From Sarajevo to Mariupol: what the Yugoslav Wars can teach us about Ukraine’s fate

The same applied to Milošević, who consistently denied that Belgrade was involved in the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. Those who called the conflict in Ukraine a "civil war" were often the same people who applied this term to Bosnia, where it was just as inaccurate.

Parallels also exist when it comes to the scale of atrocities. Intellectuals, opponents and notable figures are the main targets, along with civilians trying to flee or obtain supplies; massive bombardments aim to terrorize and destroy entire cities; rapes and mass murders of civilians are being covered up. The strike on the Kramatorsk train station in Ukraine is reminiscent of the Markale shelling of 1994; in both cases, attempts have been made to deflect blame. Russians are trying to hide crimes with the help of forced displacements and mobile crematoria; in Serbia, victims’ remains were excavated and moved. Some already qualify Russian acts in Ukraine as genocidal. When it comes to Bosnia, of course, the international justice system has already used this term several times to describe the events in Srebrenica. 

The war

So what are the possible outcomes? On this point, too, the Yugoslav case is instructive. First of all, it is clear that the political outcome will be determined by the military balance of power on the ground. There are serious limits to the comparison between the Ukrainian war and the Dayton Agreement, and not only because the latter was secured through American assurances and the deployment of 100,000 NATO soldiers. More important to note is that the Dayton Agreement was made possible in the first place thanks to the Croatian counter-offensive, Operation Storm, in the summer/autumn of 1995. The Americans asked the Croats to stop before taking Banja Luka. In other words, while the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict may involve compromise regarding the Donbass territory (or even Crimea), the situation on the ground is not yet ripe for such an outcome, and there is no indication that it will ever be. Moreover, many Bosnian commentators warn that a Dayton-inspired resolution of the conflict would lead to an impasse. Finally, it must be considered that any territorial changes recognized by the UN would very likely have implications for sovereignty claims in the region and could lead to a wider reassessment of Balkan borders, starting with Bosnia and Kosovo.

There is another possible parallel: what if Ukrainians recapture the entire territory, as the Croatians did when they drove 200,000 Serbs from Croatia into exile? This scenario is unlikely, and can only come to pass if the West sets out to achieve total Russian defeat and a complete end to the massive displacement and crimes in Russian-held territories. If the Russians do get defeated, there is no guarantee that Putin will follow the same fate as Slobodan Milošević, who was defeated in the 2000 elections thanks to a revolution after he tried to rig the results of the FRY presidential election. Russian elections are set to be held in 2024, but under conditions that make the 2000 elections in Serbia look like the pinnacle of transparency. In truth, no one can seriously imagine that Vladimir Putin will one day answer for his crimes in The Hague.

The actors

The final dimension that needs to be addressed is the attitude of Western countries. This comparison has its limits, too. The current confrontation does not come with the differences of opinion provoked by Bosnia at the time, despite a quasi-romantic sympathy for Russia (and Serbia) as a "natural ally" in some parts of French society.

Twenty-seven years after Srebrenica, democracies are once again being asked what they are prepared to do in order to defend the values they promote. The Yugoslav Wars represented a dramatic contrast with the newfound peace enjoyed on the rest of the continent. Like Bosnia, Ukraine believes it is not simply fighting for its survival, but for a certain international order. Kyiv’s fear, like Sarajevo’s at the time, is that fatigue will set in among governments and populations as people become accustomed to the reports of mass graves and massacres.

If the war is to last, there is no doubt that more and more voices will be calling for a return to some form of normality with Russia. The debate on the effectiveness of sanctions is bound to intensify when they start to affect the entire Russian population. The choice to put pressure on the population is similar to the 1992 UN embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (for which Russia voted in favor while China abstained). The reasoning was that this would, at the very least, signal the international community’s disapproval and, at best, incite the Serbians to turn against Milošević. However, it is doubtful that these two objectives were achieved, even if the Serbs finally overthrew Milošević in October 2000 after a decade of economic and moral ruin. It is worth noting that Russian society is even more isolated from international political debate than Serbian society was at the time.

Conclusion

This series of parallels leads us to two conclusions.

The first relates to the objectives of our support for Ukraine. At this stage of the war, a total military defeat of Moscow is a reasonable objective, even without saying so openly. Russia will not stop if it is not stopped - monstrosities included - and, as argued above, the political outcome will be determined by the military situation. Total Russian defeat is the only way to exert influence on the conflict’s resolution, both to prevent revenge war crimes and massive displacement - in other words, to avoid the fate that the Sebrs of Croatia suffered in 1995 - and to avoid a Dayton-type compromise. The latter would not only imply that the course of events truly forced Kyiv’s hand; it would also be a temporary solution that could open the door to future conflicts, and therefore to other tragedies.

It is possible that NATO’s attitude in 1999, when Russian paratroopers took Pristina airport, is still fresh in Russia’s mind. When asked by the commander of NATO forces to take back the airport immediately, a British officer in charge of the local forces infamously replied, "General, I am not going to start the Third World War for you". If this memory is indeed guiding Russia’s calculations, it is important to change this perception by taking measured risks.

The second conclusion relates to the European Union’s policy in the contemporary Balkan region more broadly. A small-scale but Moscow-assisted revival of Serbian nationalism is already underway. Everything that happens in Ukraine will have a direct or indirect impact on this EU periphery. Beyond the fates of Ukraine and Moldova, the EU would be wise to urgently rethink its entire neighborhood policy.

COPYRIGHT: Anatolii STEPANOV / AFP