One of the main reasons for this is that the Burmese military is notorious for failing to implement public policies in the country - the five decades during which it has been in power in Myanmar, from 1962 to 2011, illustrate this point rather well. See for example the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): the Chinese would like to rely on a government that they could cooperate with, not only in terms of willingness to work with China, but also in terms of capacity to work with China.
In the short term, the Burmese military will be willing to support the Chinese agenda in Myanmar and might become open to Chinese economic projects, as in the middle of this intense period of international condemnation, the military wants to gather as much international support as possible. The military will depend on China and Russia to secure protection at the UN Security Council. However, China will have an increasingly cautious approach. Myanmar today is no longer what Myanmar used to be ten years ago. Social norms, social perceptions and what people now find acceptable have changed over the years. There will be a political cost for China to really dive into a partnership with the military government: the Burmese people are already saying that China is, once again, supporting the "evil military" and that it is, once again, abandoning the democratically elected leaders of the country. By working with the military, China will have made a choice, which will not be a popular one among the population. But let us keep in mind that the military coup is not over and that we are not seeing the end of it yet.
Chinese large-scale projects in Myanmar have either been canceled or scaled down (the Myitsone Dam, the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port…). Where do you see the dynamics of the Chinese projects in Myanmar going forward?
Most Western companies have already been deterred from entering the country and the investment coming from the West is already low. China has tried to push megaprojects in the country, but the government has been rejecting them. One example is the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port, whose original price tag amounted to USD 7.2 billion, with China having 85% of the stake. After years of negotiations, both parties agreed to cut the size of the project, from USD 7.2 billion to USD 1.3 billion, and to reduce China’s stake from 85% to 70%.