This will be part of the rebooting of regionalism. Issues like migration, drug trafficking, and climate change are issues that require multilateralism - and it is exactly this sort of approach that we can expect to see should Lula win.
Characterizing Bolsonaro and Lula and the domestic election
As a leader, Bolsonaro personifies a number of different traits. He possesses populist qualities as well as authoritarian and conservative ones. He does not believe in representative democracy and is also not particularly committed to his political party. When elected, many expected the answer to his popularity to lie in the fact that he was able to hoodwink the poor and uneducated segments of the electorate to vote for him while playing the role of a political outsider. However, this isn't quite the case. Many of those who supported Bolsonaro didn't fit the stereotype of the "poor uneducated voter". Rather, Bolsonaro was able to win as someone who represented traditional values (especially family values). This has now changed a little. Many of those who supported Bolsonaro once do not anymore and this explains why Lula is ahead in the polls. At the same time, the lead isn't very large and we should not expect a landslide victory. A good portion of voters is convinced that Bolsonaro can do the job and that he deserves a second term.
Lula is a charismatic and pragmatic leader. He knows how to build coalitions, especially when it comes to solving Brazil's poverty issues. He comes from a generation of Trade Unionists who were deeply involved in the democratization of Brazil. His party is also a resilient force within Brazilian politics and, despite its defeat in the 2018 election, they have remained viable to the point that they are arguably now the only strong political party in Brazil. Thus, while Lula defends leftist values, he is fundamentally a pragmatic leader. There is a chance that he may focus on climate issues if he wins because that is what is topical now, at least on the international stage. That being said, he does not have a reputation as a particularly clean leader. His leadership oversaw some slowdown of rainforest deforestation, but it was not that impressive. Brazilians in general believe in absolute Brazilian sovereignty over the Amazon and this is unlikely to change much until Brazilians take action for change.
The campaign and its aftermath
If the campaign between Lula and Bolsonaro can be characterized by one feature, it is likely the sheer level of vitriol it produced. This presidential campaign has not been fought as a battle between ideas, or policy proposals. In fact, these issues have been largely secondary. Rather, the race has been fueled by hatred. Bolsonaro's religious and wealthy base harbors hatreds against the Worker's Party that can be traced back to its time in power, and members of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) reciprocally cultivate hatred for Bolsonaro, along with the corruption and danger he embodies.
This hatred has the potential to boil over should Bolsonaro lose. While it is unlikely that the police or the military would perpetrate violence on behalf of Bolsonaro, it is quite possible that a consequence of this campaign may be a sustained uptick in grassroots violence. Gun ownership has shot up under Bolsonaro evidenced by spikes in gun sales. And while Brazil is not a country particularly marked by violent politics, it is possible that disgruntled Bolsonaro supporters, armed and angry, could take to the streets especially if the results of the election are narrow. In fact, three PT supporters have already been killed during this campaign.
Another possible scenario lies in the possibility of a Bolsonaro criminal trial and indictment. Corruption by not only Bolsonaro himself, but members of his family, has been well reported. And while the Brazilian judicial system has been politicized in the recent past, it still operates in a professional and independent manner. This could lead to charges being drafted against Bolsonaro, though Lula himself is likely to remain uninvolved. This in part, may be due to his recent imprisonment (on false charges that were later rescinded) but more broadly may likely just be out of a concern of increasing the politicization of the judiciary.
This paper was co-written with the help of Aaron Irion and John Chrobak, as part of Institut Montaigne's partnership with the Illiberalism Studies Program at George Washington University.
Copyright: Miguel Schincariol / AFP
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