Iran: The Case For a Grand Bargain

No doubt the Trump administration has other ticking time bombs of this kind up its sleeve (e.g., the colossal arms contract with the United Arab Emirates, involving the sale of fifty F35 planes). Iranian decision-makers and their proxies will have to be very level-headed to avoid facilitating the outgoing Trumpists' manoeuvrings. 

Let us note that we would face the worst-case scenario if a regional conflict were to erupt in the final weeks, even if only due to miscalculations. It might serve as an additional pretext to cling to power for an administration that is still reluctant to admit its defeat and  supports the fiction of massive electoral fraud. 

How can the Biden administration reconnect with Iran?

We know that once Mr. Biden is settled in the White House, the process of establishing a new administration will take a long time. The usual delays are likely to be even longer this time around because of the polarization in Congress and the bureaucratic chaos left in the wake of the Trump administration.

However, it is likely that decisions pertaining to Iran will be among the first "strong signals" that the new US administration will send internationally, along with America's return to the World Health Organization or the Paris Climate Accord. The President-elect is surrounded by many specialists familiar with this issue who have previously worked on the JCPOA under Obama. On paper, the recommitment of the US to the nuclear agreement appears simple: the United States can lift the sanctions imposed under Trump and the Iranians can return to a strict application of their obligations, from which they have released themselves for over a year. This formula is known as "compliance for compliance". 

In practice the manoeuvre is instead likely to be confronted with a certain number of difficulties. For instance, the Americans cannot make a move without a guarantee that the Iranians intend to reduce their stockpile of enriched uranium, once again destroy their surplus centrifuges, etc. Moreover, how should certain irreversible advancements made by the Iranians be taken into account, for example, in research and development? What effect will the lifting, or initially the easing, of sanctions have insofar as it will be very difficult to persuade heavy-weight Western companies to re-engage, off-put by American oscillations and lack of reliability? And how could the Iranians not fear that they would never actually reap the economic benefits of a deal with the US? By backing down on their nuclear program, wouldn't they risk giving up tangible advantage for hypothetical benefit? 

All these questions require high caliber diplomatic engineering to be properly addressed, yet they may find answers with the help of the other JCPOA signatories (the three Europeans — Germany, France, the United Kingdom — but also China and Russia). This requires consensus on the "sequencing" of measures that would need to be respected by each side, work that can be done within the JCPOA Commission. An encouraging sign is that after Iran appeared to be dragging its feet (multiplying conditions attached to the notion of "compliance for compliance"), local experts, followed by Minister Zarif in his official capacity, indicated that Iran would be willing to comply if the Americans did so as well. 

A restrictive political environment 

What of the political environment surrounding the possible return of the United States to the Iranian dossier, taking into account its particularly restrictive character?

In Tehran, everything depends on the decisions of the Supreme Leader. New presidential elections will be held in June, likely bringing to power a so-called "conservative" government (Mr. Rouhani's current administration is considered "reformist"). There is concern that the Leader will not allow the current administration, familiar with the Obama teams, to negotiate, or that the post-June administration might question what would have been achieved. Ultimately it comes down to whether the Leader will be surrounded by persons whom he trusts (hypothetically the hard liners), who could argue that given the current state of the country's economy, it would be foolish not to search for an oxygen tank from the West, and that only he himself can accomplish this historic endeavour. They could argue that promises of cooperation with China, assuming they are not illusory, might only materialize in the long term and may prove more dangerous for the independence of the Islamic Republic than a new arrangement with the West.  

Another complicating factor is the American approach. The United States drew the conclusion from the JCPOA experience that a nuclear agreement with Iran is not enough. As suggested by President Macron, the Democratic administration will want to supplement the JCPOA with a regional component and a post-JCPOA agreement (extending the freeze on Iranian nuclear activities). Mr. Biden apparently understands (this remains to be seen) that this can only be achieved in stages: first resurrect the JCPOA, then address the other issues. However, the Iranians know that if they accept the first step, that of the JCPOA, they will be faced with other demands, including ones pertaining to their ballistic missiles program, which they consider non-negotiable.

Towards a grand bargain? 

It might perhaps be helpful for the Iranians and their relevant foreign counterparts to quickly engage in substantive discussions through unofficial channels, addressing all of these problems and taking into account all of their complexities. It should be understood that an overly limited agreement would not benefit from a political or even a legal endorsement (by the Senate) in Washington. In retrospect, this was the JCPOA’s main weakness, rebuked by Republicans and only timidly supported by Democrats. 

Likewise, the economic argument, however important it may be on the Iranian side, is only one aspect among others. At least from the "moderate" perspective, one might have thought at some point that the stakes of the JCPOA for Tehran was also in the "normalization" of the country's relations with the outside world. What is the situation like today?

What of Iran's strategic situation, particularly after the normalization of relations between some Arab countries and Israel, foregrounded again this weekend by the Israeli Prime Minister's trip to Saudi Arabia? From Tehran’s perspective could the perception potentially be that the means of aggression of the Hebrew state (planes and such) are coming dangerously close to Iranian territory? What is the optimal response to this new threat? Is it to exploit the planned withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and Iraq? But isn't the "strategy of tension" precisely the surest way to convince the United States not to abandon the region? 

This is but a glimpse of what we have called the "political (and strategic) environment" for a possible return to negotiations with Iran. What is striking is the extraordinary complexity of the problems raised. Unfortunately the future American administration, once the first steps have been taken, might not have the determination or the freedom - having so many internal challenges to address first - to deal with these in the long term. However, one could be tempted to draw this conclusion: due to the immense complexity of the Iranian dossier - more than ever key to peace in the Middle East, and thus to the possibility for the Americans to disengage - the US should aim for a "grand bargain" with Iran; while starting with a simple return to the status quo on the nuclear dossier, it would be in their best interest to display these intentions from the outset.

On this point, we agree with the analysis from a good observer at the Atlantic Council, Barbara Salvin, in her latest article for Foreign Policy. Let's add a final point: wouldn’t a global agreement with Washington allow the Islamic Republic to not only regain its economic sovereignty, but also to cement some of its regional gains while emancipating itself from a situation of permanent confrontation? 

Copyright: MANDEL NGAN / AFP