Libya - first lessons from Marshal Haftar's offensive on Tripoli

Secondly, the Marshal's adventure as post-Gaddafi Libyan warlord, after a difficult start in 2014-2015, had turned more and more successful in recent years. From its initial base in Benghazi, he succeeded in taking control of the oil crescent bordering the Gulf of Sirte in 2016. He then progressed inexorably, combining various forces, ranging from former soldiers of the Gaddafi era to the so-called "madkhalist" Salafists (whose inspirer, a Saudi sheikh, advocated "obedience to the governor" whoever he may be). The ANL now controls 70% of the country. It is clear that the Marshal thought that the balance of power allowed him to conquer Tripoli and establish his power all over Libya.

Will this bet succeed? For many observers, the answer is no. Haftar had relied on the rallying of a number of militias and tribal factions supposedly always ready to change side but in fact, the country's other major military force, the Misrata militias, came to the rescue of the Government of National Accord, which also found support in the armed groups ruling Tripoli (including Islamist groups not to be trusted). Some go as far as to say that a military failure in Tripoli could lead to the political fall of the Marshal. However, the most likely outcome remains an escalation of the conflict. An important factor will be external support - including arms supplies - for both sides.

It is said that he has just made a secret trip to Moscow; this is unsure, but it is certain that the Russians have had a sustained dialogue with him in recent years. On the other side, not surprisingly, we find, as elsewhere, Turkey and Qatar.

And then there are the Europeans. In Misrata, at the moment, demonstrators are marching in the streets denouncing France's aid to the putschist Marshal. Everyone knows that the French government supported the ANL a few years ago by sending special forces, even air strikes, when Marshal Haftar's troops destroyed pockets of jihadists who had established themselves in the south and east of the country. One of the Marshal's assets vis-à-vis Europeans is his ability to prevent the return of Libyans who left for Syria to join Daesh's ranks, as well as to prevent the departure of migrants to Europe. Although they often appeared to be in competition, the Italians and the French, through their mediations, helped to confer a sense of repute to the Marshal. Only the Germans - who had abstained on the resolution 1973 authorizing the intervention in 2011 - stand firm in their disapproval of Marshal Haftar. The British are trying to develop international action for a ceasefire.

On the surface, however, the international community remains united in its call for de-escalation and its support for UN mediation. From this point of view, we are still far from a "globalization of the conflict". Washington has very little interest in it for that matter. However, "weak signals" show the limits of the unity of the powers concerned: Egypt has not joined any common call; Russia did not want the ANL to be mentioned in a Security Council text in New York; among Europeans, there is strong suspicion that France's role is ambiguous. Very involved in the case, Mr. Le Drian was in Libya, where he met again Mr. Sarraj and also the Marshal, a few days before the offensive on Tripoli. In terms of image, French diplomacy is playing big in this affair: it has given the impression in recent years of compromising itself with a dictator's apprentice; this risky attitude can be justified if it gives it the means today to send convincing messages to Marshal Haftar to stop the fighting. This would be all the more important as, at a time when the latter is seeking to reclaim the role of the "strong man" indulged by foreign powers for his hostility towards Islamists, Algerians and Sudanese show that the desire to get rid of authoritarian regimes remains well alive in the region.

Copyright : Mahmud TURKIA / AFP