Towards Europeans, the concessions under consideration appear very limited. There is a non-specific prospect of more market opening, but "controlled", "layer after layer". One expert suggests cooperation in third countries and more greenfield investment in Europe.
More broadly, if WTO is so valuable to China, what kind of reform can it propose or accept in order to save the multilateral trading system? Its December 2018 position paper on WTO reform is defensive, centering on the importance of the developing country status. Our sources are clear on what China does not want, but remain cryptical about what it could live with. Logically, in this period of negotiations with the Trump administration, these sources also dismiss US threats to leave the WTO as empty rhetoric. There is an echo here of China’s boasts in the spring of 2018 that the US economy would suffer more than China from a trade war. The defense of the status quo at the WTO extends to pointing out the downside of a bilateral US-China trade deal. Indeed, large promises to buy from the US and to reduce the trade deficit with the US would violate WTO rules and hurt other trading partners, among them Europe.
In short, China will only participate in talks on WTO reform from a very conservative base line. We are reminded indirectly that China’s professions of multilateralism are often a thin veneer, beneath which its national interest and assessment of relative strength prevail. This is perhaps not surprising, but it is also an indication of how tough the global trading game is likely to remain in coming years.
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