When we look at the US position, the problem lies in the fact that the Gulf States understand the US agenda, while the US has little regard for theirs. President Biden said he expected "further steps" from the Saudis to cool oil prices and safeguard the global economy. This means the US wants the Gulf to opt out of OPEC+, increase their energy supply for more accessible oil and gas prices, and reduce Saudi-China trade relations. Yet at the same time, the US is not seriously considering the requirements for a lasting security architecture in the region. There are many questions at the moment. Is the United States withdrawing from the Middle East or sticking to its historical commitments in the region? We hear a stated public commitment on the one hand, but then we see something else in terms of implementation, for example when one looks at their recent policy towards Iraq. The US used to be a security guarantor for the GCC states, but today, especially in light of the current negotiations in Vienna and JCPOA talks, this is no longer the case. In the meantime, the US is not allowing the region to build the capacity and capability to defend itself. This is why the Crown Prince’s visit to France in August 2022 was an indirect message to the US. France is a reliable partner with excellent military capabilities; it showed previous commitments to the region by supplying Saudi Arabia with long-range missiles, and it deployed a radar system on the eastern coast of the kingdom after Iranian missile attacks damaged an oil processing facility.
Domestically, the US is also in a precarious position, leaving many to worryingly observe and follow the current political situation in Washington. The November 8 midterms are around the corner and commitments made on the political campaign trail are both short-term and volatile. Gulf countries question whether US foreign policy towards the region will follow a similar path, initiated under Obama’s administration, and later by President Trump and President Biden, or whether there will be a change towards a renewed commitment. We have heard Biden’s claims stating that the region will not "be left as a vacuum to be filled by Russia or China" however in reality, the vacuum has already been created, as was evidenced by the previously-mentioned attack on the critical oil facility.
What steps can Saudi Arabia take to strengthen the Gulf countries’ security?
Saudi Arabia needs to protect itself and rely on a more comprehensive security arrangement, which requires three preconditions:
- First, resolving regional problems is a prerequisite for stability. These include dealing with the Iranian policy of intervention and expansionism and with Hezbollah, the situation in Syria, the war in Yemen, political instability in Iraq, and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, a source of continued tension;
- Second, it is important to have an inclusive framework by including Turkey, Iran and Israel, as part of this security arrangement or framework;
- Third, there is a pressing need for a guarantor, which cannot be the UN alone since it lacks the muscle and the means to achieve stable security in the region. A guarantor could be the P5 + the UN, along with a mechanism that can prevent any party from overreaching in the region.
On the oil market, the Gulf has an ambivalent relationship with Russia, it sees it as a competitor yet they also share common interests. Is that correct?
It is. One example is that Russia is already trying to supply more oil to China at the expense of Gulf countries. How the Gulf will continue to manage this relationship is yet to be seen. Saudi Arabia’s commitment indicated that the kingdom would like to continue at OPEC+, stating the organization had the means and flexibility to deal with challenges. Ultimately, energy security needs to be viewed from both the producer's and the consumer’s viewpoint.
How do you assess Biden’s trip to the Middle East in mid-July?
If the goal of the Biden administration was to reassure the region about the US commitment to the region, the visit was, to a certain extent, positive. It was a useful opportunity to exchange views and perspectives. Yet, if one looks at precise outcomes or concessions provided by the Gulf countries to US requests, the outcome of the trip was less fruitful. There is a persisting trust problem between the GCC countries and the US. This applies to the supply of military support and equipment to Saudi Arabia where, for example, when it comes to Yemen, the kingdom is still at war and is not receiving all they require (and this also goes for supporting the current ceasefire). Equally, President Biden failed to secure commitments to higher oil production. What is not understood on this issue is that Saudi Arabia is unable to increase oil production as this requires time, and investment, and cannot be done overnight. In a way, the West will therefore not be able to use the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a means to reorder international energy markets.
In terms of regional security, it appears the US approach vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern order pushed Saudi Arabia into an agreement with Israel as if withdrawing itself but still maintaining an offshore balancing strategy. How do you assess this?
Saudi Arabia has gone above and beyond in doing what it could with Israel. But it cannot normalize relations under the current situation. Saudi Arabia maintains that normalization with Israel can only take place after the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is resolved. The Palestinians and Israelis need to get to an agreement before Saudi Arabia can seriously consider the Abraham Accords.
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