Iran - US: High Tensions Incoming

After some attempted resistance — including seeking arbitration by the National Security Council and the Supreme Leader himself — Mr. Rouhani's government decided to apply the law, in essence replicating the "tough" approach advocated by the Majles. 

This brings us to the third explanation for the Iranian decision, the one that ultimately really matters to outside actors: Iran has equipped itself with a powerful negotiating tool vis-à-vis Washington, with a "don’t mess with us" approach. Among other steps in the exit from the JCPOA, the law of December 3 provides for the establishment of a production capability for uranium metal — again accelerating the possibility of Iran’s access to a bomb. Above all it also provides for the non-application of the additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that is, mainly the reinforced inspection regime of the UN nuclear agency, without it being clear whether these various measures would take place during the two-month period or at the end of it. However, the Rouhani government has set February 19 — a few days before the deadline of February 25/26 — as the date by which it would assess the status of the lifting of sanctions. The end of January is therefore the window of opportunity for the new U.S. administration. One cannot exclude that the "tactical" move by Iran of accelerating its nuclear program becomes a "strategic" decisive action towards the bomb. 

What will the Biden administration do? Is there a chance that it will reach an agreement with Iran to reinstate the JCPOA? 

The clearest outcome of the Iranian approach is to saddle Washington with an ultimatum, in theory taking effect by the end of February, as mentioned above, thus only a few weeks after the inauguration of the new American administration. 

Was this the best way for the Iranians to establish a fruitful dialogue with the Biden team? Obviously not. The competition between "hardliners" and "moderates" was certainly at play in Tehran. However, it turns out that the Biden camp had in any case shown its willingness to move quickly in the process of returning the United States to the JCPOA. It could therefore make a move in application of its program while ignoring the Iranian ultimatum. The operation would certainly be more complex than the signing of two or three presidential decrees, as Mr. Zarif, the brilliant Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, would have us believe. However, one can indeed imagine that the new American president would, for instance, reinstate exceptions to the oil sanctions ("waivers") and allow certain financial flows with Iran to resume. Even if we would not immediately be in a "complete lifting of sanctions" scenario and a simple return to the situation of January 2017, it is hard to imagine how the Iranians could respond negatively to such an overture.

The only opening that can be noted from Tehran pertains to the possibility of a security dialogue between regional actors once the JCPOA is back on track. It would be helpful for the Americans to take up one topic after another. 

What’s the role of the other signatories of the agreement: Russians, Chinese, Europeans? 

Germany, France, and the United Kingdom all expressed their disapproval of the Iranian decision to move to 20% uranium enrichment. They have also urged Tehran to give up the idea of producing uranium metal. It is striking that Russia and China did not join them on those points. It seems that Russia and China’s only red line is the maintenance of the inspection apparatus, leaving ample room for Iran to intensify its nuclear program. 

One might have also thought that the Europeans would have taken visible initiatives to prepare some groundwork for the future American government during the transition period between the Trump and Biden administrations. This has not been the case. It must be said that they have every reason to be concerned about the attitude adopted by Iran: Iranian leaders repeat that the violations of the JCPOA that they have authorised are reversible. However, the know-how acquired by Iranian scientists, in the field of advanced centrifuge technology for example, cannot be erased. Even in the event of a return to the JCPOA by all parties, it is unlikely that the agreement reverts to what it once entailed, that is, a one-year "time break" (the length of time needed for Iran to obtain nuclear weapons). That’s why for instance, the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian is now sounding the alarm.

On the other hand, nothing proves that the "hardliners" are more attached to the nuclear program than other factions. Their priorities are likely elsewhere (e.g., particularly controlling Syria, missiles) and all Iranian leaders are aware of the state of economic and social decimation of their country. The Supreme Leader himself stated that the real way to "neutralize sanctions" resides in a national self-sufficiency program, though without denying, as a somewhat subsidiary (rhetorical) option, the benefits that a lifting of sanctions would present under certain conditions. 

But one should refrain from making recommendations to the new American government: the main leaders of the NSC (Mr. Sullivan), of the State Department (Mr. Blinken himself or Mrs. Sherman, his deputy) or finally of the CIA (Ambassador William Burns) were all very closely associated with the Obama era negotiations with Iran. They are all connoisseurs of the Iranian dossier, which in itself is a strong indication of the priority given to this issue by the Biden administration. It is worth noting that in 2019, Institut Montaigne hosted Jake Sullivan for a working lunch between experts devoted exclusively to the topic of Iran. 

Copyright : STR / afp