Trump vs. Venezuela: Scenarios for an Impending War

On October 24, 2025, Stephen Miller, Donald Trump's Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security Advisor, told the American press that Venezuela was hosting "the ISIS of the Western Hemisphere [NB: The Americas] and would be dealt with in the same way we dealt with the Islamic State". One of the closest and most influential advisors to the American president put into words several weeks of military asset relocation in the Caribbean: the American administration is preparing, without saying so, for a war against Nicolas Maduro, the Venezuelan president, whom it accuses of being at the head of a drug cartel called the Tren de Aragua ("Aragua train").

The ousting of President Maduro is a priority objective of the new American administration

In this context, what might happen on the military front? Why such an intervention? The following analysis seeks to answer these questions and shed light on the emerging U.S. strategy in the region, from its ideological underpinnings to the operational realities that can be expected.

The Misunderstood Ideological Framework of D. Trump

In geopolitics, it is essential to examine the representations, the ideas, frames of reference that actors invoke or that influence their thinking, as these are at the root of the strategies they pursue. In the case of Venezuela, multiple representations naturally intersect among U.S. decision-makers: since the Bolivarian Revolution led by Hugo Chávez in 1999, the Venezuelan regime has adopted a sharply anti-American stance, grounded in anti-imperialism and Marxist references, which also serves to legitimize the regime domestically. It maintains close ties with strategic adversaries of the United States, such as Russia, Iran, and China. From this perspective, Venezuela is hence perceived as a strategic adversary by American political and security officials.

However, at its ideological core, several distinctly American representations inform Donald Trump and his inner circle. Partially discussed in a previous article, they are revisited and clarified here.

While many commentators mobilize this doctrine as the cornerstone of US foreign policy in the Americas, its aims are often misunderstood or distorted. In 1823, President James Monroe (1817-1825) declared that the Western Hemisphere would no longer be open to new colonization by European powers. This doctrine did not mean that the United States would be the sole master of the Americas, but rather that the U.S. would oppose any new European colonial ventures in exchange for non-interference in European affairs. Its primary aim at the time was to support Latin American countries that had gained independence from the Spanish Empire-particularly Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina-against the risk of recolonization by France or Russia. The doctrine was coordinated with the United Kingdom, which provided part of U.S. maritime security, thereby weakening the empires of its rivals by keeping them out of Latin America.

This moment equally represents a founding moment in Trumpian thought as it falls within the governing period of one of his three favorite presidents, Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), who conquered Florida and Texas from Spain. At the request of James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, the officer-turned-president, led these conquests, as well as the resulting ethnic cleansing of Native Americans. This figure-a populist with an aggressive personality, a defender of tariffs and racial segregation, a proponent of American territorial expansion and a survivor of an assassination attempt -is one of Donald Trump’s key influences.

The Monroe Doctrine was subsequently co-opted from its original meaning and instrumentalized by two U.S. presidents at the end of the 19th century: William McKinley (1897-1901) and Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909). Relatively unknown, the former was the only president explicitly mentioned by Trump during his inauguration speech on January 20, 2025, and underwent a sort of symbolic revalorization through a presidential decree on the same day, that renamed the United States’ highest peak as "Mount McKinley." In this decree, he is described as having "heroically led our Nation to victory in the Spanish-American War. Under his leadership, the United States enjoyed rapid economic growth and prosperity, including an expansion of territorial gains for the Nation. President McKinley championed tariffs to protect U.S. manufacturing, boost domestic production, and drive U.S. industrialization and global reach to new heights." His influence on Donald Trump is crystal clear. The latter is one of the best-known U.S. presidents, with whom Trump has often compared himself due to Roosevelt’s virile, unfiltered, media-savvy, and New York-style personality-although many historians contest such a parallel, arguing that Roosevelt would likely have opposed many of Trump’s positions.

During their mandate, the United States expelled Spain from the Western Hemisphere, liberated Cuba by taking indirect control of the new regime, annexed Hawaii, took control of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and numerous Pacific islands (such as Guam), all whilst building the Panama Canal. They also took part in the Open Door policy, using military pressure to compel China to trade with the United States. This imperial expansion was justified by the need to secure the Western Hemisphere-eastward against European powers, westward by gaining strategic control of the Pacific-while also finding colonial outlets for an American industry that had already saturated the domestic market. This period heavily informs Trump’s vision of U.S. territorial and geopolitical expansion (Panama, Canada, Greenland, etc.). Furthermore, McKinley was a president in strong support of tariffs, a point that Trump does not fail to highlight.

It is this historically-situated reading of the Monroe Doctrine that has been mobilized by D. Trump since 2018, but also in the current context where Pentagon documents, for example, explicitly refer to it. What we are bearing witness to here is the doctrine’s imperialist reinterpretation.

This interlude lasted only a few years, with significant consequences, because the imperial project was strongly rejected, both by the American political class founded on anti-colonialism and by its own instigators, with Roosevelt at the forefront, deterred by the financial and military costs of the counter-insurgency war that had to be waged in the Philippines. The imperial posture was abandoned in favor of a doctrine of intermittent yet recurrent intervention in Latin America throughout the 20th century, based on the foundations of the Monroe Doctrine as well as the management of regional threats (anti-communism, the war on drugs, etc.).

The Monroe Doctrine, the imperialist interlude, and the current warlike tendencies cannot be understood without taking into account the representations of a regional threat. D. Trump’s position is heavily influenced by a concern shared by all Americans since the founding of the United States: external threats that target their political project and economic prosperity. This sentiment is pervasive, and without delving into its origins, it is crucial to understand that the primary layer of perceived threats for U.S. policymakers comes from their regional space. The historical moments described above sought to secure the United States in this nearby space. Yet, in the 21st century, following three decades of military operations beyond from its borders (peacekeeping missions, counterterrorism efforts, etc.), a consensus has emerged within the American political class: the Western Hemisphere has once again become a zone of threat for the United States, due to the explosion of drug cartel activity (and overdose mortality in the U.S.), the increased activism of strategic competitors Russia, China, and Iran in the region, terrorist threats emanating from the infiltration of illegal immigration networks...

Wielding the Sword Against Venezuela

In this context, Nicolas Maduro's regime embodies the convergence of all these threats: a Marxist regime openly anti-American in a post-Cold War context; closely supported by Russia, Iran, and China; a source of mass immigration to the United States; links between the army and drug cartels, etc. Consequently, an important historical current within the Republican party, driven by a deep-seated anti-communism and intertwined with commercial interests, is seeking to overthrow American revolutionary leaders, such as Maduro or Castro. Such a current is notably carried today by "Cuban-American" officials such as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Marco Rubio, and several Florida officials. D. Trump is surrounded by these figures, and it seems that Rubio is at the helm of the campaign against Venezuela.

In 2019, during his first term, Trump had already given a secret order to topple the Maduro regime, but only via clandestine means and economic pressure. This initial attempt failed, but he retained this objective for his second term, back to work: the objective remains the same, but the strategy changes and escalates. From the outset of his second term, his very first decisions, he laid the groundwork for this strategy to build a political and legal framework capable of legitimizing military intervention to the U.S. public and political officials. How?-Designating drug cartels as terrorist groups; publicly denouncing Nicolas Maduro as directly linked to Tren de Aragua and Cartel de Soles, after having been indicted for drug trafficking in 2020 by the American justice system; fanning the flames of the supposed threat, despite divergent opinions from his intelligence services; ordering the preparation of clandestine operations meant to destabilize the regime; increasing economic sanctions; pre-positioning military forces in the Caribbean; launching targeted, low-scale attacks against ships linked to drug cartels, despite the lack of evidence of and justification for their threatening nature, outside the legal framework of war…

D. Trump's strategic formula has been both simple and clear since his return to power. He does not wish to commit American ground troops to major military operations, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, but wishes to use force and coercion to overthrow Maduro. In this context, the only military solutions available to him are air or naval strike campaigns, and covert strategies (special operations, clandestine operations, cyberattacks, informational operations, etc.). These would be coupled with existing economic pressures to bring about regime change via an internal overthrow of power and military defection to an alternative political figure, such as Juan Guaido, interim president between 2019 and 2023 in parallel with Maduro, or more probably Maria Corina Machado, the 2025 recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, already in close contact with the American administration in preparation of said overthrow.

Preliminary Operations Against Drugs

Since late August 2025, 10 drone strikes, 8 of which in the Caribbean, have been carried out against ships suspected of belonging to drug cartels, resulting in over forty deaths and two prisoners. Colombian, Ecuadorian, Trinidadian, and Venezuelan citizens have been killed, without confirmation of their supposed link to drug trafficking. D. Trump justified these operations by claiming he had particularly precise intelligence-notably of electromagnetic origin (phone or radio interception)-regarding the presence of drug shipments bound for the United States.

While it is currently impossible to confirm that the targeted individuals were drug traffickers, it is important to note that American intelligence services and American armed forces have reallocated significant resources to Latin America to support the fight against drug cartels, particularly since Trump’s first term-a policy that has was continued under President Biden. As such, the mapping of cartels is probably more precise and advanced than it was a decade ago.

A twofold problem emerges:

(i) The disproportionate use of lethal force and the fear of triggering a war without congressional authorization. Legally, the initiation of targeted military operations against "enemy terrorist combatants" is possible for the American president and does not require any specific authorization. However, killing individuals, rather than arresting them, for persons suspected of being drug traffickers is a significant ethical and legal evolution. Mistakes are likely, and the American political class, even Republican, is demanding accountability for what amounts to extrajudicial killings in international zones. Furthermore, political officials, particularly Democrats, noticing the gradual escalation of tensions towards a war in Venezuela, are seeking to prevent such an outcome by returning to the legal and constitutional framework which requires war to be declared against a third state by congressional authorization.

(ii) The absence of evidence produced by the administration, in a context of widespread skepticism toward presidential statements. Only images or videos taken by drones from the airstrikes have been made public, for political communication purposes, but the administration has still failed to produce proof that these operations were targeting drug traffickers. D. Trump has confirmed that these operations are carried out based on abundant and reliable intelligence, yet the divergences that have emerged within the intelligence community since his return to power, on Venezuela or on Iran, tend to discredit his word. Nothing rules out the possibility that these operations are conducted on the basis of weak or unreliable intelligence: while this seems unlikely, given the U.S. military’s robust verification processes, it remains possible considering the political pressure emanating from the White House and the significant biases that could lead to failed military operations. The sudden and unexplained departure of Admiral Alvin Hosley, commander of SOUTHCOM, the American military command responsible for this type of operations, further casts doubt on their legality and legitimacy.

Military Options

In this context, these "anti-drug" military campaigns serve to build the pretext for an imminent American operation on Venezuela.

Approximately half of these forces, including 2,200 marines, are stationed on at least nine ships, among them three destroyers(frigates), three vessels of the Iwo Jima amphibious group, and two special forces ships (including the MV Ocean Trader, a Navy SEAL command vessel used for covert intelligence and projection missions). The other half of these forces have been deployed to airports in Puerto Rico, alongside numerous surveillance aircraft (P8 Orion) and drones (MQ-9 Reaper). Overflights into the Venezuelan airspace and coastlines have been detected, notably B-52 bomber flights from the United States. Puerto Rico constitutes the advanced base for these operations, with a significant deployment of forces and the implementation, for example, of new radars in the Virgin Islands. On October 24, 2025, the Pentagon announced the deployment of the Ford Carrier Strike Group to the Caribbean within the next 10 days. This group comprises the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford and five destroyers as well as 5,500 sailors and over 75 aircraft, including helicopters and combat aircraft.

For now, this deployment is in the planning phase, what American military personnel describe as "shaping the battlefield". Operations would be launched once the shaping phase is complete, when viable options have been presented to President Trump, and he judges the window of opportunity to be favorable. In any case, the deployment offers insight into the military strategy that could be employed, in light of customary U.S. doctrines and the objectives being pursued.

(i) The military strategy would essentially rely on strike campaigns, carried out at sea (missiles from frigates) and from above (B-52 bombings for important military objectives and combat aircraft for secondary strikes). These strikes would target key military aims: initially, radars and anti-aircraft batteries, in particular at the Capitan Manuel Rios airbase housing formidable S-300 batteries, as well as their Sukhoi Su-30 fighters, to take control of airspace; secondly, air (at least 16 identified) and naval bases, to prevent reprisals on American ships; thirdly, army bases, notably Fort Tiuna in Caracas.

(ii) These strike campaigns would be coordinated with special-operations raids, upstream to guide these strikes (covert insertion of JTACs to call in fires), and then, once the airspace secured, to capture or eliminate high-value targets (senior regime figures). Given D. Trump's lack of restraint, it is likely that he would seek to neutralize Nicolas Maduro, for example, via a drone strike. These "in and out" special-operations raids would be carried out from offshore ships, in parallel with combat helicopter-raids to potentially destroy secondary and mobile targets (tanks, ground troops). The destruction of Venezuelan armies should not necessarily be an objective of the campaign, given that part of the strategy is to lead the army to abandon Maduro.

(iii) An amphibious deployment of U.S. Marines could follow, intended to capture coastal bases and, if necessary, support the installation in Caracas of an alternative Venezuelan political figure. Even though the capital is little more than 10 kilometres from the shoreline, this phase would remain the riskiest, exposing American ground troops to the highest operational danger.

(iv) These operations would be backed by covert measures designed to weaken the Venezuelan politico-military edifice and support military operations. The US Cyber Command and cyber components (notably MARFORCYBER for SOCOM and FLTCYBER for SOUTHCOM) would be responsible for neutralizing defenses (radars) and critical infrastructure (the electrical grid, for example) via cyberattacks. SOCOM would also be responsible for conducting informational operations to flood the Venezuelan digital and media space, presumably by calling for popular uprising or by circulating rumors of regime collapse or the flight of senior officials. Above all, the CIA has been tasked with conducting clandestine operations. In the present case, this rather broad term could encompass, amongst others, operations aimed at using the growing military threat to induce military defection and flight of senior officials, but also to prepare political figures or paramilitary actors to support an insurrection and power transfer, and other deniable actions. These activities would also likely contribute to destabilizing the Venezuelan economy.

Given D. Trump's lack of restraint, it is likely that he would seek to neutralize Nicolas Maduro via a drone strike, for example.

(v) In intelligence terms, the United States has a considerable advantage over Venezuela. Military planning, particularly the targeting phase, is predominantly carried out through satellite photography and aerial reconnaissance (IMINT), backed by the interception and localization of radio and telephone communications of the Venezuelan armed forces (SIGINT). The main challenge is to locate the mobile, discreet S-300 batteries, which are the only ones capable of destroying American aircraft. This practice of military intelligence is typical for American armies. In addition, almost all international data flows from Latin America transit through Miami and American territory, allowing the NSA to carry out massive intelligence collection on the Internet and more regular trapping of telephones and computers used by regime officials. The uncertainty lies in human-source intelligence (HUMINT), the country having been both a long-term adversary as well as a low-priority objective for the CIA for the past 20 years. In any event, to carry out the strategy described above, the United States has largely sufficient means.

Even if the Maduro regime is preparing and deploying, as of now, its popular militias to face a possible aggression, the military and technological superiority possessed by America is overwhelming. The Venezuelan Army has over 100,000 soldiers, including approximately 60,000 army soldiers and 30,000 navy personnel; as well as several hundred thousand popular militiamen who have received military training. These forces are generally poorly equipped, poorly trained, and poorly maintained, plagued by deep corruption and harsh economic sanctions. While it is plausible to anticipate a regime collapse, it is far more difficult to measure the level of nationalism and ideological indoctrination of soldiers and citizens that would result in a strong, popular, and insurrectional response to a unilateral American assault.

Strategically, the United States would therefore have at least four challenges:

• Venezuela is a very vast country, making it likely to pave the way to a long insurrection in the event of the regime's collapse or the seizing of Caracas. If the United States manages to install a new government while opening the way to a long civil war, the problem will remain for Washington;
• Venezuela is not alone. The large neighboring countries are far from privileged allies of the United States, the American administration is strongly opposed to both the Brazilian and Colombian governments. The logistical and political support, if not military, of these two countries must be taken into account and could extend the scope of the Venezuelan problem for the United States. In a context of war, the United States will only be able to count on the logistical assistance and territories of Trinidad and Tobago or Guyana, both close to the American administration;
• Russian, Iranian, and Chinese reactions could complicate matters for Washington. While they may lack the means to directly prevent such an intervention or influence tactical balances, they could nonetheless exploit U.S. military engagement to advance their own agendas, supporting new offensives in Ukraine or applying additional pressure on Taiwan. American stagists will therefore have to manage challenges posed by their competitors, who would not miss an opportunity to rally the countries of the Global South against an intervention of this type, all the while ensuring the success of their operations;
• In the short term, an overthrow of the Maduro regime would be perceived as a victory, but in the medium term, the MAGA base could be very critical of this new military adventurism, especially as migratory flows would sharply increase. Loud criticism, from within the MAGA camp, can already be heard and, like the sole American strike in Iran, this military operation would need to remain swift if Trump wishes to maintain the support of his electoral base and his ideologues.

Copyright image : Jim WATSON / AFP.US
Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Donald Trump at the White House, October 9, 2025.