No doubt the Trump administration has other ticking time bombs of this kind up its sleeve (e.g., the colossal arms contract with the United Arab Emirates, involving the sale of fifty F35 planes). Iranian decision-makers and their proxies will have to be very level-headed to avoid facilitating the outgoing Trumpists' manoeuvrings.
Let us note that we would face the worst-case scenario if a regional conflict were to erupt in the final weeks, even if only due to miscalculations. It might serve as an additional pretext to cling to power for an administration that is still reluctant to admit its defeat and supports the fiction of massive electoral fraud.
How can the Biden administration reconnect with Iran?
We know that once Mr. Biden is settled in the White House, the process of establishing a new administration will take a long time. The usual delays are likely to be even longer this time around because of the polarization in Congress and the bureaucratic chaos left in the wake of the Trump administration.
However, it is likely that decisions pertaining to Iran will be among the first "strong signals" that the new US administration will send internationally, along with America's return to the World Health Organization or the Paris Climate Accord. The President-elect is surrounded by many specialists familiar with this issue who have previously worked on the JCPOA under Obama. On paper, the recommitment of the US to the nuclear agreement appears simple: the United States can lift the sanctions imposed under Trump and the Iranians can return to a strict application of their obligations, from which they have released themselves for over a year. This formula is known as "compliance for compliance".
In practice the manoeuvre is instead likely to be confronted with a certain number of difficulties. For instance, the Americans cannot make a move without a guarantee that the Iranians intend to reduce their stockpile of enriched uranium, once again destroy their surplus centrifuges, etc. Moreover, how should certain irreversible advancements made by the Iranians be taken into account, for example, in research and development? What effect will the lifting, or initially the easing, of sanctions have insofar as it will be very difficult to persuade heavy-weight Western companies to re-engage, off-put by American oscillations and lack of reliability? And how could the Iranians not fear that they would never actually reap the economic benefits of a deal with the US? By backing down on their nuclear program, wouldn't they risk giving up tangible advantage for hypothetical benefit?
All these questions require high caliber diplomatic engineering to be properly addressed, yet they may find answers with the help of the other JCPOA signatories (the three Europeans — Germany, France, the United Kingdom — but also China and Russia). This requires consensus on the "sequencing" of measures that would need to be respected by each side, work that can be done within the JCPOA Commission. An encouraging sign is that after Iran appeared to be dragging its feet (multiplying conditions attached to the notion of "compliance for compliance"), local experts, followed by Minister Zarif in his official capacity, indicated that Iran would be willing to comply if the Americans did so as well.
Add new comment