[National Security: The Reality Check] - “Economic Security Is National Security”

INSTITUT MONTAIGNE - What, in your view, is the best definition of economic security?
 

GEOFFROY ROUX DE BÉZIEUX - "Economic security policy aims to ensure the defence and promotion of the Nation’s economic, industrial, and scientific interests, which notably consist of strategic tangible and intangible assets for the French economy. It includes the defence of digital sovereignty." This is how the law sets the terms of the debate.
 

Let us go further. To conceptualise economic security, one must proceed via concentric circles, the most elementary of which consists of ensuring that the vital mechanisms of the public economy function smoothly. These terms can be interpreted more or less extensively. However, under a minimalist vision, every link in our food sovereignty, as well as our transport and communication infrastructures, is essential. A broader, longer-term definition ensures the continuity of supply for critical materials required to communicate, receive healthcare, and travel. The scope of economic security is therefore vast. A vital minimum must be guaranteed while extending the protection of our interests, keeping in mind that economic security differs between peacetime and wartime - the former being significantly broader than the latter.

For instance, the SNCF is an indispensable actor in our national and economic security. Securing it means protecting it against interference of any kind. This ranges from physical attacks on installations to interferences with tangible effects (such as a cyber operation with severe human consequences targeting signaling systems) or intangible effects (such as disparagement campaigns).
 

IM - What is the relationship between economic security and national security?

GRB - "Economic Security is National Security." This is the epigraph, attributed to Donald Trump, placed at the head of the second pillar ["Promote American Prosperity"] of the 2017 US National Security Strategy. While the interpretation offered by the American president is dubious to say the least, the fact remains that national security cannot be conceived without its economic dimension, and that economic security is a category of national security. One would be wrong to dissociate them or rank them hierarchically, as in the simplistic formula: "the logistics will follow" (wrongly attributed to General de Gaulle, who never said any such thing). On the contrary, the functioning of the nation’s vital economic services and our capacity to maintain functional technological and military structures are integral and indispensable components of national security.

This is especially true in a twenty-first century defined by dual-use technologies. The war in Ukraine provides proof of this every day. In January, Volodymyr Zelenskyy thus appointed Mykhailo Fedorov, a 34-year-old tech entrepreneur and drone specialist, as Minister of Defence. Such a convergence of the security and economic spheres, forced by urgency, represents a seismic shift in practices that was unthinkable until recently. By the very force of circumstances, it completely redefines our conceptual framework.
 

IM- So the challenge of adaptation is fundamental?

GRB - It will need to be addressed in three stages. Today, we are only at the awareness stage, but it has indeed begun: economic security has become a matter of concern (one can think of the Flash intelligence alerts regularly published by the DGSI on economic interference), particularly for heads of companies operating in sovereign domains.

The second stage will involve establishing an actual national strategy. For the time being, economic security is not handled at the appropriate level: while there are departments that deal with different aspects of economic counter-interference (such as SISSE at the Ministry of the Economy, or the DGSE and the DRSD within the Ministry of the Armed Forces), there is no integrated strategy, and therefore no global approach. Our system must scale up to match the escalation of threats.

The final stage would involve preparing society as a whole by raising our fellow citizens' awareness of these issues. Ongoing work on the defence spirit shows that this vulnerability is being taken into account from a military perspective. Hence the shock caused in public opinion by the words of the French Chief of the Defence Staff, Fabien Mandon, at the Mayor’s Congress of France on 19 November 2025: he warned of the peril of a lack of "strength of soul" and the risk of "faltering" in the face of potential armed conflict, calling on the French people to prepare to "lose their children" and to "suffer economically". But let us not forget that economic security and the defence spirit share a common trait: they constitute two targets through which an adversary can seek to destabilise a country in peacetime. The security threat very much affects businesses as well, which might no longer be able to operate under normal conditions. We must therefore prepare the resilience of our economic activity from this angle too.

IM - The parallel with military conflict is enlightening: economic security threats occur during peacetime, meaning the economic domain is a peacetime battlefield. Under these conditions, does the response need to be comprehensive and integrated? 

GRB - In France, although military exercises are frequent (I’m thinking of Orion, a joint and allied military exercise organized every three years on our territory to simulate a major multi-domain engagement, the latest of which has just concluded), they have no civilian equivalent. That would involve simulating a major supply chain disruption or the destabilization of transport and command hubs. Obviously, practicing the paralysis of the entire country is difficult, but it would be more feasible at a regional scale. Some of our allies are setting an example with preparations that integrate civilian and military issues on equal terms. The British, for instance, organize wargames that bring together the National Security Council and the Treasury Secretariat to simulate crises. Geopolitical signals indicate that we must prepare for this type of eventuality, and that the economy is part of an increasingly expanding theater of hostile operations. Russia, for example, tests its target countries in multifaceted ways, seeking to destabilize them over the long term through everything from digital interference to disrupting democratic stability. To expose the adversary's actions and boost the spirit of defense, it would be desirable to declassify more information to bring it forward as evidence in the public debate. It is normal and understandable that the services concerned, within the Ministry of the Armed Forces or even Foreign Affairs, are reluctant given the sensitivity of certain files. Nevertheless, if we want better mobilization of the French people, they must be better informed about the reality of these threats.
 

IM - Foreign interference involves an adversarial State: is the state framework sufficient for a response, or should other actors be included?

GRB - We used to believe that interstate destabilisation belonged to an era that the optimism of 'happy-globalisation' had brought to a close. Today, it is returning with a vengeance. However, we are now witnessing not only state-on-state operations, but also destabilisation campaigns carried out via proxies, some of whom do not even realise they are being used. Certain NGOs or businesses, for instance, can be manipulated by hostile states looking to weaponise specific issues. State capitalism is also being used as a tool for leverage. Look at the United States, where, in a stark departure from traditional laissez-faire policy, the state is increasingly taking direct stakes in private companies. We must recognise that in this post-globalisation era, as soon as companies begin to be viewed as extensions of national interest, they become targets for exploitation.
 

IM - How can we improve corporate resilience? What are the best approaches for raising awareness among businesses?

GRB - Several solutions are currently being deployed. Companies are sometimes embedding a strategic foresight and geopolitical intelligence function directly into corporate security directorates, moving far beyond a sole focus on asset and personal security. Increasingly, former military personnel are joining companies or advising them through specialised consultancies. While this is useful, it is not the right scale of response. As argued in the report I submitted to the Presidency, we need to tighten the links between the business world and public economic security, that is to say national security, on a much more comprehensive scale.

To achieve this, however, France has yet to clearly identify what is truly vital to the country - this is the prerequisite for any resilience strategy. While a classified list of critical operators does exist, it is not systematic enough. We need a comprehensive map outlining the country’s essential requirements, taking into account various levels of tension. What are our dependencies? How are our technologies being protected from foreign interference?

Talking about resilience does not mean we have to manufacture everything in France, but it requires a smart approach that builds in the parameter of redundancy. It is one thing not to manufacture a given component in France if we can source it from Portugal or Italy; it is quite another if the component in question is no longer manufactured anywhere in Europe.
 

IM - It is sometimes easy to claim that economic security is simply protectionism by another name. To what extent can we reconcile an open, attractive model with the security of our national interests?
 

GRB - I have said it elsewhere, and I will say it again: we must "find the right balance between 'Choose France' and 'Protect France'". On one hand, far from adopting a protectionist, inward-looking posture or blocking investments, France, where capital depth is insufficient and which only has a market of 69 million consumers, must support the position of its companies within globalisation, while simultaneously, it must understand its dependencies and choose its battles to address them. "100% Made in France" is impossible. For the moment, we are content with merely listing critical technologies, without making any trade-offs. We must concentrate our resources in line with a strategic vision, this is the prerequisite for any industrial policy. We need to strictly select 7 or 8 strategic technologies that we lack, and do everything possible to enable ourselves to produce them, for example, by making Chinese companies' access to the French market conditional on setting up joint ventures with technology transfers.

This defensive approach must go hand in hand with a more offensive approach, by preserving options for retaliation or negotiation. We have the means to do this: for example, we can assert true industrial sovereignty regarding undersea telecommunications cables, because around a third of the world's cable-laying fleet is controlled by French actors, and they were integrated into the strategic fleet by decree in 2017.
 

IM - What role should economic security play in our national security strategy? What methodology would guarantee its effective integration?
 

GRB - Economic security must be treated on an equal footing with other sectors of national security. It is therefore appropriate to involve a panel of corporate leaders brought together in a committee to avoid individual bias. Intelligence services must build meaningful links with strategic economic sectors. We need a permanent body, mixing practitioners from the economy and the administration that interacts regularly with security-cleared economic leaders in positions of responsibility. This would be the equivalent of the PIAB [President's Intelligence Advisory Board] during the Obama administration. France all too often tends to consider that a business leader can only defend private interests. On the contrary, a genuine patriotism exists that can be readily mobilised.
 

IM - That said, globalisation can blur the traditional boundaries of the economy. How can we know if an economic actor is purely national?
 

GRB - Talking about economic security means indirectly raising the question of corporate nationality. Does it remain a functional parameter, in a globalised economy where a majority of shareholders as well as the Board of Directors are not of the same nationality as their company, and their employees, suppliers and customers are global? Ultimately, what serves as proof is seeing who a company turns to in times of difficulty, whether legal or economic. The fact that the solution of last resort is Bercy can serve as a touchstone to signal that the company is indeed French…

IM - You submitted a report to the President of the Republic eighteen months ago: as far as you are able to talk about it, have some of your recommendations resulted in concrete measures? Do you feel that the relevant actors are more aware of the issues?
 

GRB - There has been no structural reorganisation but rather a series of continuous improvements. Certain desirable reforms, the creation of a civil security clearance status for example, require legislative action but the parliamentary route remains blocked due to the political context. On the other hand, best practices are spreading across both companies and the State.
 

IM - Which existing system seems to you to be the most advanced and could serve as a model?

GRB - Economic security is not thought about in the same way in the democratic world as it is in authoritarian regimes. Among democracies, Israel undoubtedly presents the most advanced model, with a quasi-existential fusion of economic and security matters. Yet, this can only be understood through a highly unique historical context and specific constraints that France cannot, and must not, replicate.

The English-speaking world offers an interesting example: the permeability between major economic leaders and the world of state economic security is much higher there. The British Ministry of Defence hosts an independent board, a sort of advisory council on which business leaders sit. It is similar to the American PIAB that I previously mentioned. Its composition is public but its work is not. This is proof that the business world can collaborate with the State without this having to be analysed through the prism of a conflict of interest.

IM - Indeed, the 2008 White Paper, in discussing the redefinition of core strategic functions and the reorganisation of public authorities, recommended (in addition to creating a Defence and National Security Council) the constitution of an advisory council including civil figures: "the State must organise its relationship with public and private operators as well as with civil society", and specified that "this strategic function includes, as essential components, workforce training, business preparedness and public communication, which must increase the overall resilience of French society."

GRB - French resistance is strong: we have a cultural bias which makes us consider that the defence of the public interest belongs to the State, and that the defence of private interests falls to businesses. This is tantamount to signing the death warrant of any economic security strategy. This siloed vision was temporarily challenged during the Covid pandemic. Historically, a common threat forces a "sacred union". Nonetheless, the old suspicion quickly returned with a vengeance. While companies have their specific interests, they also care about the public interest. Conversely, it is in the public interest for the French economy to be successful. The State does not have a monopoly on the public interest, but is its custodian and guarantor. The company acts in the interest of its shareholders, but also contributes to the public interest.
 

IM - Can economic security be addressed at the European level?
 

There is a European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, the Slovak Maroš Šefčovič (a Social Democrat), and certain aspects of economic security are exclusive European competences, starting with trade policy (customs duties, trade agreements) or economic sanctions (safeguard system, rebalancing measures with additional customs duties, anti-coercion regulation). However, the competences associated with economic security are for the most part national competences (national security, economic intelligence).

Most other aspects of economic security fall under shared competences, such as the control of foreign investments, governed by the 2019 Foreign Direct Investment screening regulation. It provides for an alert system between Member States regarding investments deemed concerning and a minimum threshold of mandatory requirements at national level on the security of FDI, and it gives the Commission the possibility to issue an opinion in the event of an investment undermining the security of more than one Member State. This regulation was revised with higher requirements in December 2025, with an adoption in April 2026: FDI screening is now mandatory in certain strategic areas (dual-use items and military equipment, "hyper-critical" technologies, critical raw materials, critical entities in the field of energy, transport and digital infrastructure, electoral infrastructure), the alert system between Member States will be strengthened and the Commission has announced a draft European directive to condition foreign investments in risky sectors.

GRB - The EU is therefore an indispensable tier of economic security. But this cannot erase reality: even if it is desirable to work together, for example through the implementation of common doctrines regarding certain American or Chinese investments, European countries and their companies compete with each other and do not have the same interests. In Europe, different States vie for the opportunity to host this or that production site, this or that factory which they hope will revitalise a local job market.

Furthermore, not all States are at the same level regarding economic intelligence culture. It is long-standing in certain countries, including France, a Gaullist heritage, or the United Kingdom, but this is not the rule. It is easy to understand why: the very notion of economic security makes little sense in a country of two million inhabitants, where companies cannot turn to their domestic market, where economic sovereignty has little relevance and where there are fewer major industrial and technological players. Economic security is a crucial subject above a certain threshold of population and wealth. It can be approached at the European level but not at 27: only between "large countries". Another difficulty is that of the offensive boundary: Europeans can agree to defend their companies; but what happens when it comes to conducting offensive policies?

Economic security is thus a reminder of the unsurpassable nature of our national sovereignty, even if it can be approached in a polymorphic and concerted manner.

Interview conducted by Hortense Miginiac

Copyright Behrouz MEHRI / AFP