Turning the Table: Emmanuel Macron in Moscow

On sanctions, for instance, the Germans are far less open than the Americans are to bringing an end to Nord Stream 2 in the event of a Russian attack. And on the question of arming Ukraine, the British are notably more fervent than others. 

In reality, however, these nuances are secondary to the consensus that exists on the bottom line. The West’s approach to political resolution centers around two points: arms and confidence-building measures for Europe as a whole, and, with regard to Ukraine specifically, the 2015 Minsk Agreements. The former is clear NATO territory and, in practice, the focus of the Russian-American dialogue. Negotiations on the latter issue are taking place in the so-called Normandy Format, which involves Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine.

This is Germany and France’s entry point into the great game that is unfolding. But aren’t Normandy

Format talks doomed to end in either failure or a humiliating setback for Kiev?

This is one of the major issues of the current crisis. It should be noted that the balance of power on the ground has been shifting in Ukraine’s favor because of the arms and training its forces have been receiving for several months now, thanks in particular to the Biden administration. Contrary to Russian propaganda, there are no "NATO missiles" pointed at Russia from Ukrainian territory. Nevertheless, equipment like Turkish drones in Ukrainian hands could make life harder for Russian proxies in Donbass. This certainly contributes to Putin’s fury and his desire to break the Ukrainians - but perhaps, in an optimistic scenario, also to his need to make concessions.

Ukraine is generally not in favor of implementing the Minsk Agreements, which were concluded at a time when Kiev was in a very weak position. Vladimir Putin’s misogynistic statement during his press conference with Emmanuel Macron can only have strengthened Ukraine’s position on the subject: "Whether you like it or not, you’ve got to put up with it, my beauty…".

Given these facts, it is tempting to consider that the negotiations can only end in a permanent stalemate - that is, unless the sheer magnitude of the crisis creates a context that is conducive to a change in current positions. This is the great unknown that the governments in Berlin and Paris will have to tackle in the coming weeks. As noted above, the balance of military power on the ground has shifted in favor of the Ukrainian authorities. The political balance of power in Ukraine has undoubtedly also shifted to Russia’s disadvantage.

The idea of declaring Ukraine a neutral country, as a way to end the impasse, has been floating around in many circles in the United States and Europe. The French president denies having spoken of a "Finlandization", contrary to claims by journalists who were with him on the Moscow trip. It is perhaps not irrelevant to entertain this line of reasoning, but the fact remains that Russia’s behavior has so far been pushing Ukraine toward the West. It is imperative to make the Kremlin understand that its current attitude can only reinforce this trend.

Is there any real hope for de-escalation?

This is obviously an impossible question to answer. The Kremlin denies Macron’s claim that he had received assurances from Putin that the situation would not deteriorate and would instead de-escalate. Whether or not Russia will actually withdraw its troops from Belarus after the exercises scheduled for in about ten days will be an important indicator.

However, there is a prevailing sense that the Chinese did not encourage Putin to take action. China is going to buy more Russian gas, but not under conditions and in volumes that would allow Moscow to dispense with sales to Europe or strengthen its negotiating position with its European customers.

Looking ahead

While all these elements point in different directions, it is worth adding a longer-term consideration. As we have already argued, the motivations of Putin and his advisors - who form an increasingly small and isolated clan - cannot be reduced to a game of chess about European security. The Russian president is also motivated by the stamp he wants to leave on history and the fear of seeing his country marginalized in the new geopolitical configuration of Sino-American opposition.

As a result, we can expect other crises in the future - even if the current one is successfully defused. Russia’s deteriorating position in Ukraine might prompt the Kremlin to launch a "minor incursion" - to use Joe Biden’s expression - or to resort to "hybrid" actions that include cyber attacks, of which we have already had a taste. The current convergence of European and American approaches is not guaranteed in future episodes. If there is a lesson to be learned in the medium term, it is that the West, and Europe in particular, needs to prepare for a relationship with Russia that is likely to remain difficult - confrontational, even, at least as long as Vladimir Putin’s generation is in power.

In the immediate term, President Macron’s management of the crisis has likely strengthened his credibility among France’s allies and partners. The next step is for him and his officials to project further ahead, toward a common European attitude that is fit for what is left to come.

Copyright: LUDOVIC MARIN / AFP