European Elections: One Year Later, the Need for Radical Change

European Fragmentation in the Face of External Challenges

Stunned and confused: these are the main feelings that Europeans have experienced since the new European institutions - resulting from the European elections (June 2024) and the composition of the new Commission (November 2024) - took office. This year has been marked by the decisions taken by Donald Trump since his return to the White House. The US president had announced what he was going to do, both economically, with the increase in customs duties - even if he has gone further than expected - and geopolitically, particularly with regard to Ukraine - even if the rapprochement between Washington and Moscow constitutes an unprecedented break with the Western bloc.

Internationally, the European Union is now the only major power-at least economically-thatis not subject to the political rule of a single and authoritarian exercise of power and to the domination of an oligarchy. Just a few months after Trump's return to the White House, it is now clear that the new US administration is also engaged in an ideological and cultural war against the "values" and principles of political liberalism and the social market economy that underpin the European Union. The Munich Security Conference served as a revelation of this fracture within the West itself.

More than a year ago, we showed that the dynamics of fragmentation and the rise of populism at work in the Member States and across the Union risked making it difficult to formulate a European response and make decisions in the face of external challenges and threats. Since then, during a situation of increased vulnerability in terms of competitiveness and external security, further exacerbated by an internal political context in which radical and extreme right-wing parties are enjoying electoral success - most recently in Poland, Portugal and Romania - Europe is all the more exposed as its political fragmentation prevents it from reaching agreement and taking decisions. 

The risk of European fragmentation is therefore political, economic and strategic: political, because the inability to make decisions increases dissatisfaction and fuels populism, which in turn reinforces political fragmentation; economic, because political uncertainty leads economic actors to postpone their investments, which reduces growth and employment; and strategic, because the inability to make decisions weakens the European Union in relation to other powers. A fragmented European system makes it more difficult to respond not only to authoritarian regimes, but also to a United States with a unified government pursuing a program radicalized by internal polarization. Therefore, this European fragmentation and its institutional consequences make it very hard for the European Union to prepare itself to face the challenges ahead.

These challenges are considerable: war on the European continent, liberal democracy under attack, increasingly tense international relations on both the economic and geopolitical fronts, and the acceleration of digital transformation. In such an unstable and conflict-ridden world, increased political fragmentation within the EU and its member states is widening the gap between the size of the challenges to be met and the ability to agree on ambitious responses. On the one hand, there is consensus on the economic and strategic situation and the critical moment the EU is facing, as evidenced in recent months by the reception of the alarming but lucid reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi on European competitiveness. There is also the recent realization of the need to rearm Europe in the context of the fracture in the Western bloc following Trump's return to the White House. On the other hand, however, fragmentation and nationalist populism are making it exceptionally difficult to present a united front and act as Europeans at a time when external pressure is very strong

European Institutions (still) Reacting and too Slow...

The threats are obvious: Russia's aggressive policies threaten European security, China's production surpluses threaten European industry, and the technological and financial dominance of the United States is driving the most promising European companies to leave the continent.

This context gives the impression to the outside world that the EU and its member states are too slow to react and incapable of responding to threats that were nevertheless foreseeable.

This contrasts sharply with the unified decision-making capacity on the other side of the Atlantic, symbolized by the executive orders signed by the US president. This causes the EU to appear to be reacting once again, rather than proactively addressing external events. In terms of defense, despite the announcement of the "ReArmEurope" plan (also known as the "defense package" presented a few days earlier by the President of the European Commission), there is no clear strategy that would give Europe the means to ensure its own security at the supranational level and obtain the financial resources to achieve this. Whatever response is chosen, the real test will be the ability to rearm in accordance with the spirit of the EU: how can we think in a concerted manner, as Europeans, i.e. by investing in common defense capabilities, if at the same time national political actors have as their priority the rearmament of their own states? Due to the costs of duplication, the operational costs of limited interoperability between national armies, the political costs of a sharp slowdown in European integration or even a national arms race between Member States, and the strategic costs of a reduced capacity to develop a common and autonomous industrial base, any bad decisions will be highly damaging.

Furthermore, it seems that Europe does not have a clear vision of the technology and finance needed to close its productivity gap with the United States: we are not making any progress on the capital marketsunion, even though the investment needs for the energy and digital transitions are immense and the legislative proposal on the digital euro, which dates back two years, has still not been adopted by the EU's legislative branch.

The simplification agenda and the Omnibus project are welcome, assuming that such a review of European regulatory policies is a useful exercise to strengthen the competitiveness of European businesses without leading to excessive deregulation. However, it is very important to emphasize that regulatory simplification cannot come solely from the European level. It must also come from the national level. European regulation can indeed be a source of simplification when it replaces national rules. In doing so, it not only serves to simplify but also to unify and harmonize the single market.

Furthermore, with regard to the legislative measures needed, the Commission must help to raise awareness of the urgency of the situation, particularly in the European Parliament, where so far the European People's Party (EPP) has mainly served to create confusion and weaken the Commission by regularly voting with the conservative, radical right-wing and far-right parties (at least to amend or delay texts). Several votes, initially consultative and then legislative (e.g. on postponing the ban on imported deforestation), led to negotiations between the EPP and the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), which resulted in majority compromises supported by the additional votes of the two far-right groups. It remains to be seen whether this convergence reflects an ideological rapprochement that is likely to continue over time, at the risk of generating opposition from the Social Democrats and some of the Liberals, or whether it is more of a tactical warning shot from the EPP. It is therefore also up to the Commission President to assess the urgency of the situation and their own responsibility. The new German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, could be of great help in this regard.

The Need for European Strategic Thinking

The critical situation in which Europeans find themselves at least clarifies the objectives: the issue of European sovereignty is now very clearly articulated in terms of "independence"-to employ the word used by both Friedrich Merz and Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank. But this awareness must be accompanied by a clear understanding of the world we live in, a precise definition of the means we need to achieve this goal of "independence," and the organization of the logistics for this within the framework of quasi "military" planning.

Doesn't this strategy at work in the United States, China, and also Russia resemble a return to "gunboat diplomacy"? The lesson of history from this period is well known: such ambitions can lead to alliances between these powers (in the short term, competitors can become allies) or, conversely, to major confrontations between them.

Furthermore, another characteristic feature of these new international relations is the dominant affirmation of an authoritarian and illiberal oligarchic logic. While the United States once sought to be an example of government of the people, by the people, and for the people-in line with Abraham Lincoln's vision-it is now a government run by a few billionaires for themselves, relying on their media, financial, and now executive power to limit domestic opposition. They are thus following the example of Russia (where economic and political power is concentrated in the hands of Putin and his inner circle) and China (around the Chinese Communist Party). While this logic is not new, as the interwar period showed, what is new today is the means available to these new illiberal oligarchies. Now, they have the means to reconfigure the balance of power, leaving the EU and its member states very isolated and in a position of great vulnerability given the demographic, economic, and military weight represented by this "alliance"-even if informal-of authoritarian and illiberal oligarchies formed around the American, Chinese, and Russian spheres of influence. This unnatural "alliance" finds its point of convergence in the attack on what the EU embodies: a political and legal community that remains committed to a democratic and liberal constitutional order that protects freedoms, as well as to the rule of law-a guarantee of stability and trust on both the political and economic fronts-and which is based on the separation and balance of powers.

A new regime of international politics is thus emerging with the shift from a political dynamic based on the opposition between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes to an international order now dominated by the divide between oligarchies and non-oligarchies on the political level, on the one hand, and between liberal market economies and illiberal capitalism on the other, which accommodates mercantilist policies or "gunboat diplomacy." In such a context, the EU and its Member States find themselves in a relationship of weakness vis-à-vis the strong. To resist the strong, Europeans must maintain their cohesion and unity around the political principles that underpin the EU. They must also show that they are a geopolitical force that commands respect, has many allies, and supports those who want to follow its path. If the European Union becomes the rallying point for liberal democracies and open economies, if its support for Ukraine remains strong enough even in adversity, and if the member states equip themselves with the means to protect themselves effectively and in solidarity against a potential invader, then the European Union can protect its sovereignty. Beyond that, avoiding subservience to the strong means that Europeans must achieve their "march towards independence," to use the expression recently used by the President of the European Central Bank, and organize themselves to develop this independence sector by sector.

Presenting a United Front and Embodying the EU's "March Towards Independence"

In such a situation, the key question is therefore: how can such a fragmented political system be organized to present a united front in the face of challenges and threats?

At the institutional level, the experience of recent crises suggests two avenues. The first is creating a united front of institutional leaders to agree on a few priorities and focus political capital on them. At the European level, this is what made it possible to emerge from the sovereign debt crisis. The reform of the economic governance of the eurozone was the result of a common agenda defined in a report co-signed by the presidents of the main European institutions (European Commission, European Central Bank, European Council, Eurogroup, European Parliament). The second consists of appointing a figurehead to lead negotiations on the basis of a mandate entrusted to them by the political authorities, reporting regularly to them and drawing on the public administration across the board. At the European level, this is what was put in place in the context of Brexit and ensured European unity and cohesion in the negotiations with the United Kingdom. A similar solution could be adopted to defend European positions and engage in a showdown with Trump, Putin or Xi. These would be practical ways to remedy the inherent weaknesses of a fragmented political system and embody European values and interests in global geopolitical and economic competition.

We need a figure who embodies European unity and prepares the Union's strategy in response to these authoritarian leaders in a multi-sectoral manner. Europeans need to embody this "march towards independence" and think about how to organize and implement it. They must set themselves the goal of speaking loudly enough with one voice to be heard and carry weight. Finally, they must think through their strategy and its implementation to maximize its effectiveness. Despite their fragmentation and polyarchy, the European Union and its member states must rely on the principle that Europeans are stronger together. In the military sphere, as in the economic sphere, this cannot be achieved through cooperation; it requires union. To do this, they must organize themselves and prepare for battle.

There can be no significant political change at the European level without the ability to conceive of a truly European policy, i.e., a European defense, a European industry, European finance, and European research, which are not reduced to the lowest common denominator of the positions of the member states in Brussels. During recent crises, it was precisely the ability to invent new ways of doing things and to overcome certain national taboos-from the European recovery plan to joint gas purchases and joint vaccine production-that made it possible to rise to the various challenges.

If Europeans do not move in this direction, they will remain under fire-on the economic, security, and ideological fronts-from all those who refuse to allow them to be independent in the face of the return of brutal power relations and neo-imperial ambitions. To put it another way, and in the context of the current paradigm shift, Europeans must be able to unite if they do not want to be divided and conquered! As Mario Draghi says, "Radical change is needed!"

Copyright image : FREDERICK FLORIN / AFP
Eurocorps soldiers during the commemoration of the end of World War II in Europe, in Strasbourg, in front of the European Parliament, on May 7, 2025.