Weapons of Mass Debate - Time to Talk about Nuclear Deterrence in Europe (Again)

US U-turns

Since the signing of the Washington Treaty (1949), Europeans have wondered how solid the US defense guarantee to NATO allies really was and transatlantic crises of confidence have been many. But the experience of the Trump administration has left a deep mark on some of them, fuelling the narrative that it cannot be a reliable long-term solution for the security of the continent. To be sure, they breathed a sigh of relief when Mr. Biden was sworn into office, but the new US President is troubling some of his allies when he claims that, in addition to focusing more on China than on Russia, he seeks to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy, aiming for a “sole purpose” concept, whereby the function of these weapons would henceforth be limited to the deterrence of a nuclear attack. In addition, there are fears that Washington could be ready to give up its non-strategic nuclear presence on the continent, if this was the price to pay for a follow-on bilateral arms control treaty.  

French Proposals

Indeed, in Paris, the evolution (and zigzags) of US strategic choices since 2010 have validated the traditional, post-1958 dominant national narrative, according to which the United States – or, to be clear, any other non-European country – can ever be a solid guarantor of European security on the long run. This was a major driver behind Emmanuel Macron’s February 2020 proposals. The French President emphasized – more than his predecessors ever did – the European vocation of his country’s nuclear forces, and proposed a new dialogue on deterrence with interested countries. He added that they would be invited to participate in French nuclear exercises. This happened in the background of a renewed French drive for more “strategic autonomy”. Recall that as early as 1994, Paris had solemnly stated that “With nuclear [weapons], Europe’s defense autonomy is possible. Without [them], it cannot exist”.    

Consequences

What these elements suggest is that a new strategic fracture could open up on the continent. A future US-German convergence for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance’s strategy, which would be supported by several NATO and EU members, would be problematic for Paris and London. Also, a unilateral decision by one nuclear-sharing country to cease its participation in the process and demand the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons could lead to an unraveling of the whole scheme through the empowerment of anti-nuclear forces in national parliaments of other countries. That would put an end to a decades-old arrangement, often seen to be at the core of the transatlantic bargain, the “sharing of nuclear risks and responsibilities”.

There is no reason to over-exaggerate those risks, and even a break with nuclear-sharing practices by one country could theoretically find a fallback solution. For instance, if asked by the United States and supported by other allies, Poland could theoretically “replace” Germany as a nuclear sharing nation. Greece – which was a nuclear sharing country until 2001 – could be an alternative to Turkish nuclear basing, even though these would entail major political decisions by their capitals. 

It is also likely that national positions on nuclear deterrence will remain more in terms of shades of grey than in black-and-white, or in clear-cut “camps”. But the new parameters described suggest that it is a good time to reopen the nuclear deterrence debate among Europeans.  

National Views

Geography and history matter when charting the European nuclear debate. In the Western part of the continent, there is a British-French “Nuclear Weapon-States axis”, where nuclear assertiveness prevails. In the central part, one finds the NATO nuclear sharing countries, where the presence of US nuclear weapons is generally challenged by the Left and the Greens.These countries suffer from a certain nuclear anxiety today. In the North, nuclear ambivalence prevails as these countries are torn between their traditions of neutrality or pacifism, and growing worries about the Russian threat. Further east, Central Europe is where NATO and EU members support or accept nuclear deterrence and do not want to rock the nuclear boat. In EU Mediterranean countries, the debate is generally non-existent: the expression nuclear apathy comes to mind. Turkey appears to be the odd country out.

A slightly different taxonomy was suggested by a 2018 European Council on Foreign Relations report, which distinguished “True Believers” (France, the UK, Poland and Romania) from “Neutrals” (Ireland, Austria, Malta, Cyprus and Finland), “Pragmatists” (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Belgium, and Italy), and “Conformists” (Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Greece, Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal).

Disarmament-oriented ideas and proposals are generally put forward or supported by center-left, leftist and green forces, while conservative, liberal and Christian-democrat parties remain more attached to the status quo. In most other countries, nuclear apathy prevails and no major political parties or non-governmental organizations influence political decisions. Only on occasion does a parliamentary debate happen on a key decision – such as in Spain where the previously-ruling coalition was inclined to join the TPNW.  

In some EU countries, notably Germany and Poland, the ideas proposed by Emmanuel Macron, in February 2020, were politely welcomed, although colored by lingering suspicions about French motives. To be sure, in 2019 and in 2020, opinion polls in the Federal Republic revealed significant support for a French and/or British nuclear protection. But although the emergence of the pandemic prevented Paris from embarking on a major diplomatic campaign to promote Macron’s ideas, there is no strong official appetite in European governments  for implementing them today – even more so since the election of Joe Biden. Many governments are unwilling to “rock the boat” either nationally (waking up antinuclear forces), or internationally (giving arguments to those in the US who seek to trade away the weapons based in Europe). In most NATO countries, the fear that any European initiative could weaken the transatlantic link is often heard. That may be because open enthusiasm for the French proposals might signal a lack of trust and could be used by Washington to reduce its deterrence commitments. Such attitudes largely mirror those regarding the need for a stronger “strategic autonomy”. Questions have also been raised about what is sometimes seen as a paradoxical or self-contradictory French position, given Macron’s strong desire to maintain dialogue and cooperation with Moscow. It is likely, however, that quiet bilateral discussions about nuclear deterrence have taken place among officials since February 2020. 

Scenarios and Possible Outcomes 

Overall, two broad future scenarios exist. 

As is often the case, the most probable one is the status quo, even more so since nuclear deterrence is one of those issues where Heads of State and governments almost always resist abrupt changes. That is even more true  at a time when nuclear weapons are brandished all around the world as instruments of power, much more than was the case in the 1990s and 2000s. The renewed salience of the Russian threat, for instance, helps explain why traditionally disarmament-friendly Nordic countries stayed away from the TPNW. 

Then again, there are too many forces at work pushing for change to discard the possibility of a second scenario of an unraveling of the nuclear deterrence arrangements within the Atlantic Alliance. This could particularly be the case if more than one country pressed for change, either because they have a disarmament-oriented agenda (the United States, Germany) or because of a nationalistic one (Turkey). 

If the status quo did prevail, it does not mean that the French ideas for a European-only debate on nuclear weapons would be irrelevant. Paris is right to say that Europeans need to avoid leaving this discussion entirely to transatlantic forums, and that only a reinforced dialogue among them can ascertain whether there is a common understanding of nuclear deterrence, nurture a common strategic culture, as well as inform French thinking about the European dimension of its national deterrent. Such discussions would be particularly relevant in an era of increased uncertainties about the reliability and future of the US deterrent. Under the Biden administration, only 51% of Germans see Washington as the most reliable of their allies – and most Europeans are aware that the likelihood that Mr. Trump (or a Trump-like figure) could be elected in 2024 is non-trivial. 

If the UK stood firm on its new nuclear stance and European countries worried about US protection, a UK-French consensus on some form of explicit nuclear umbrella declaration for Europe could then be in the cards, perhaps including an intention to consult partners before nuclear use, time and circumstances permitting. Rotations of French Strategic Air Forces aircraft – without their nuclear weapons – on bases in Central Europe could also be envisioned as a reassurance measure. This would not be a substitute for the NATO deterrent and nuclear arrangements – rather a sort of additional insurance or safety net (a “backstop”?). Indeed, a high-level multinational taskforce composed of recognized senior experts and former officials from various Western nations suggested in 2021 that “France and Britain should extend their nuclear deterrent to their European allies. [...] Ultimately, European defense cooperation would benefit from a strong, European-oriented nuclear deterrent capability separate from the US nuclear umbrella”.

Consultations with a group of European experts convened by Institut Montaigne on June 14^th, suggest a few additional recommendations to French officials regarding a European discussion about nuclear deterrence. Paris should: 

• be clearer about what it seeks and does not seek through such discussions, including by public statements directed at national parliaments, think tanks and NGOs;
   
• refrain from openly linking the idea of a nuclear dialogue to the drive for European strategic autonomy; 
   
• include arms control and other “strategic stability”-related questions in any European nuclear deterrence discussions; 
   
• consider joining the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, at least as an observer, to alleviate suspicions. If Paris joined as a full member - something that would not imply any de jure constraint on its nuclear force - Paris would also benefit from another forum to push for its ideas and positions about nuclear policy issues. While a political taboo in France (Paris has long feared that its deterrent would be seen as less independent if it was an NPG member), domestic politics - i.e., Gaullist opposition - would less be a constraint for such a move than they were in the past;
   
• foster non-official dialogues among European experts, including for educational purposes, perhaps on the model of the NATO Defense College’s annual workshop for young scholars.  

If the second scenario was to materialize – a real break, at some point in the future, in the existing NATO nuclear arrangements – then more drastic innovations should be imagined. This could include a formal French or UK-French nuclear umbrella and even a new form of nuclear sharing in which European aircraft would carry the French ASMPA missile, for those countries which would be willing and able to do so. But we’re not there at all. 

Copyright: EMMANUEL DUNAND / AFP