The UK government and the EU Commission are not likely to even consider removing the Protocol. This is partly because they have neither the will, nor the resources to reopen negotiations. It is also because they still agree on the need for it, namely to address "the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland", arising as a consequence of the UK’s withdrawal. In fact, it was acknowledged relatively early on, after the UK referendum in 2016, that particular attention would have to be paid to the Northern Ireland dimension to Brexit. The EU language from April 2017 onwards was of finding "flexible and imaginative solutions… while respecting the integrity of the Union legal order". This paved the way for the Protocol and its differentiated treatment of Northern Ireland. Both the UK and the EU also subscribe to the objectives of the Protocol, as outlined in Article 1(3): "to maintain the necessary conditions for continued North-South cooperation, to avoid a hard border and to protect the 1998 Agreement in all its dimensions".
Although the value of that trade with Great Britain is far greater for Northern Ireland than it is with Ireland south of the border, the number of vehicles crossing the Irish Sea on a daily basis is far fewer compared to those crossing the land border. Nevertheless, the new trading conditions that the Protocol creates within the UK introduce new frictions and require considerable adjustment for business. Northern Ireland consumers are seeing the effects in terms of prices and choice - and they know that this effect is likely to grow.
The fine balance of the Protocol
Had they been given a choice in 2016, it is unlikely that voters in Northern Ireland would have chosen the Protocol.Very few people, even "Leavers", wanted to see a hardening of Northern Ireland’s sea or land borders. But the Protocol is a compromise arrangement that has arisen out of complex circumstances. Among those who support it (and early polling data would indicate that this is about one in two voters), the Protocol is viewed as the "least worst" option given the hard Brexit route the UK government has chosen. As well as avoiding a hard Irish border (about which there were serious concerns), it places Northern Ireland in a unique position of ongoing participation in the EU’s internal market for goods as well as "unfettered access" to the UK market. As a result, about half of voters appear to regard the Protocol as providing economic opportunities (although one third does not). However, the unique status is not as privileged as is sometimes assumed. Northern Ireland is not part of the EU internal market as far as the free movement of services, capital and people are concerned and this does have negative consequences for movement across the Irish border.
The Protocol is also fragile. The arrangements the Protocol has introduced are heavily contested and proving exceptionally challenging to implement. This would be of concern anywhere, but it is particularly alarming in Northern Ireland given its weak economy, fraught politics and, frankly, fragile peace. Moreover, the continuation of the core provisions of the Protocol requires the regular consent of members of the Northern Ireland Assembly. They will vote for a first time in late 2024 and then, assuming consent is granted, potentially every four years thereafter. Further votes will be after eight years if there is "cross-community" support for it from unionists as well as nationalists - something that seems highly improbable at present.
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