On March 9, 2021, the European Commission presented its vision for a human-centred, prosperous and sovereign digital future by 2030: the Digital Compass. This strategy aims to make the European Union an assertive player in fair and rule-based international trade, thanks to a solid industrial base, highly-skilled citizens and a robust civil society.
In this article, Katrin Suder, President of the Digital Council of the German Federal Government, former Secretary of State of Ursula von der Leyen at the German Ministry of Defense, and Ramon Fernandez, Deputy CEO at Orange, highlight some priorities to address the European Union’s strategic vulnerabilities and high-risk dependencies, in order to have a digitally sovereign Europe.
This paper is a contribution to a broader project initiated by Institut Montaigne and the Gemeinnützige Hertie-Stiftung which brings together French and German decision-makers and experts to define common priorities for building a self-confident and forward-looking Europe.
Summary
The Covid-19 crisis has shown the importance of digital technologies and also the extent to which European organisations’ freedom of choice regarding digital services can be limited. This is the most visible part of Europe’s dependency on foreign entities to collect, transport and process data in various sectors, especially in the area of consumer space. But there exists many profound dependencies in the business-to-business (B2B) space too - especially when we look at cloud services as well as semiconductors, a layer of the information and communication technologies (ICT) stack where we are depending on both US firms and manufacturing capabilities in Taiwan. Consequently, the European Union is faced with a challenge: how can it be sovereign in the digital field?
There are two potential ways to be sovereign. The first entails the complete independence of European companies and public institutions from foreign services and infrastructures. Aiming at this model of sovereignty would require excluding foreign actors from the European market and rebuilding the digital infrastructures from the ground up. The second encourages the acknowledgement of the dependencies between foreign actors and European ones whilst promoting the European Union’s own competences and preserving its freedom of choice.In this model, the objective is to ensure that the existing services can be used at the European Union’s advantage in order to foster economic development and freedom of trade. We are firm believers in the second model - the first model being neither inspiring nor realistic.
In order to succeed with the second model, we believe there are four priorities, that go in the direction of and complement the European Commission Digital Compass: the first is to accelerate the digitalisation of Europe’s economy and society, in order to increase demand in digital services as well as the development of cloud-native B2B services, which will be the main source of value in the years to come. The second is to commodify digital infrastructures - by digital infrastructures, we mean infrastructure as a service (IaaS) models such as cloud computing digital infrastructures - to ensure that European organisations have freedom of choice while leveraging innovative services. The third is to emphasise the importance of scale in the digital sector to allow European companies to reach the size they need to compete internationally. The fourth is to create a process to identify the areas that pose important sovereignty questions and that should be prioritised.
What is at stake ?
The tip of the iceberg: Europe’s reliance on foreign digital services
For most European companies’ executives, the Covid-19 crisis has been a wake-up call in terms of digital services, as most video-conferencing services that have helped organisations function during the crisis (companies, institutions, schools, associations) were foreign. However, whilst in this remote communications sector European solutions can be chosen over American ones if European actors want to, other sectors are more worrying. In the semiconductor space, Europe’s dependency on foreign companies, in some cases de facto monopolies, is manifest (high-end chips are only produced by TSMC and Samsung, US companies dominate chips’ design) and the declaration of UK-based ARM’s buy-out by US player Nvidia could drastically reduces Europe’s bargaining power in this domain, if it is approved by regulators. However, let’s note that, in parallel, the European Commission has ambitions to have, by 2030, a European production of cutting-edge and sustainable semiconductors doubling EU share in global production to reach 20% of world production in value.
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