’s territory, pursuant in particular to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, to which France and Greece are parties".
It is thus dubious that Athens would invoke the agreement with France in case it believed Turkey encroached on what it considers its EEZ.
There are, however, at least two scenarios under which the defense clause could be triggered.
One is a conflict over the Eastern Aegean islands which, demilitarized by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, have a particular status. According to the Turkish press, in a letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres dated September 30, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN and former Foreign Affairs Minister, Feridun Sinirlioğlu wrote that "Article 12 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty unequivocally establishes a clear connection between sovereignty and demilitarization for all the Eastern Aegean islands". Turkey claims that Greece violates the demilitarization commitment. Athens fears that the 2023 presidential campaign in Turkey could witness deliberate provocations by Mr. Erdogan.
Another scenario would be a Greek decision to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea to 12 nautical miles, as it is entitled by UNCLOS. Such a move, Turkey warned, would be a casus belli. Ankara fears that Athens could be emboldened by the French security guarantee and make moves in the region that it would have refrained from before benefitting from this guarantee.
In sum, while the Franco-Greek agreement is not transformative for mutual defense commitments in Europe and while it brings some reassurance, deterrence and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, it also sheds a new light on possible crisis scenarios in the region.
Copyright: Ludovic MARIN / AFP / POOL
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