Quest for Autonomy: History, Geopolitics and Ideology in Turkish Foreign Policy

Later, the financial and economic crisis of the EU economically diminished its lure. The Arab spring of 2011 presented a geopolitical opening for the AKP government. Turkey became more assertive regionally. In the beginning, Ankara pursued this through the deployment of its soft power. Then, as the Syrian condition deteriorated and began to present a major national security threat, there was a swift turn to hard power. The dramatic decision by President Obama not to punish the Assad regime in August of 2013 after the use of chemical weapons was confirmation to Turkish security elites that they could not count on Washington. The latter further alienated Ankara as it allied with the Kurdish PYD/YPG, the Syrian branch of Turkey’s nemesis PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in the fight against the Islamic State. 

But arguably, the most critical turning point for Erdoğan, by then in full command of Turkey's politics, was the response of the allies on the night of the failed coup attempt in July 2016. Whatever the full story, the allies' reaction was inadequate and lacking in democratic solidarity. This lack of support at such a critical moment deeply embittered both the Turkish public and the government. The failed coup led to the declaration of a state of emergency, and soon the prosecution of the culprits was used as an opportunity to launch a comprehensive witch hunt. These developments further undermined the rule of law along with democratic institutions and practices in the country. 

Another consequence of the coup, during which President Putin expressed his solidarity and support for the Turkish President, was to direct Turkey to align itself with Russia with which it usually finds itself on opposite sides. This punctuated the beginning of their pas de deux. As Professor Evren Balta of Özyeğin University observed: "Arguably the most important problem in Turkey-Russia relations is the fact that the cooperation between the two countries has never been predicated upon common principles, institutions or even a short-term common vision. These two countries that do not trust one another and have different understandings of their interests and of the threats they face, can only manage to have a partnership if a third actor appears on stage that they both mistrust more than one another".

The purchase of the S-400 defensive air missile system from Russia was arguably a decision that was consistent with this quest for "autonomy". However, their procurement eventually led to Turkey's expulsion from the F-35 production network and cancellation of the delivery of the aircraft Turkey ordered that were to be the mainstay of its strategic doctrine and air defense in the coming era. The backlash to the decision to purchase the S-400s left Turkey vulnerable and isolated within NATO. Moreover, the move brought Ankara fury from the US Congress that forced the hand of President Trump to implement the CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) legislation against Turkey. Currently, Turkey awaits the approval of the US Congress to buy F-16 fighter jets and modernization kits for its existing fleet. 

The religiously driven ideological bent of Turkish foreign policy in recent years bears the unmistakable stamp of the ruling party and its leader whose heritage is anti-Western. But there is also an element of continuity in Turkey's foreign policy preferences since the end of the Cold War: the thread is the "quest for autonomy" and the desire to feature in world politics as a regional power. It is this underlying current that helps explain much of what Turkey does on the global stage today that appears contradictory and worrying to outside observers, and leads to the deepening estrangement between Ankara and its allies in the transatlantic community. 

Militarily, Ankara is a nearly impeccable ally and participant in NATO's military exercises and operations, despite the penchant of its President for frequently expressing his desire to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was founded to contain and counter NATO’s reach. But Turkey is also a frequent gadfly in political matters as its recent obstruction of the strategically critical admission of Sweden and Finland into the organization underscores. Turkey's skillful "balancing act" since the beginning of the war in Ukraine is one of those confusing moments for its allies. Ankara critically blocked Moscow's use of its navy fleet in the Black Sea by calling the invasion a "war." It invoked the Montreux Convention which enables it not to allow the passage of belligerent parties' battleships through Turkish straits. It does not recognize the annexation of Crimea, supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sustains Kyiv's war effort by supplying it with drones and other military material. At the same time, however, it keeps communication with Russia open, does not close its air space, does not join the sanctions regime, welcomes Russian refugees and oligarchs, and helps broker agreements. President Erdoğan can meet with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky almost at will and has a "special" relationship with the former whose assistance he needs and gets for domestic and foreign policy matters.    

A lost battle in the Middle East

For a while, the more Islamically-oriented AKP foreign policy and the nationalistic and decidedly anti-Western visions of secular nationalists merged to support policies backing Turkey's interests. A doctrine developed by secular nationalist officers (The Blue Homeland) justified Erdoğans' policies in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. This opening was also an attempt to break the quasi-encirclement of Turkey by a set of Eastern Mediterranean countries. They joined forces to counter Turkey's assertiveness and hardline policies, and in so doing, trampled upon its legitimate concerns. The rising importance of the Eastern Mediterranean's energy reserves and the competition to explore those added a new dimension to the already tense relations between Turkey and Cyprus, and through it, with Greece. Athens took advantage of Ankara's isolation in the region to forge close-knit relations with Egypt, the Gulf countries and Israel as well as France and the United States. 

In the end though, Turkey failed in its attempt to be a hegemonic power in the Middle East. After years of harshly condemning the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt and even Syria, efforts were made to rebuild bridges with these nations.

The "precious loneliness" of Turkey, a term coined by Presidential advisor İbrahim Kalın, turned out to be not so precious after all. The country's economic vulnerabilities, its chronic problem of governance and its self-inflicted solitude in the region made it imperative to mend fences. Reconciliation may work but Turkey will be in a much weaker position than when the bid for hegemony was launched. 

In almost all these issues the Turkish move was a response to a strategic void. The retrenchment of American power and its neglect of Turkish concerns led to the interventions in Syria. In the Eastern Mediterranean, although Turkey’s isolation was of its own doing, Turkey reacted to the moves of an adversarial bloc of countries by defiant military moves and heightened rhetoric but at the same time with an invitation to put all the interrelated matters (East Med. energy, Aegean issues with Greece, Cyprus, Libya) on the table for diplomatic bargaining. Ankara signed a military cooperation agreement with Tripoli that was being attacked by rebel forces (supported by UAE, Egypt, irregular Russian forces and France) and intervened militarily when no other country would come to that government’s help. 

Ultimately though, belligerent rhetoric notwithstanding Turkey refrained from a repeat of the summer of 2020 and let the waters calm. Even the recent escalation of a war of words with Greece is more likely to be for domestic consumption than a sign of genuine martial intent.

So, which direction to take?

Russia's invasion of Ukraine changed the global strategic landscape considerably and laid out the contours of an emerging world order that can be defined as asymmetric multipolarity. The European security structure that was predicated on taming Russia by commercially integrating it into European markets collapsed. A major war launched by a powerful authoritarian country against a smaller and weaker neighbor led Europeans to strongly respond with a series of sanctions. The gradual withdrawal of the US from Europe was halted; NATO emerged as the central organization of a soon-to-be rectified Atlantic Alliance and the larger systemic West that includes countries in Asia and Oceania. Russia will emerge considerably weakened and possibly destabilized out of this ordeal and will have to content itself to play second fiddle to a gradually more abrasive China. Caught off-guard by Putin's failure, China had to tread carefully so as to not fall on the wrong side of the Western sanctions regime.

A more striking feature of the post-Ukraine world order is that the West does not command as much authority as it used to. The so-called Global South convinced that we have entered a post-Occidental stage in world history, did not support the sanctions imposed on Russia. Many countries saw this not as a global affair but one that was limited to the EU theater. Collectively the Global South will be more assertive and some regional powers will have the ability to resist Western demands and follow their own proper agenda as most remarkably Saudi Arabia did during this crisis.

Turkey's geopolitical importance, the size of its economy and its institutional affiliations enable it to be a consequential actor in world politics and a force to be reckoned with. It will also benefit from the weakening of Russia, as the Black Sea will become less of an area of geopolitical pressure. The caveat is that these advantages need to be well managed, diplomacy must be consistent (and constructive) and the bellicose language must be dropped. Ankara should consider a model of relations with allies that is not just transactional and "short-termist" and recognize the importance of the collective interests of organizations it is a member of. Most importantly, the rulers of Turkey must recognize that membership in alliances does not preclude strategic autonomy. On the contrary, alliances may buttress sought-after strategic autonomy. In turn, Turkey's allies (particularly the Europeans) will have to fully appreciate its overall importance and make an effort to build a new, more egalitarian and imaginative relationship - not just with Ankara but with Turkish society as well.

Copyright image: Adem ALTAN / AFP