[Decoding France] - The Road to 2027: Elections, Culture, Energy, and Diplomacy

After the Municipal elections last month, followed what is traditionally known as the "third round "-a process that illuminates certain power dynamics. This round involves the election of 1,254 presidents of intermunicipal bodies-structures that pool several municipalities to jointly exercise delegated powers and which are playing an increasingly significant role in local governance.

The results of this "third round" confirm the growing presence of the National Rally (RN). In 2020, the RN did not win a single intermunicipal body; just six years later, it has already claimed five. Although this surge remains geographically concentrated in areas already favorable to the RN, it nonetheless constitutes a further step in the party’s drive for mainstream acceptance. This dynamic is likely to shape the coming political landscape, particularly the Senate elections in late September 2026. It could allow the RN to form a group within the Senate, which requires a minimum of ten senators.

The first round of the presidential election is expected to take place on April 11 or 18, 2027, and the campaign has already well and truly begun. Yet even as the number of candidates is growing, the selection processes remain unresolved across the board.

The process of nominating a right-wing candidate offers a prime example. On April 19, members of Les Républicains (LR) appeared to have made their decision by rejecting the idea of a primary and choosing the party’s president, Bruno Retailleau, as their candidate. The fact that the party used primaries as the method for selecting two previous failed candidates-François Fillon in 2017 and Valérie Pécresse in 2022-may have influenced the decision not to hold a primary. Yet the nomination of Retailleau has not resolved all issues. Laurent Wauquiez, Retailleau’s main rival and leader of the LR deputies in the National Assembly, denounced the selection process as a "farce" and revived the idea of holding a broad primary. The question is, therefore, not merely who will represent LR but whether there can be a single candidate for the entire center right and centrist bloc. The difficulty of nominating a presidential candidate is not just a problem for LR. It is mirrored, in a different form, in the ambitions of two of Emmanuel Macron’s former prime ministers: Édouard Philippe, who entered the campaign as early as September 2024 and is pursuing a strategy of cautious, independent positioning, and Gabriel Attal, who is stepping up the pace. In a new book, Attal distances himself further from President Macron and leaves little doubt as to his intention to stand as a fully fledged candidate. Ultimately, LR’s rejection of a primary has done nothing to clarify the issue facing the broader bloc spanning from the right to the center. Without a common procedure or uncontested leadership, rival candidacies are multiplying.

On the left, too, the disagreement centers primarily on the nomination process. The "united left" primary, announced for October 11, 2026 by several leaders from the left and the Greens (notably Marine Tondelier and Olivier Faure), remains a contested process, with several prominent figures such as MEP Raphaël Glucksmann refusing to participate altogether. La France insoumise, for its part, refuses to participate in this process and is expected to nominate Jean-Luc Mélenchon once again.

Perhaps most unexpectedly, uncertainty has also descended on what had until now been the most unified camp. Marine Le Pen is awaiting the appeal ruling on her potential ineligibility, which is due on July 7, 2026. Should this be confirmed, Jordan Bardella has already indicated that he would step in as the candidate.

One certainty emerges from this confusing situation: The field for the presidential election will be very crowded. The abundance of candidates will, however, be whittled down by two mechanisms: the requirement for 500 signatures from elected representatives to stand, and, as the election approaches, the polls. Current polls place Édouard Philippe and the far-right candidate in the lead, but their significance remains limited this far out from the election. Of the six presidential elections held between 1995 and 2022, the frontrunner a year out has won in only half of cases.

In the Absence of Unity on the Candidate, Unity Through the Manifesto?

If the parties cannot agree on a candidate, can they at least attempt to unite behind a common platform? Here too, the answer appears to be no.

The Socialist Party laid bare its internal divisions during the presentation of the first draft of its manifesto. Allies of Nicolas Mayer-Rossignol-mayor of Rouen and the main challenger of First Secretary Olivier Faure-contested the text the day before it was presented to the press. This program attempts to achieve a delicate synthesis by borrowing from the right the aspiration to "live freely"-the program’s title-while retaining very clear redistributive measures: increased taxation of large estates, a new levy on large inheritances, and a rise in the minimum wage to €1,700 per month. On pensions, it commits to repealing the Borne reform while suggesting for the first time that the statutory retirement age would no longer be the system’s sole central criterion. Ultimately, it is the institutional section-which commands greater consensus within the party-that contains the strongest measures. The platform highlights the objective of "de-presidentialization": making the prime minister the true leader of the majority, granting them the power to dissolve parliament, and strengthening parliament’s budgetary powers. Overall, this first policy document reflects less of a settled position than a difficult attempt at internal compromise.

Edition and Audiovisual Media, Hexagonal Public Debate’s Lost Illusions

Before the 2027 presidential election, another battleground is taking shape for 2027, in a manner as abrupt as it is controversial: the media and intellectual arena. Recent weeks have been marked by two incidents that underscore the polarisation of the landscape in France. The first is the dismissal of the head of Éditions Grasset - who had been in post for 26 years - against the backdrop of a dispute with Vincent Bolloré, who has been owner of the publishing house for three years. Denouncing an "ideological war", more than a hundred writers have announced their departure from the publishing house following his departure. The second is the findings of the Commission of Inquiry into Public Broadcasting, launched by Eric Ciotti’s group in the National Assembly, and explicitly aimed at discrediting French public television and radio - which have been in the National Rally’s sights for several years. As we can see, beyond mere political squabbles, it is the entire media and intellectual landscape that is beginning to be swept up in this mad dash that is a presidential campaign in France.

With fuel prices skyrocketing over the month of March-a politically charged issue at the best of time, let alone with presidential elections in a year-the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the resulting energy crisis moved to the center of public debate. In 2022, the government’s budgetary "whatever it takes" response-the so-called Bouclier tarrifaire-successfully cushioned the inflationary impact of surging energy prices on inflation. This scheme cost between €60 billion and €85 billion, however, and had the drawback of promoting fossil fuel consumption, with negative redistributive effects. This time, the government is constrained by a major budgetary crisis. On the positive side, electricity generation is strong-unlike in 2022-with France now in an overproduction situation: It has been exporting the equivalent of Belgium’s electrical consumption, keeping power prices low. From the very first weeks of the crisis, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu stepped up consultations on an electrification action plan while making clear that no blanket support scheme would be introduced. At the same time, the government announced targeted assistance for some highly petrol-dependent sectors: long-distance transport, fisheries, and agriculture.

The prime minister made a formal address on April 10 to outline how the government intended to answer the crisis. France’s central answer to the immediate exogenous shock is a long-term electrification action plan designed to increase the share of electricity in final energy consumption, thereby shielding consumers and industries alike from future volatility in fossil fuel markets. The narrative is clear: Electricity is mainly nationally produced, decarbonized, and relatively cheap, whereas fossil fuels are imported, vulnerable to being used as an economic weapon, highly polluting, and highly volatile. The generating capacity is there, but increasing electricity’s share of total energy consumption effectively acts as a shield. The plan is ambitious and has attracted broad support among stakeholders, with one main limitation: It involves no new legislation and no budgetary commitment. To finance the doubling of support for electrification actions, the government is drawing on the CEE scheme (Certificas d’Économie d’Énergie), a levy paid by energy distributors that is redirected toward consumer-facing subsidies.

On the international stage, France-which, like other European countries, has stopped short of direct involvement in the Middle East conflict-has nonetheless been diplomatically active in an effort to maintain its political and diplomatic voice.

Together with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron brought together forty other non-belligerent leaders at the Élysée Palace on April 17 for an international conference aimed at securing the Strait of Hormuz. This initiative echoes the one already taken by the two leaders as part of the coalition of the willing in the war in Ukraine. This new coalition called for the reopening of the strait and undertook to contribute to its security by escorting ships and clearing mines, should a political understanding be reached between the two belligerents. This ambition was quickly called into question when the strait was blocked again-just twenty-four hours after the announcement of its reopening-underscoring that the mobilization is primarily symbolic, aimed at demonstrating a capacity for action without taking full part in the conflict. For Emmanuel Macron, this is also a way of demonstrating his ability to rally allies.

Ever since the start of the bombings, and given the strong historical and diplomatic ties between the two countries, France has been very active in its efforts to bring an end to the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. From the first exchanges of fire between Israel and Hezbollah in March, the French president tried to intervene with Benjamin Netanyahu, calling for a ceasefire, but to no avail. French diplomacy was no doubt hoping for a repeat of its previous success in November 2024 when, through active and tactful negotiations, it managed to secure a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon and the start of a disarmament process to put a stop to Hezbollah. The call between Emmanuel Macron and Donald Trump at the beginning of April may nevertheless have played a part in the ceasefire that was eventually agreed on April 16.

On April 21, Emmanuel Macron hosted Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam for a meeting and joint press conference. This provided an opportunity to reiterate France’s support for Lebanon, two days ahead of negotiations in Washington with Israel, which had refused to allow France to participate. To put pressure on Israel, Macron went so far as to threaten to suspend the trade agreement between the EU and Israel, a step that remains divisive among Europeans.France has also been directly affected by the conflict, with the deaths of two French UNIFIL peacekeepers, Staff Sergeant Florian Montorio on April 18 and Master Corporal Anicet Girardin, both killed in an ambush attributed to Hezbollah, even while the ceasefire nominally remained in force.

Copyrights image : Ludovic MARIN / AFP