Public Opinion and the EU: The French and Defense Issues

From Secondary Subject to Established Priority: Defense Moves Up the Ranks

In the mid-2000s, concerns in France was dominated by economic and social issues. Opinion polls from this time - whether from the Eurobarometer series or national institutes - showed that defense only appeared as a marginal concern (fewer than 5% included it in their list of worries). The issue was perceived as a strictly sovereign prerogative (compétence régalienne), handled through an alliance system within the primary framework of NATO, and relatively disconnected from daily life in an era marked by few conflicts, especially within Europe. With the exception of certain Eastern European Member States, this marginalization of defense in public opinion was common across most of the EU-27.

This marginality contrasts sharply with the current period. In 2025, 18% of French citizens cited security and defense as one of the two main issues facing the European Union; a level close to the European average (16%), though lower than that observed in certain Central and Eastern European countries. In Poland, for example, concern levels regularly exceed 25%, reflecting direct geographical and historical exposure to the Russian threat. Conversely, in Italy and Spain, defense remains significantly behind economic and migration priorities.

This shift is part of a broader European trend: in 2024, 33% of Europeans ranked security and defense as the Union’s top priority. That figure rose to 37% in 2025; it had never exceeded 20% before 2022. In 13 out of 27 Member States - including France, Germany, and Poland - these issues now lead the pack. This progression marks a break from the 2010s, which were shaped by other emergencies: first the Eurozone crisis, then the 2015 migration crisis.

In historical terms, this upswing might well be construed as a return to a former status quo. During the Cold War, defense constituted a structuring horizon in France, though it was rarely debated publicly. The period that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, by contrast, brought with it a sequence of "strategic desensitization." This included military budget cuts and the gradual distancing of national service - suspended in France since 1997 - against the backdrop of a diminished, and ultimately legitimately so, perception of threat. French public opinion had gradually disinvested from defense issues, which were primarily discussed in the public sphere during technical debates (parliamentary budget discussions, debates on military welfare, or humanitarian crises).

Simultaneously, research on French public opinion shows that the image of the armed forces has remained generally positive since the 1990s, but defense was not perceived as a central political issue until the 2010s and 2020s. During this decade, the surge in terrorist attacks, the major deployment of French soldiers in the Sahel, and, above all, the war in Ukraine has pushed this issue back to the forefront of public focus.

A Shift Linked to the War in Ukraine and the Degradation of the Strategic Environment

The shift observed since 2022 stems primarily from an exogenous shock: the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This conflict acted as a brutal revelation of the return of state-on-state conflict to Europe - something many believed was an element of the past.

Eurobarometer data corroborates this point. In 2025, 75% of French citizens (and 77% of Europeans) considered the invasion a threat to the security of the European Union (Eurobaromètre Standard 104, automne 2025). Furthermore, 78% of Europeans feel "concerned about the defense and security of the EU for the next five years" (77% in France, Standard Eurobarometer 103, Spring 2025). This level of risk perception is historically high, comparable to the peaks of tension during the Cold War, albeit in a drastically different context where conventional warfare is now combined with hybrid forms and cyber threats.

Another unique feature of our time is that this shock has translated into mass support for European action. In Autumn 2025, 79% of Europeans declared themselves in favor of a common security and defense policy, and 71% supported strengthening the Union's military industrial capabilities. In the same survey, 71% of people in France approved of economic sanctions against Russia, 73% supported financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and 53% backed the funding and delivery of military equipment to Ukraine (down from 68% in Spring 2022-a notable decline).

Political discourse in France has mirrored this shift, with the presidency investing heavily in defense topics. This has materialized in the publication of three strategic reviews between 2017 and 2025 (over the previous 40 years, the average for this reference document was one every ten years). As early as 2017, Emmanuel Macron advocated for a "Defence Europe" in his Sorbonne speech. After 2022, this line was reaffirmed, particularly during European security conferences, emphasizing the need to "rearm" the continent. It recently culminated in a more explicit stance in favor of extending the French nuclear umbrella to its European partners - a move President Macron has vigorously backed, marking a significant shift in doctrine.

An Established Centrality, but Lingering Divergences on the Response

While a consensus is emerging on the reality of the threat - some 58% now consider an armed conflict involving France a likely prospect over the next five years - this does not mechanically extend to the modalities of the response. This high perception of risk contrasts with a low level of confidence in national preparedness: only 27% of French people believe the country is ready to face a conflict, and 73% judge its military preparation to be insufficient. Nevertheless, a large majority of French people support a common security and defense policy for EU member states (74%), and nearly one in two French people believe that more decisions should be taken at the EU level (49%). This principled support for collective action is, however, accompanied by widespread distrust of both European and national institutions.

The French case is thus distinguished by a recurring paradox. Sensitivity to strategic issues is relatively high, and support for common action is the majority view, yet trust in institutions (European and national) remains low. In 2025, only 27% of French people declared they trust the European Union, compared to an EU average of 48%. Conversely, 61% expressed distrust; a gap of more than fifteen points from the European average. This tension also permeates France’s relationship with Europe. With historically ambivalent roots regarding European integration, the France-Europe relationship is marked both by a leading role in defense policies (from national nuclear deterrence to European capability initiatives) and a reluctance to delegate sovereignty. Furthermore, this sentiment of distrust is characteristic of France as a whole. Recall that in 2025, nearly one in two French people said they felt "distrust," and a sweeping majority stated they had "little to no trust" in political parties (89%), the national government (86%), or the national parliament (80%).

What about elsewhere? By comparison, Germany presents the opposite profile: higher trust in European institutions but a strategic culture that has long been more reluctant to use force. Poland, for its part, combines a strong perception of threat with a priority attachment to the NATO framework. Italy and Spain are characterized by a lower priority given to defense and a more intermittent approach to these issues.

The French case presents another ambivalence: a high sensitivity to defense issues combined with a persistent reluctance to fully assume their implications. On one hand, the perception of the threat is widely shared; it now structures the political agenda. On the other hand, the modalities of the response - the level of effort, the instruments mobilized, and the coordination between national, European, and Atlantic levels - remain heavily debated. The divide is no longer over the necessity of action, but over the conditions of that action.

Copyright image : Thibaud MORITZ/AFP
The Standard Eurobarometer is a survey conducted for the European Commission by Verian.