Bataclan 6 Years On: The Attacks That Changed France

Over 10,000 soldiers and 4,500 law enforcement officers were then mobilized to secure sensitive sites on French soil. The operation became permanent in April 2016, and was reduced to 3,000 soldiers in March 2021. 

Abroad, then French President François Hollande decided to intensify efforts in the international coalition formed in 2014 against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which had claimed responsibility for the 2015 attacks. On November 15, France launched the biggest airstrike of Opération Chammal: 12 Rafale fighter bombers struck the Islamic State stronghold, Raqqa. In 2016, France engaged its artillery to support the takeover of Mosul. Similarly, Opération Barkhane, which began in 2014 to fight the spread of Islamist groups in the Sahel, is part of France’s effort to fight jihadist terrorism abroad. 

A New Normal

It is striking how the French population has adapted to these measures that were put in place following the 2015 attacks. It is for instance the case for some measures that used to be specific to the state of emergency, that went into force overnight from November 13-14, 2015. It ended two years later when President Emmanuel Macron replaced it with a strong anti-terror law that cemented a number of emergency measures, for example granting law enforcement agencies extended powers to search homes, close religious sites viewed as promoting radical ideas and restrict the movement of suspected jihadist sympathisers. This was met with complaints by human rights activists arguing that these measures encroach on civil liberties and discriminate against minorities, in particular Muslims, and triggered some debates within the political class. But the law was adopted at first reading by the Parliament and the wider population seemed to widely support it, according to polls conducted at the time. 

The population is also accustomed to the military operating on national soil, out of its traditional perimeter, and is asking for more: a poll conducted in March 2021 reveals that a significant part of the population (4 out of 10 respondents) called for a greater involvement of the army in the fight against the pandemic and the vaccination campaign. The 2015 attacks have even triggered an important increase in interest in the military among the population: according to the Army Recruitment Office, over 1,400 Internet users logged on to the sengager.fr ("enrol") website every day, in the week following November 13^th, compared with an average of 400. 

A New Response to a New Phenomenon

However, since 2015 and the shock of mass terror attacks, other challenges have emerged, thereby relativizing jihadism as a top priority. Firstly, the military is increasingly concerned with the return of military power worldwide, as shown by the military spending figures. In the context of the increasing likelihood of a major conflict between states, it is important to preserve a specific role for the military, which challenges the nature - or at least the scale - of domestic Opération Sentinelle. Similarly, intelligences services (both internal and external), although still very much dedicated to the fight against jihadist terrorism, are increasingly looking into the terrorist threat posed by violent groups from the far-Right and the far-Left. The same goes for the population, which is now more worried about climate change than terrorism, as a July 2021 poll shows.  

Ideological jihadism is based on a binary vision of society with the "good" Muslims (the salafists) on one side, and the rest (all other French people, including Muslims) on the other. They are motivated by the belief that French society is threatening, permissive and corrupt: the state, embodied by the police, is Islamophobic and dangerous. These individuals intend to impose their vision of Islam by force, but without necessarily committing violent acts - except in somes cases such as the two mentioned above. 

The threat is endogenous, so the response should adapt accordingly. The security approach is no longer sufficient and needs to be coupled with prevention measures. It is imperative to prevent radicalization by ensuring that the second generation of French Muslims, who compose the majority of individuals who were recruited by the Islamic State, feel fully integrated into the nation. First, the State must work hand-in-hand with the Muslims and civil society to promote, particularly on social media, an alternative vision of Islam, one that is compatible with the identity and values of the French Republic. It should also encourage better training for imams, finance research about Islam, and intervene in prisons (among the 1,300 radicalized individuals in France, 250 became so in a prison environment), for example by allowing Arabic or Quran reading classes. Finally, the State must help set up a financing system for French Islam, through the establishment of a tax on economic activities related to Islam (halal food, Mecca pilgrimage). 

This evolution in the response to an increasingly endogenous phenomenon is particularly pressing as the campaign for the 2022 presidential election is starting, and the narrative of likely candidate Eric Zemmour risks reinforcing the feeling among potential jihadists of an Islamophobic France. 

Authored with the help of Assistant Policy Officer, Maud Lelou. 

Copyright: Benoit PEYRUCQ / AFP