Germany and the Zeitenwende

Former president of the German Evangelical Church, Margot Käßmann exemplifies this idea by rejecting the idea of a Zeitenwende to warn that "…more armaments and more weapons will not create more peace… NATO is equipped many times over in relation to Russia. It is not as if NATO urgently needs to catch up". Nearly thirty intellectuals and artists signed an open letter warning Chancellor Scholz of escalating the conflict and highlighting the risks of co-belligerence and even nuclear strikes. The philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, while condemning "the massive war of aggression launched by Putin and the Russian government," also calls on Scholz to show restraint, troubled by Kyiv’s attempts at “moral blackmail” with the mistakes of previous coalitions. Confronted with this dilemma, he does however conclude that the West must not let Ukraine lose this war. 

Rebuilding defense policy

Shortly after Donald Trump’s inauguration in spring 2017, Angela Merkel declared that we, as the EU, had to "take our fate into our own hands." However, Germany’s leaders did not heed the warning of a changing international environment (aggressive Russia, the US pivot towards Asia), aside from an increase in the Bundeswehr budget. The continued dialogue with the Kremlin - in which Merkel had no illusions about Putin - is not as reprehensible as their relentless effort to maintain inadequate energy and defense policy, which, as we saw in February, gave Berlin little room for maneuver. According to Sönke Neitzel, if the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag had been involved in drafting the government’s February 27 statement, it would have sounded very different. Scholz realized that he had to show firm leadership and that Germany could no longer shirk its responsibilities.

The transformation of the Bundeswehr into an army capable of ensuring Germany’s territorial defense while also contributing to operations abroad (Afghanistan, Mali), constitutes a significant challenge for the new coalition in power and its Defense Minister whose actions until now have been lackluster. This transformation requires an increase in overall capabilities, of course, but above all, it calls for changes to the prevailing strategic culture and mindset so that soldiers can be psychologically prepared for war. Structural reforms of the Bundeswehr and the defense industry are also vital, as previous budget increases (reaching €50 billion in 2022) have done nothing to improve efficiency or equipment availability. Just recently, the coalition parties and the CDU/CSU reached an agreement on the recipients of the "special fund" (Sondervermögen) announced by Olaf Scholz on February 27th. The €100bn fund will be used exclusively to finance the Bundeswehr - despite the Greens and some SPD leaders wanting to allocate funds more widely, to boost cyber defense, provide further assistance to allies, or increase the international aid budget, for example. It has also been announced that the 2% GDP target for defense spending will be reached "on average over several years".

Towards a redefinition of the "Export Nation" model?

With regards to the economy, the Zeitenwende is already taking shape. Many German companies have withdrawn from the Russian market – Siemens, notably, withdrew after 170 years of business in Russia. In just three months, Germany has significantly reduced its dependence on Russian energy, slashing Russian oil imports falling from 35% to 12% and gas exports from 55% to 35%, with a goal to fall under the bar of 10% of Russian gas by summer 2024, Berlin is urgently working to diversify its supplies, rushing to a deal with Qatar at the end of May. For his first trip to Asia, the Chancellor did not go to China, as Merkel and Schröder had done, but rather Germany’s ally Japan – a choice he made very deliberately. 

Receiving his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, the following week, Scholz announced that India, who he called "Germany’s central partner in Asia," would benefit from €10 billion in funding by 2030 aimed at boosting cooperation in the fight against climate change and continued development of hydrogen technologies.

While Scholz was in Japan, the Bundestag adopted a resolution calling on China to help work towards a ceasefire in Ukraine, as well as warning it against circumventing Western sanctions. Beijing remains Germany’s largest trading partner, but following the Greens - who have long advocated a change in strategy - German officials are beginning to adopt a more cautious approach. Finance Minister Christian Lindner is looking to redesign the economic model for relations with China, while SPD chair Lars Klingbeil has called to draw lessons from Russia’s aggression and to support moves towards ending Germany’s dependence on the Chinese market. Leaders of the BDA and the AHK, the two largest employer federations in Germany, have come to realize that Merkel-era approaches are no longer appropriate. Central and Eastern European countries are more important trading partners than China. Furthermore, a law requiring German companies to ensure social and environmental standards in their supply chains will be coming into effect in 2023, and could pose significant problems for German companies operating in Xinjiang, where forced labor is widespread.

How will this model affect Germany’s European policy?

Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has also called into question what historian Gerd Koenen called "the Russia Complex" in his book of the same name. This idea is rooted in the economic compatibility between Germany and Russia, as well as what Koenen sees as "spiritual affinities" (Seelenverwandtschaften) between the two nations. However, this Russocentric view overlooks countries such as Ukraine and Belarus and the derived attempts to conflate modern Russia and the USSR, which seem so outdated today, were still prevalent until recently: for example, President Steinmeier invoked Nazi crimes against the USSR in his attempts to justify the construction of Nord Stream 2. Within the EU, the errors Berlin has shown towards Putin’s regime has strengthened the hand of those Central European and Baltic countries that have consistently warned of the Russian threat. Sanctions and drastic reductions in Russian energy supplies will inevitably lead to a sharp drop in bilateral trade and a rebalancing of Germany’s dealings with the region. Any return to normality in relationships with Russia seems a very distant prospect, at least as long as Putin remains in power.

A reconstruction of Germany’s strategic culture will be a further consequence of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The creation of a national security council, as provided for in the coalition agreement, should not only improve coordination between foreign and defense policies but also contribute to spreading this new culture. Furthermore, the return of war to the European continent has made it even more necessary to rapidly overcome the difficulties encountered by ongoing Franco-German armament projects. For Merkel’s diplomatic advisor Christof Heusgen and former Bundestag President Norbert Lammert, it also increases the urgent need to build, in conjunction with the French, a new "European security architecture as an autonomous part of NATO," as the military might of the United States remains indispensable to the defense of the European continent. However, with the next US presidential election of November 2024, time is of the essence to make this project happen.

Copyright: Tobias SCHWARZ / AFP