The mythology of the US as a country of immigrants is largely true. Indeed, the countrydid have some sort of open immigration (which Europe did not) until the 1920s (with the notable exception of Asian exclusion, imposed at the end of the 19th century), when immigration quotas were imposed along racialist and eugenic lines. The US had been through the "racial composition debate" throughout much of its history, with the concept of "race" broadly applied to groups of different nationalities. The racist/eugenicist argument against immigration was also made in Europe (particularly in the UK, Germany and France), but it was far more dominant in the US.
The populist discourse has been strongly anti-immigration on both sides of the Atlantic. With a more diverse ethnic population in the US, the PRR has often differentiated between "good" and "bad" immigrants. Most Europeans (and now, sometimes Asians!) often fall into the former category. South and Central Americans, in contrast, are viewed as mostly "bad" ones. However, there have been important exceptions, as illustrated by the Cuban immigration. Cubans were different from other immigrants for two reasons. First, during the Cold War, there was legislation welcoming anti-communist Cubans to the US. Second, with an easier path to citizenship than most immigrants, at least the first generation mostly voted Republican compared to other immigrant groups, making the refugees and immigrants that followed much more welcomed by the American right.
We often think of immigrants one-dimensionally, but their political commitments (often a reaction to the policies applied to them at their arrival) vary by their country of origin and their socioeconomic class. Immigrants from the Dominican Republic and Central America were less welcomed, or on different bases. Mexicans were welcomed as transient workers, with the idea that they would eventually return home. The first arrivals from Cuba were given privileged access under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, but variations of this privilege lasted until 2017.
What policy prescriptions would you recommend to deal with the Populist Radical Right in future?
Populist radical-right parties are often viewed as a kind of political pathology. Yet these are not "flash parties" that suddenly appear and disappear - rather, they are likely to continue to endure, since, like other political parties, they have voters who identify with them and networks and organizations that have solidified their support. They cannot be "cured" as a disease but rather they need to be dealt with effectively.
Two dynamics limit the prospect for growth of PRR parties. First, ambition for power is often linked to deradicalization (as the Italian Lega and the French National Front (FN) tried a decade ago), which can unsuccessfully lead to party splits. Even when this reorientation is successful, participation in governing power has tended to reduce, not increase, their electoral support (as with the Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ). Second, as this electoral support increases, so does the strength of electoral opposition that seeks to block them from gaining seats or forming coalitions. Electoral support for Rassemblement National (RN) in France peaked between 2017 and 2019, and is likely to diminish in 2022, with a challenge from its right in Eric Zemmour. Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany has not managed to increase its electoral support since 2017; Vox in Spain has not increased its support since 2019. Electoral support for radical right parties in Denmark, Norway and Greece has also declined in the past few years.
Structure matters. As the case of the US demonstrates, federalism and localism can sustain radical right parties in local fiefs, and protect them even if their support at the national level does not grow or even diminishes. Indeed, the accentuated "gerrymandering" of congressional districts will probably sustain the radical right at the national level (about 15% of the Republican caucus) even if electoral support at the national level declines.
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