Think in terms of "conflict management" rather than "negotiations"
As things stand, the greatest danger is that the Kremlin will take the initiative to offer negotiations and ask for an immediate cease-fire. That would create the space for a suitable "pause" allowing the Russian army to regroup and increase the risks of division among Ukraine’s supporters. In view of this scenario, "calls for negotiation" are likely counterproductive.
That being said, having or creating channels for dialogue with Moscow appears, on the face of it, useful. Particularly if the focus becomes less on the conflict’s "endgame" than how it is "managed", such as setting boundaries that both sides must respect to avoid an uncontrolled escalation. The approach seems to have produced results when handling nuclear concerns and could also mitigate other risks (e.g. geographic contagion of the conflict, energy and food security, and reciprocal self-restrictions in hybrid warfare). This could very well be what President Macron has in mind when repeating his calls for China to play a "mediating role".
Structure the dialogue between Ukraine and its main allies
Obviously, multiple lines of communication already exist at several levels between Ukrainians, Americans and Europeans. But perhaps the time has come for a more structured dialogue - including at the level of Heads of State and Government - by gathering, as one example, the Euro Quad (Germany, France, US, UK), Ukraine, Poland, and the European External Action Service (EEAS).
A framework such as this would foster a more conducive environment for pondering the question of "eventual negotiations". On the one hand, while it is imperative that Ukraine has the final say on if and when to pursue negotiations, Kyiv may have an interest in sharing the burden of choosing when and how to exit the war given that their backers also have their own interests to defend. On the other hand, as shown by the Ukrainian missile incident, future developments are likely to test the unified view shared by the governments most involved.
A question: can Kherson set a precedent?
We are now entering unknown territory. In Kherson, Russia and Ukraine appear to have struck some sort of tacit understanding. Russia had known for weeks that its troops wouldn't be able to hold the line. And Ukraine had witnessed the benefit of postponing (and sparing themselves) a large-scale offensive that would have proven very costly for its own soldiers.
Was this not a form of "conflict management" between the two sides that could be replicated elsewhere? Does this not provide an incentive to take a different approach to Crimea (so crucial for the West, rightly or wrongly) and stop thinking of it as a black-or-white issue like we seem to have grown accustomed to?
Copyright: Andrew Harnik / POOL / AFP
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