Tunisia At A Crossroads

The representation of Islamists in positions of power was mainly symbolic: between 2014 and 2019, Ennahda had only 3 or 4 ministers out of a government of 30. Ultimately, Béji’s idea was to dissolve them into the landscape. 

This strategy preserved the foundations upon which Tunisia was historically built, including secularism and women’s rights. During this period, for example, we passed laws aimed at preventing violence against women as well as a ban on wearing the niqab in government buildings. I myself denied entry to Islamist preachers, including Wajdi Ghnim, in 2019.

Ten years later, we can see that despite the high economic cost, the Islamists’ clout has declined significantly. The Islamists garnered 1.5 million votes in 2011 and 1 million votes in 2014. In the 2019 elections, the numbers dropped to 500,000 votes and polls for the 2024 elections project around 300,000 votes. That would represent 10-15% of the vote, which is probably their actual proportion in the population. The primary reason the Islamists exist today depends upon their ability to join forces when there is a lack of representation from the rest of the political family, which often lacks cohesion and discipline. 

In the end, history will be the judge. But the coalition that followed the first free legislative elections of 2014 - in one of the few democracies in the Arab-Muslim world - was likely a necessary stage of development, not only to prevent bloodshed but to counter the Islamization of society as well. Tunisian democracy today is ready for a genuine alternation of power.

HEK: Let’s turn to migration. In what way has Tunisia become an immigration and transit country? As they are both impacted by the situation, is there cooperation between Europe and Tunisia? What conclusions can be drawn? 

YC: Immigration numbers are highly disputed; the numbers of migrants landing in Italy and the number of those leaving North Africa don’t line up. There is no monitoring agency and, apart from the IOM, few people are looking at the issue. The problem isn’t addressed, whether by Europeans or by the Maghreb countries-such issues only come up during elections in Europe and tragedies in the Maghreb. There is no underlying procedure or agreement for managing migration flows. Europe’s immigration policy can be summarized along four main lines: closing borders, blocking migrants, multiplying repatriation flights and boosting technical support for border control. 

In truth, Europe has not consulted the Maghreb countries on these issues. There has been no involvement of third and sub-Mediterranean countries in the development of European migration policies. They are drafted unilaterally and are often very closely linked to internal European security issues and the electoral agenda. For example, the measures included in the European migration deal that EU members signed in Brussels in June 2018 were a surprise to Maghrebi officials. The idea of building disembarkation platforms in departure countries had been unilaterally conceived!

Their number could very well exceed 500,000; this poses a major problem at the local level. The second notable transformation is that the profile of the illegal migrant has evolved from the typical small-scale trafficker, to new social categories such as women, families and university graduates. 

North African countries are therefore witnessing a brain drain towards Europe and the accumulation of thousands of illegal immigrants without papers in transit, whose management at the local level has become increasingly difficult. Although faced with two monumental shifts in the migration phenomenon, the southern Mediterranean countries have not come together to discuss it. This is especially true as migration issues are not the top priority of the Maghreb countries, whose unemployment rates remain high.

A security-based approach is not the solution; it will not push illegal immigrants to stop what they are doing. The Barcelona Treaty was drawn up unilaterally, between Europe and each country on the southern shore. This framework should be reinvented today, acknowledging migration as a crucial issue. 

HEK: From the perspective of the Maghreb, what should immigration policies look like? 

YC: A global and concerted approach - divorced from electoral concerns - must be established to identify labor needs in Europe, which are significant but often unspecified. If properly managed, circular and seasonal migration could be beneficial for Europe and the Maghreb. Illegal immigration and brain drain should be linked. While Europe gives a warm welcome to the doctors and engineers from North Africa, low-skilled laborers are denied access. For example, Tunisia is a great country for training ICT (information and communications technologies) engineers. But it is losing its skill capacity while Europe shuts the door on the low-skilled workforce that is abundant in North Africa and scarce in the European economy.

We must also develop Tunisia’s network of associations to support those citizens who are directly affected by these issues. Many families have lost people. We have also noted a sharp increase in departures last year, in connection with Covid-19. Activities hit hard by national lockdowns, such as construction, textiles and export, have led to more and more people leaving the country. The unemployment rate in Tunisia has risen by 3 or 4 points. We must expand our network of support organizations in order to develop a genuine framework. Despite the importance of issues such as terrorism and unemployment, government actions fail to devote the required time and resources. The last axis that needs strengthening is the development of coastal areas, along with economic activities such as fishing, which will make the region more viable and profitable. 

Economics also plays a clear role; the interests of these countries of the Maghreb have shifted towards Europe. Even while trying to diversify our markets, especially towards the Gulf, our exports remain deeply focused on Europe, as our connection is strong. And we would need to invent a status of "country in democratic transition" so that certain economic mechanisms could be set up. Even if economic cooperation between Europe and Tunisia has increased, there is a lack of qualitative contribution: no commitment on foreign direct investment, no help with visa facilitation or circulation of human capital. This makes it more difficult for a country in a period of democratic transition to make the difficult decisions that need to be made.

Copyright: FETHI BELAID / AFP