AUKUS: Can the Franco-American Relationship Be Repaired?

During the transition period between both US administrations, Paris supported the EU-China investment agreement (end of December 2020), which Merkel wanted. Other signals have generated, whether rightly or wrongly, a sense of Franco-German ambiguity on how to respond to the China challenge. The after-effects have been felt since spring 2021, not without paradox. Biden has sought to spare Germany (inviting the Chancellor to Washington, compromising on the German-Russian Nord Stream 2 pipeline); he has chosen to call Boris Johnson's Great Britain back for a retake, given its conversion to a hard line with respect to Beijing; he has paid only superficial attention to the EU and France. The French have all the more reason to feel frustrated because they are less inclined than other Europeans to be complacent towards Beijing, and because their Indo-Pacific strategy was generally aimed at strengthening the defense capacity of states threatened by China.

A third reason for our discontent - if we refer to the 2003 precedent - is that only a frank clarification can restore confidence in Franco-American cooperation.

It is up to Washington to fix the damage. In the discussions that will begin between the French and the Americans, the latter would be well advised to explore two avenues. First, an effective implementation of a consultation mechanism between Europe and the United States, more robust than the one agreed upon during Biden's meeting with Brussels leaders in June, possibly backed by a transatlantic charter for the 21^st century between the EU and America. Second, and perhaps most importantly, a deal that ensures strategic coordination in the Indo-Pacific, with at least a guarantee that the interests of European allies engaged in the area will not be undermined. This must apply first and foremost to France, which rightly claims the status of an Indo-Pacific power.

Would the French reject such advances? There are currently numerous talks in Paris about the idea of a "return to the Gaullist roots". Let us be Gaullian, of course, but let us also be fully aware of the strategic moment in which we happen to be in. General de Gaulle waited until the Cold War had entered a phase of relaxation (1966) to really distance himself from NATO and America. Today, however, we are in a period of intense polarization between China and the West. This is perhaps the main lesson of the painful episode of the Australian submarines.

The original text in French was published in Le Monde on September 21, 2021. 
 

Copyright: Ludovic MARIN / AFP